Dhinakaran Vinayagamurthy

Anupama Ray, Sai Sakunthala Guddanti, Vishnu Ajith et al.

Ethereum is one of the most valuable blockchain networks in terms of the total monetary value locked in it, and arguably been the most active network where new blockchain innovations in research and applications are demonstrated. But, this also leads to Ethereum network being susceptible to a wide variety of threats and attacks in an attempt to gain unreasonable advantage or to undermine the value of the users. Even with the state-of-art classical ML algorithms, detecting such attacks is still hard. This motivated us to build a hybrid system of quantum-classical algorithms that improves phishing detection in financial transaction networks. This paper presents a classical ensemble pipeline of classical and quantum algorithms and a detailed study benchmarking existing Quantum Machine Learning algorithms such as Quantum Support Vector Machine and Variational Quantum Classifier. With the current generation of quantum hardware available, smaller datasets are more suited to the QML models and most research restricts to hundreds of samples. However, we experimented on different data sizes and report results with a test data of 12K transaction nodes, which is to the best of the authors knowledge the largest QML experiment run so far on any real quantum hardware. The classical ensembles of quantum-classical models improved the macro F-score and phishing F-score. One key observation is QSVM constantly gives lower false positives, thereby higher precision compared with any other classical or quantum network, which is always preferred for any anomaly detection problem. This is true for QSVMs when used individually or via bagging of same models or in combination with other classical/quantum models making it the most advantageous quantum algorithm so far. The proposed ensemble framework is generic and can be applied for any classification task

Krishnasuri Narayanam, Venkatraman Ramakrishna, Dhinakaran Vinayagamurthy et al.

A core enabler for blockchain or DLT interoperability is the ability to atomically exchange assets held by mutually untrusting owners on different ledgers. This atomic swap problem has been well-studied, with the Hash Time Locked Contract (HTLC) emerging as a canonical solution. HTLC ensures atomicity of exchange, albeit with caveats for node failure and timeliness of claims. But a bigger limitation of HTLC is that it only applies to a model consisting of two adversarial parties having sole ownership of a single asset in each ledger. Realistic extensions of the model in which assets may be jointly owned by multiple parties, all of whose consents are required for exchanges, or where multiple assets must be exchanged for one, are susceptible to collusion attacks and hence cannot be handled by HTLC. In this paper, we generalize the model of asset exchanges across DLT networks and present a taxonomy of use cases, describe the threat model, and propose MPHTLC, an augmented HTLC protocol for atomic multi-owner-and-asset exchanges. We analyze the correctness, safety, and application scope of MPHTLC. As proof-of-concept, we show how MPHTLC primitives can be implemented in networks built on Hyperledger Fabric and Corda, and how MPHTLC can be implemented in the Hyperledger Labs Weaver framework by augmenting its existing HTLC protocol.

Kavya Govindarajan, Dhinakaran Vinayagamurthy, Praveen Jayachandran et al.

Decentralized exchange markets leveraging blockchain have been proposed recently to provide open and equal access to traders, improve transparency and reduce systemic risk of centralized exchanges. However, they compromise on the privacy of traders with respect to their asset ownership, account balance, order details and their identity. In this paper, we present Rialto, a fully decentralized privacy-preserving exchange marketplace with support for matching trade orders, on-chain settlement and market price discovery. Rialto provides confidentiality of order rates and account balances and unlinkability between traders and their trade orders, while retaining the desirable properties of a traditional marketplace like front-running resilience and market fairness. We define formal security notions and present a security analysis of the marketplace. We perform a detailed evaluation of our solution, demonstrate that it scales well and is suitable for a large class of goods and financial instruments traded in modern exchange markets.

Dushyant Behl, Palanivel Kodeswaran, Venkatraman Ramakrishna et al.

Private blockchain networks are used by enterprises to manage decentralized processes without trusted mediators and without exposing their assets publicly on an open network like Ethereum. Yet external parties that cannot join such networks may have a compelling need to be informed about certain data items on their shared ledgers along with certifications of data authenticity; e.g., a mortgage bank may need to know about the sale of a mortgaged property from a network managing property deeds. These parties are willing to compensate the networks in exchange for privately sharing information with proof of authenticity and authorization for external use. We have devised a novel and cryptographically secure protocol to effect a fair exchange between rational network members and information recipients using a public blockchain and atomic swap techniques. Using our protocol, any member of a private blockchain can atomically reveal private blockchain data with proofs in exchange for a monetary reward to an external party if and only if the external party is a valid recipient. The protocol preserves confidentiality of data for the recipient, and in addition, allows it to mount a challenge if the data turns out to be inauthentic. We also formally analyze the security and privacy of this protocol, which can be used in a wide array of practical scenarios

Alexey Gribov, Dhinakaran Vinayagamurthy, Sergey Gorbunov

Encrypted database systems provide a great method for protecting sensitive data in untrusted infrastructures. These systems are built using either special-purpose cryptographic algorithms that support operations over encrypted data, or by leveraging trusted computing co-processors. Strong cryptographic algorithms (e.g., public-key encryptions, garbled circuits) usually result in high performance overheads, while weaker algorithms (e.g., order-preserving encryption) result in large leakage profiles. On the other hand, some encrypted database systems (e.g., Cipherbase, TrustedDB) leverage non-standard trusted computing devices, and are designed to work around the architectural limitations of the specific devices used. In this work we build StealthDB - an encrypted database system from Intel SGX. Our system can run on any newer generation Intel CPU. StealthDB has a very small trusted computing base, scales to large transactional workloads, requires minor DBMS changes, and provides a relatively strong security guarantees at steady state and during query execution. Our prototype on top of Postgres supports the full TPC-C benchmark with a 30% decrease in the average throughput over an unmodified version of Postgres operating on a 2GB unencrypted dataset.