Jiajun Gu

Weizhao Jin, Yuhang Yao, Shanshan Han et al.

Federated Learning trains machine learning models on distributed devices by aggregating local model updates instead of local data. However, privacy concerns arise as the aggregated local models on the server may reveal sensitive personal information by inversion attacks. Privacy-preserving methods, such as homomorphic encryption (HE), then become necessary for FL training. Despite HE's privacy advantages, its applications suffer from impractical overheads, especially for foundation models. In this paper, we present FedML-HE, the first practical federated learning system with efficient HE-based secure model aggregation. FedML-HE proposes to selectively encrypt sensitive parameters, significantly reducing both computation and communication overheads during training while providing customizable privacy preservation. Our optimized system demonstrates considerable overhead reduction, particularly for large foundation models (e.g., ~10x reduction for ResNet-50, and up to ~40x reduction for BERT), demonstrating the potential for scalable HE-based FL deployment.

Jiajun Gu, Yuhang Yao, Shuaiqi Wang et al.

Gradient inversion attacks pose significant privacy threats to distributed training frameworks such as federated learning, enabling malicious parties to reconstruct sensitive local training data from gradient communications between clients and an aggregation server during the aggregation process. While traditional encryption-based defenses, such as homomorphic encryption, offer strong privacy guarantees without compromising model utility, they often incur prohibitive computational overheads. To mitigate this, selective encryption has emerged as a promising approach, encrypting only a subset of gradient data based on the data's significance under a certain metric. However, there have been few systematic studies on how to specify this metric in practice. This paper systematically evaluates selective encryption methods with different significance metrics against state-of-the-art attacks. Our findings demonstrate the feasibility of selective encryption in reducing computational overhead while maintaining resilience against attacks. We propose a distance-based significance analysis framework that provides theoretical foundations for selecting critical gradient elements for encryption. Through extensive experiments on different model architectures (LeNet, CNN, BERT, GPT-2) and attack types, we identify gradient magnitude as a generally effective metric for protection against optimization-based gradient inversions. However, we also observe that no single selective encryption strategy is universally optimal across all attack scenarios, and we provide guidelines for choosing appropriate strategies for different model architectures and privacy requirements.