Maria Osório

2papers

2 Papers

NEJul 20, 2022
Can a Hebbian-like learning rule be avoiding the curse of dimensionality in sparse distributed data?

Maria Osório, Luís Sa-Couto, Andreas Wichert

It is generally assumed that the brain uses something akin to sparse distributed representations. These representations, however, are high-dimensional and consequently they affect classification performance of traditional Machine Learning models due to "the curse of dimensionality". In tasks for which there is a vast amount of labeled data, Deep Networks seem to solve this issue with many layers and a non-Hebbian backpropagation algorithm. The brain, however, seems to be able to solve the problem with few layers. In this work, we hypothesize that this happens by using Hebbian learning. Actually, the Hebbian-like learning rule of Restricted Boltzmann Machines learns the input patterns asymmetrically. It exclusively learns the correlation between non-zero values and ignores the zeros, which represent the vast majority of the input dimensionality. By ignoring the zeros "the curse of dimensionality" problem can be avoided. To test our hypothesis, we generated several sparse datasets and compared the performance of a Restricted Boltzmann Machine classifier with some Backprop-trained networks. The experiments using these codes confirm our initial intuition as the Restricted Boltzmann Machine shows a good generalization performance, while the Neural Networks trained with the backpropagation algorithm overfit the training data.

7.2LOMay 4
Bilateralism with incompatible proofs and refutations

Victor Barroso-Nascimento, Maria Osório, Elaine Pimentel

Logical bilateralism challenges traditional concepts of logic by treating assertion and denial as independent yet opposed acts. While initially devised to justify classical logic, its constructive variants show that both acts admit intuitionistic interpretations. This paper presents a bilateral system where a formula cannot be both provable and refutable without contradiction, offering a framework for modelling epistemic entities, such as mathematical proofs and refutations, that exclude inconsistency. The logic is formalised through a bilateral natural deduction system with desirable proof-theoretic properties, including normalisation. We also introduce a base-extension semantics requiring explicit constructions of proofs and refutations while preventing them from being established for the same formula. The semantics is proven sound and complete with respect to the calculus. Finally, we show that our notion of refutation corresponds to David Nelson's constructive falsity, extending rather than revising intuitionistic logic and reinforcing the system's suitability for representing constructive epistemic reasoning.