Qian Chen

Jorge Castillo, Phillip Rieger, Hossein Fereidooni et al.

Federated learning (FL) is a distributed learning process that uses a trusted aggregation server to allow multiple parties (or clients) to collaboratively train a machine learning model without having them share their private data. Recent research, however, has demonstrated the effectiveness of inference and poisoning attacks on FL. Mitigating both attacks simultaneously is very challenging. State-of-the-art solutions have proposed the use of poisoning defenses with Secure Multi-Party Computation (SMPC) and/or Differential Privacy (DP). However, these techniques are not efficient and fail to address the malicious intent behind the attacks, i.e., adversaries (curious servers and/or compromised clients) seek to exploit a system for monetization purposes. To overcome these limitations, we present a ledger-based FL framework known as FLEDGE that allows making parties accountable for their behavior and achieve reasonable efficiency for mitigating inference and poisoning attacks. Our solution leverages crypto-currency to increase party accountability by penalizing malicious behavior and rewarding benign conduct. We conduct an extensive evaluation on four public datasets: Reddit, MNIST, Fashion-MNIST, and CIFAR-10. Our experimental results demonstrate that (1) FLEDGE provides strong privacy guarantees for model updates without sacrificing model utility; (2) FLEDGE can successfully mitigate different poisoning attacks without degrading the performance of the global model; and (3) FLEDGE offers unique reward mechanisms to promote benign behavior during model training and/or model aggregation.

Xiao-Yang Liu, Hongyang Yang, Qian Chen et al.

As deep reinforcement learning (DRL) has been recognized as an effective approach in quantitative finance, getting hands-on experiences is attractive to beginners. However, to train a practical DRL trading agent that decides where to trade, at what price, and what quantity involves error-prone and arduous development and debugging. In this paper, we introduce a DRL library FinRL that facilitates beginners to expose themselves to quantitative finance and to develop their own stock trading strategies. Along with easily-reproducible tutorials, FinRL library allows users to streamline their own developments and to compare with existing schemes easily. Within FinRL, virtual environments are configured with stock market datasets, trading agents are trained with neural networks, and extensive backtesting is analyzed via trading performance. Moreover, it incorporates important trading constraints such as transaction cost, market liquidity and the investor's degree of risk-aversion. FinRL is featured with completeness, hands-on tutorial and reproducibility that favors beginners: (i) at multiple levels of time granularity, FinRL simulates trading environments across various stock markets, including NASDAQ-100, DJIA, S&P 500, HSI, SSE 50, and CSI 300; (ii) organized in a layered architecture with modular structure, FinRL provides fine-tuned state-of-the-art DRL algorithms (DQN, DDPG, PPO, SAC, A2C, TD3, etc.), commonly-used reward functions and standard evaluation baselines to alleviate the debugging workloads and promote the reproducibility, and (iii) being highly extendable, FinRL reserves a complete set of user-import interfaces. Furthermore, we incorporated three application demonstrations, namely single stock trading, multiple stock trading, and portfolio allocation. The FinRL library will be available on Github at link https://github.com/AI4Finance-LLC/FinRL-Library.

Jinwoo Ahn, Donggyu Park, Chang-Gyu Lee et al.

Traditional techniques to prevent damage from ransomware attacks are to detect and block attacks by monitoring the known behaviors such as frequent name changes, recurring access to cryptographic libraries and exchange keys with remote servers. Unfortunately, intelligent ransomware can easily bypass these techniques. Another prevention technique is to recover from the backup copy when a file is infected with ransomware. However, the data backup technique requires extra storage space and can be removed with ransomware. In this paper, we propose to implement an access control mechanism on a disk drive, called a KEY-SSD disk drive. KEY-SSD is the data store and the last barrier to data protection. Unauthorized applications will not be able to read file data even if they bypass the file system defense, thus denying the block request without knowing the disk's registered block key and completely eliminating the possibility of the file becoming hostage to ransomware. We have prototyped KEY-SSD and validated the usefulness of KEY-SSD by demonstrating 1) selective block access control, 2) unauthorized data access blocking and 3) negligible performance overhead. Our comprehensive evaluation of KEY-SSD for various workloads show the KEY-SSD performance is hardly degraded due to OS lightweight key transmission and access control drive optimization. We also confirmed that KEY-SSD successfully protects the files in the actual ransomware sample.