Sergiu Hart

TH
5papers
131citations
Novelty45%
AI Score41

5 Papers

THOct 13, 2022
Forecast Hedging and Calibration

Dean P. Foster, Sergiu Hart · amazon-science

Calibration means that forecasts and average realized frequencies are close. We develop the concept of forecast hedging, which consists of choosing the forecasts so as to guarantee that the expected track record can only improve. This yields all the calibration results by the same simple basic argument while differentiating between them by the forecast-hedging tools used: deterministic and fixed point based versus stochastic and minimax based. Additional contributions are an improved definition of continuous calibration, ensuing game dynamics that yield Nash equilibria in the long run, and a new calibrated forecasting procedure for binary events that is simpler than all known such procedures.

THOct 13, 2022
Smooth Calibration, Leaky Forecasts, Finite Recall, and Nash Dynamics

Dean P. Foster, Sergiu Hart · amazon-science

We propose to smooth out the calibration score, which measures how good a forecaster is, by combining nearby forecasts. While regular calibration can be guaranteed only by randomized forecasting procedures, we show that smooth calibration can be guaranteed by deterministic procedures. As a consequence, it does not matter if the forecasts are leaked, i.e., made known in advance: smooth calibration can nevertheless be guaranteed (while regular calibration cannot). Moreover, our procedure has finite recall, is stationary, and all forecasts lie on a finite grid. To construct the procedure, we deal also with the related setups of online linear regression and weak calibration. Finally, we show that smooth calibration yields uncoupled finite-memory dynamics in n-person games "smooth calibrated learning" in which the players play approximate Nash equilibria in almost all periods (by contrast, calibrated learning, which uses regular calibration, yields only that the time-averages of play are approximate correlated equilibria).

THSep 11, 2022
"Calibeating": Beating Forecasters at Their Own Game

Dean P. Foster, Sergiu Hart · amazon-science

In order to identify expertise, forecasters should not be tested by their calibration score, which can always be made arbitrarily small, but rather by their Brier score. The Brier score is the sum of the calibration score and the refinement score; the latter measures how good the sorting into bins with the same forecast is, and thus attests to "expertise." This raises the question of whether one can gain calibration without losing expertise, which we refer to as "calibeating." We provide an easy way to calibeat any forecast, by a deterministic online procedure. We moreover show that calibeating can be achieved by a stochastic procedure that is itself calibrated, and then extend the results to simultaneously calibeating multiple procedures, and to deterministic procedures that are continuously calibrated.

THSep 13, 2022
Calibrated Forecasts: The Minimax Proof

Sergiu Hart

A formal write-up of the simple proof (1995) of the existence of calibrated forecasts by the minimax theorem, which moreover shows that $N^3$ periods suffice to guarantee a calibration error of at most $1/N$.

90.9THMay 26
Proper Calibeating

Dean P. Foster, Sergiu Hart

The classic concept of "calibrated forecasts" and its more recent refinement, "calibeating," are defined with respect to the standard quadratic scoring rule. We extend these notions to the class of $\textit{proper}$ scoring rules (for which the best forecast is the true distribution) and define $\textit{proper-calibration}$ and $\textit{proper-calibeating}$ by requiring the errors to converge to zero uniformly over all bounded proper scoring rules. We first establish that calibration always implies proper-calibration, whereas calibeating need not imply proper-calibeating. Second, we show how to guarantee proper-calibeating and proper-multicalibeating. Finally, we demonstrate the equivalence between proper-calibration and universal no regret when best replying to forecasts in decision-making under uncertainty.