Mauro Salazar

Giacomo Ganassoli, Francesco Mazzeo, Cecilia Pasquale et al.

To date, most of the research on transport planning has focused on optimizing revenues or utilitarian metrics such as average travel times, which often ends up penalizing the worst-off for the sake of profit or efficiency. At the same time, most of the research in transport justice has focused on assessing injustices, without being able to prescribe operational solutions. This paper contributes to bridging this gap and presents optimization models for justice-informed operational planning of intermodal mobility systems that explicitly account for the budget and safety limitations of users, and for infrastructural capacity constraints. Specifically, we first focus on an intermodal Autonomous Mobility-on-Demand (AMoD) system -- where self-driving robotaxis provide on-demand mobility jointly with public transit and active modes -- and characterize its operations from a mesoscopic planning perspective via network flow models. Second, we leverage these models to optimize system operations through both utilitarian efficiency and justice-informed objectives. We showcase our framework in a real-world case-study for Manhattan, New York. Our results show that monetary budgets significantly limit the social justice potential of AMoD systems if they are to be deployed as transportation network companies. At the same time, granting free public transit can result in sufficiency levels very close to a completely free intermodal AMoD system, where justice-informed operations can be achieved without compromising standard efficiency metrics, ultimately highlighting the strong potential of social policies.

David van de Sanden, Maarten Schoukens, Mauro Salazar

Mobility systems often suffer from a high price of anarchy due to the uncontrolled behavior of selfish users. This may result in societal costs that are significantly higher compared to what could be achieved by a centralized system-optimal controller. Monetary tolling schemes can effectively align the behavior of selfish users with the system-optimum. Yet, they inevitably discriminate the population in terms of income. Artificial currencies were recently presented as an effective alternative that can achieve the same performance, whilst guaranteeing fairness among the population. However, those studies were based on behavioral models that may differ from practical implementations. This paper presents a data-driven approach to automatically adapt artificial-currency tolls within repetitive-game settings. We first consider a parallel-arc setting whereby users commute on a daily basis from an individual origin to an individual destination, choosing a route in exchange of an artificial-currency price or reward, while accounting for the impact of the choices of the other users on travel discomfort. Second, we devise a model-based reinforcement learning controller that autonomously learns the optimal pricing policy by interacting with the proposed framework considering the closeness of the observed aggregate flows to a desired system-optimal distribution as a reward function. Our numerical results show that the proposed data-driven pricing scheme can effectively align the users' flows with the system optimum, significantly reducing the societal costs with respect to the uncontrolled flows (by about 15% and 25% depending on the scenario), and respond to environmental changes in a robust and efficient manner.

Leonardo Pedroso, Andrea Agazzi, W. P. M. H. Heemels et al.

Self-interested behavior in sharing economies often leads to inefficient aggregate outcomes compared to a centrally coordinated allocation, ultimately harming users. Yet, centralized coordination removes individual decision power. This issue can be addressed by designing rules that align individual preferences with system-level objectives. Unfortunately, rules based on conventional monetary mechanisms introduce unfairness by discriminating among users based on their wealth. To solve this problem, in this paper, we propose a token-based mechanism for congestion games that achieves efficient and fair dynamic resource allocation. Specifically, we model the token economy as a continuous-time dynamic game with finitely many boundedly rational agents, explicitly capturing their evolutionary policy-revision dynamics. We derive a mean-field approximation of the finite-population game and establish strong approximation guarantees between the mean-field and the finite-population games. This approximation enables the design of integer tolls in closed form that provably steer the aggregate dynamics toward an optimal efficient and fair allocation from any initial condition.

Juan Pablo Bertucci, Mauro Salazar, Theo Hofman

As zero-emission zones emerge in European cities, fleet operators are shifting to electric vehicles. To maintain their current operations, a clear understanding of the charging infrastructure required and its relationship to existing power grid limitations is needed. This study presents an optimization frame-work for jointly designing charging infrastructure and schedules within a logistics distribution network, validated through agent-based simulations. We formulate the problem as a mixed-integer linear program and develop an agent-based model to evaluate various designs and operations under stochastic conditions. Our experiments compare rule-based and optimized strategies in a case study of the Netherlands. Results show that current commercial solutions suffice for middle-mile logistics, with central co-design yielding average cost reductions of 5.2% to 6.4% and an average 20.1% decrease in total installed power. While rule-based control effectively manages charging operations and mitigates delays, optimizing charge scheduling significantly reduces queuing times (99%), charging costs (13.5%), and time spent near capacity (10.9%). Our optimization-simulation framework paves the way for combining optimized infrastructure planning and realistic fleet operations in digital-twin environments.

Wytze de Vries, Erik van den Eshof, Jorn van Kampen et al.

Electric endurance racing is characterized by severe energy constraints and strong aerodynamic interactions. Determining race-winning policies therefore becomes a fundamentally multi-agent, game-theoretic problem. These policies must jointly govern low-level driver inputs as well as high-level strategic decisions, including energy management and charging. This paper proposes a bi-level framework for competitor-aware race management that combines game-theoretic optimal control with reinforcement learning. At the lower level, a multi-agent game-theoretic optimal control problem is solved to capture aerodynamic effects and asymmetric collision-avoidance constraints inspired by motorsport rules. Using this single-lap problem as the environment, reinforcement learning agents are trained to allocate battery energy and schedule pit stops over an entire race. The framework is demonstrated in a two-agent, 45-lap simulated race. The results show that effective exploitation of aerodynamic interactions is decisive for race outcome, with strategies that prioritize finishing position differing fundamentally from single-agent, minimum-time approaches.

Juan Pablo Bertucci, Theo Hofman, Mauro Salazar

Electrification of marine transport is a promising solution to reduce sector greenhouse gas emissions and operational costs. However, the large upfront cost of electric vessels and the required charging infrastructure can be a barrier to the development of this technology. Optimization algorithms that jointly design the charging infrastructure and the operation of electric vessels can help to reduce these costs and make these projects viable. In this paper, we present a mixed-integer linear programming optimization framework that jointly schedules ferry operations, charging infrastructure and ship battery size. We analyze our algorithms with the case of the China Zorrilla, the largest electric ferry in the world, which will operate between Buenos Aires and Colonia del Sacramento in 2025. We find that the joint system and operations design can reduce the total costs by 7.8\% compared to a scenario with fixed power limits and no port energy management system.

Justin Luke, Mauro Salazar, Ram Rajagopal et al.

Charging infrastructure is the coupling link between power and transportation networks, thus determining charging station siting is necessary for planning of power and transportation systems. While previous works have either optimized for charging station siting given historic travel behavior, or optimized fleet routing and charging given an assumed placement of the stations, this paper introduces a linear program that optimizes for station siting and macroscopic fleet operations in a joint fashion. Given an electricity retail rate and a set of travel demand requests, the optimization minimizes total cost for an autonomous EV fleet comprising of travel costs, station procurement costs, fleet procurement costs, and electricity costs, including demand charges. Specifically, the optimization returns the number of charging plugs for each charging rate (e.g., Level 2, DC fast charging) at each candidate location, as well as the optimal routing and charging of the fleet. From a case-study of an electric vehicle fleet operating in San Francisco, our results show that, albeit with range limitations, small EVs with low procurement costs and high energy efficiencies are the most cost-effective in terms of total ownership costs. Furthermore, the optimal siting of charging stations is more spatially distributed than the current siting of stations, consisting mainly of high-power Level 2 AC stations (16.8 kW) with a small share of DC fast charging stations and no standard 7.7kW Level 2 stations. Optimal siting reduces the total costs, empty vehicle travel, and peak charging load by up to 10%.

Kiril Solovey, Mauro Salazar, Marco Pavone

We consider the problem of vehicle routing for Autonomous Mobility-on-Demand (AMoD) systems, wherein a fleet of self-driving vehicles provides on-demand mobility in a given environment. Specifically, the task it to compute routes for the vehicles (both customer-carrying and empty travelling) so that travel demand is fulfilled and operational cost is minimized. The routing process must account for congestion effects affecting travel times, as modeled via a volume-delay function (VDF). Route planning with VDF constraints is notoriously challenging, as such constraints compound the combinatorial complexity of the routing optimization process. Thus, current solutions for AMoD routing resort to relaxations of the congestion constraints, thereby trading optimality with computational efficiency. In this paper, we present the first computationally-efficient approach for AMoD routing where VDF constraints are explicitly accounted for. We demonstrate that our approach is faster by at least one order of magnitude with respect to the state of the art, while providing higher quality solutions. From a methodological standpoint, the key technical insight is to establish a mathematical reduction of the AMoD routing problem to the classical traffic assignment problem (a related vehicle-routing problem where empty traveling vehicles are not present). Such a reduction allows us to extend powerful algorithmic tools for traffic assignment, which combine the classic Frank-Wolfe algorithm with modern techniques for pathfinding, to the AMoD routing problem. We provide strong theoretical guarantees for our approach in terms of near-optimality of the returned solution.

Mauro Salazar, Federico Rossi, Maximilian Schiffer et al.

In this paper we study models and coordination policies for intermodal Autonomous Mobility-on-Demand (AMoD), wherein a fleet of self-driving vehicles provides on-demand mobility jointly with public transit. Specifically, we first present a network flow model for intermodal AMoD, where we capture the coupling between AMoD and public transit and the goal is to maximize social welfare. Second, leveraging such a model, we design a pricing and tolling scheme that allows to achieve the social optimum under the assumption of a perfect market with selfish agents. Finally, we present a real-world case study for New York City. Our results show that the coordination between AMoD fleets and public transit can yield significant benefits compared to an AMoD system operating in isolation.