Wenlu Xu

Youming Tao, Sijia Cui, Wenlu Xu et al.

Both Byzantine resilience and communication efficiency have attracted tremendous attention recently for their significance in edge federated learning. However, most existing algorithms may fail when dealing with real-world irregular data that behaves in a heavy-tailed manner. To address this issue, we study the stochastic convex and non-convex optimization problem for federated learning at edge and show how to handle heavy-tailed data while retaining the Byzantine resilience, communication efficiency and the optimal statistical error rates simultaneously. Specifically, we first present a Byzantine-resilient distributed gradient descent algorithm that can handle the heavy-tailed data and meanwhile converge under the standard assumptions. To reduce the communication overhead, we further propose another algorithm that incorporates gradient compression techniques to save communication costs during the learning process. Theoretical analysis shows that our algorithms achieve order-optimal statistical error rate in presence of Byzantine devices. Finally, we conduct extensive experiments on both synthetic and real-world datasets to verify the efficacy of our algorithms.

Xiaowu Dai, Wenlu Xu, Yuan Qi et al.

Online platforms in the Internet Economy commonly incorporate recommender systems that recommend products (or "arms") to users (or "agents"). A key challenge in this domain arises from myopic agents who are naturally incentivized to exploit by choosing the optimal arm based on current information, rather than exploring various alternatives to gather information that benefits the collective. We propose a novel recommender system that aligns with agents' incentives while achieving asymptotically optimal performance, as measured by regret in repeated interactions. Our framework models this incentive-aware system as a multi-agent bandit problem in two-sided markets, where the interactions of agents and arms are facilitated by recommender systems on online platforms. This model incorporates incentive constraints induced by agents' opportunity costs. In scenarios where opportunity costs are known to the platform, we show the existence of an incentive-compatible recommendation algorithm. This algorithm pools recommendations between a genuinely good arm and an unknown arm using a randomized and adaptive strategy. Moreover, when these opportunity costs are unknown, we introduce an algorithm that randomly pools recommendations across all arms, utilizing the cumulative loss from each arm as feedback for strategic exploration. We demonstrate that both algorithms satisfy an ex-post fairness criterion, which protects agents from over-exploitation. All code for using the proposed algorithms and reproducing results is made available on GitHub.