CVJul 8, 2022
Video Dialog as Conversation about Objects Living in Space-TimeHoang-Anh Pham, Thao Minh Le, Vuong Le et al.
It would be a technological feat to be able to create a system that can hold a meaningful conversation with humans about what they watch. A setup toward that goal is presented as a video dialog task, where the system is asked to generate natural utterances in response to a question in an ongoing dialog. The task poses great visual, linguistic, and reasoning challenges that cannot be easily overcome without an appropriate representation scheme over video and dialog that supports high-level reasoning. To tackle these challenges we present a new object-centric framework for video dialog that supports neural reasoning dubbed COST - which stands for Conversation about Objects in Space-Time. Here dynamic space-time visual content in videos is first parsed into object trajectories. Given this video abstraction, COST maintains and tracks object-associated dialog states, which are updated upon receiving new questions. Object interactions are dynamically and conditionally inferred for each question, and these serve as the basis for relational reasoning among them. COST also maintains a history of previous answers, and this allows retrieval of relevant object-centric information to enrich the answer forming process. Language production then proceeds in a step-wise manner, taking into the context of the current utterance, the existing dialog, the current question. We evaluate COST on the DSTC7 and DSTC8 benchmarks, demonstrating its competitiveness against state-of-the-arts.
GTJan 29, 2021
FedChain: Secure Proof-of-Stake-based Framework for Federated-blockchain SystemsCong T. Nguyen, Dinh Thai Hoang, Diep N. Nguyen et al.
In this paper, we propose FedChain, a novel framework for federated-blockchain systems, to enable effective transferring of tokens between different blockchain networks. Particularly, we first introduce a federated-blockchain system together with a cross-chain transfer protocol to facilitate the secure and decentralized transfer of tokens between chains. We then develop a novel PoS-based consensus mechanism for FedChain, which can satisfy strict security requirements, prevent various blockchain-specific attacks, and achieve a more desirable performance compared to those of other existing consensus mechanisms. Moreover, a Stackelberg game model is developed to examine and address the problem of centralization in the FedChain system. Furthermore, the game model can enhance the security and performance of FedChain. By analyzing interactions between the stakeholders and chain operators, we can prove the uniqueness of the Stackelberg equilibrium and find the exact formula for this equilibrium. These results are especially important for the stakeholders to determine their best investment strategies and for the chain operators to design the optimal policy to maximize their benefits and security protection for FedChain. Simulations results then clearly show that the FedChain framework can help stakeholders to maximize their profits and the chain operators to design appropriate parameters to enhance FedChain's security and performance.
CRMay 10, 2020
BlockRoam: Blockchain-based Roaming Management System for Future Mobile NetworksCong T. Nguyen, Diep N. Nguyen, Dinh Thai Hoang et al.
Mobile service providers (MSPs) are particularly vulnerable to roaming frauds, especially ones that exploit the long delay in the data exchange process of the contemporary roaming management systems, causing multi-billion dollars loss each year. In this paper, we introduce BlockRoam, a novel blockchain-based roaming management system that provides an efficient data exchange platform among MSPs and mobile subscribers. Utilizing the Proof-of-Stake (PoS) consensus mechanism and smart contracts, BlockRoam can significantly shorten the information exchanging delay, thereby addressing the roaming fraud problems. Through intensive analysis, we show that the security and performance of such PoS-based blockchain network can be further enhanced by incentivizing more users (e.g., subscribers) to participate in the network. Moreover, users in such networks often join stake pools (e.g., formed by MSPs) to increase their profits. Therefore, we develop an economic model based on Stackelberg game to jointly maximize the profits of the network users and the stake pool, thereby encouraging user participation. We also propose an effective method to guarantee the uniqueness of this game's equilibrium. The performance evaluations show that the proposed economic model helps the MSPs to earn additional profits, attracts more investment to the blockchain network, and enhances the network's security and performance.