Jason R. Brown

Akshat Naik, Patrick Quinn, Guillermo Bosch et al.

As Large Language Model (LLM) agents become more widespread, associated misalignment risks increase. While prior research has studied agents' ability to produce harmful outputs or follow malicious instructions, it remains unclear how likely agents are to spontaneously pursue unintended goals in realistic deployments. In this work, we approach misalignment as a conflict between the internal goals pursued by the model and the goals intended by its deployer. We introduce a misalignment propensity benchmark, \textsc{AgentMisalignment}, a benchmark suite designed to evaluate the propensity of LLM agents to misalign in realistic scenarios. Evaluations cover behaviours such as avoiding oversight, resisting shutdown, sandbagging, and power-seeking. Testing frontier models, we find that more capable agents tend to exhibit higher misalignment on average. We also systematically vary agent personalities through different system prompts and observe that persona characteristics can strongly and unpredictably influence misalignment, sometimes more than the choice of model itself. Our results reveal the limitations of current alignment methods for autonomous LLM agents and underscore the need to rethink misalignment in realistic deployment settings.

Rishane Dassanayake, Mario Demetroudi, James Walpole et al.

Frontier AI systems are rapidly advancing in their capabilities to persuade, deceive, and influence human behaviour, with current models already demonstrating human-level persuasion and strategic deception in specific contexts. Humans are often the weakest link in cybersecurity systems, and a misaligned AI system deployed internally within a frontier company may seek to undermine human oversight by manipulating employees. Despite this growing threat, manipulation attacks have received little attention, and no systematic framework exists for assessing and mitigating these risks. To address this, we provide a detailed explanation of why manipulation attacks are a significant threat and could lead to catastrophic outcomes. Additionally, we present a safety case framework for manipulation risk, structured around three core lines of argument: inability, control, and trustworthiness. For each argument, we specify evidence requirements, evaluation methodologies, and implementation considerations for direct application by AI companies. This paper provides the first systematic methodology for integrating manipulation risk into AI safety governance, offering AI companies a concrete foundation to assess and mitigate these threats before deployment.