Toby Walsh

Michael L. Littman, Ifeoma Ajunwa, Guy Berger et al.

In September 2021, the "One Hundred Year Study on Artificial Intelligence" project (AI100) issued the second report of its planned long-term periodic assessment of artificial intelligence (AI) and its impact on society. It was written by a panel of 17 study authors, each of whom is deeply rooted in AI research, chaired by Michael Littman of Brown University. The report, entitled "Gathering Strength, Gathering Storms," answers a set of 14 questions probing critical areas of AI development addressing the major risks and dangers of AI, its effects on society, its public perception and the future of the field. The report concludes that AI has made a major leap from the lab to people's lives in recent years, which increases the urgency to understand its potential negative effects. The questions were developed by the AI100 Standing Committee, chaired by Peter Stone of the University of Texas at Austin, consisting of a group of AI leaders with expertise in computer science, sociology, ethics, economics, and other disciplines.

Matthew Olckers, Toby Walsh

In peer mechanisms, the competitors for a prize also determine who wins. Each competitor may be asked to rank, grade, or nominate peers for the prize. Since the prize can be valuable, such as financial aid, course grades, or an award at a conference, competitors may be tempted to manipulate the mechanism. We survey approaches to prevent or discourage the manipulation of peer mechanisms. We conclude our survey by identifying several important research challenges.

Alexander Lam, Haris Aziz, Bo Li et al.

We consider the obnoxious facility location problem (in which agents prefer the facility location to be far from them) and propose a hierarchy of distance-based proportional fairness concepts for the problem. These fairness axioms ensure that groups of agents at the same location are guaranteed to be a distance from the facility proportional to their group size. We consider deterministic and randomized mechanisms, and compute tight bounds on the price of proportional fairness. In the deterministic setting, we show that our proportional fairness axioms are incompatible with strategyproofness, and prove asymptotically tight $ε$-price of anarchy and stability bounds for proportionally fair welfare-optimal mechanisms. In the randomized setting, we identify proportionally fair and strategyproof mechanisms that give an expected welfare within a constant factor of the optimal welfare. Finally, we prove existence results for two extensions to our model.

Haris Aziz, Alexander Lam, Mashbat Suzuki et al.

Proportionality is an attractive fairness concept that has been applied to a range of problems including the facility location problem, a classic problem in social choice. In our work, we propose a concept called Strong Proportionality, which ensures that when there are two groups of agents at different locations, both groups incur the same total cost. We show that although Strong Proportionality is a well-motivated and basic axiom, there is no deterministic strategyproof mechanism satisfying the property. We then identify a randomized mechanism called Random Rank (which uniformly selects a number $k$ between $1$ to $n$ and locates the facility at the $k$'th highest agent location) which satisfies Strong Proportionality in expectation. Our main theorem characterizes Random Rank as the unique mechanism that achieves universal truthfulness, universal anonymity, and Strong Proportionality in expectation among all randomized mechanisms. Finally, we show via the AverageOrRandomRank mechanism that even stronger ex-post fairness guarantees can be achieved by weakening universal truthfulness to strategyproofness in expectation.

Matthew Olckers, Toby Walsh

Due to the importance of artificial intelligence (AI) in a variety of high-stakes decisions, such as loan approval, job hiring, and criminal bail, researchers in Explainable AI (XAI) have developed algorithms to provide users with recourse for an unfavorable outcome. We analyze the incentives for a decision-maker to offer recourse to a set of applicants. Does the decision-maker have the incentive to offer recourse to all rejected applicants? We show that the decision-maker only offers recourse to all applicants in extreme cases, such as when the recourse process is impossible to manipulate. Some applicants may be worse off when the decision-maker can offer recourse.

Toby Walsh

We propose an alternative to the Turing test that removes the inherent asymmetry between humans and machines in Turing's original imitation game. In this new test, both humans and machines judge each other. We argue that this makes the test more robust against simple deceptions. We also propose a small number of refinements to improve further the test. These refinements could be applied also to Turing's original imitation game.

Toby Walsh

Randomized mechanisms can have good normative properties compared to their deterministic counterparts. However, randomized mechanisms are problematic in several ways such as in their verifiability. We propose here to derandomize such mechanisms by having agents play a game instead of tossing a coin. The game is designed so an agent's best action is to play randomly, and this play then injects ``randomness'' into the mechanism. This derandomization retains many of the good normative properties of the original randomized mechanism but gives a mechanism that is deterministic and easy, for instance, to audit. We consider three related methods to derandomize randomized mechanism in six different domains: voting, facility location, task allocation, school choice, peer selection, and resource allocation. We propose a number of novel derandomized mechanisms for these six domains with good normative properties. Each mechanism has a mixed Nash equilibrium in which agents play a modular arithmetic game with an uniform mixed strategy. In all but one mixed Nash equilibrium, agents report their preferences over the original problem sincerely. The derandomized methods are thus ``quasi-strategy proof''. In one domain, we additionally show that a new and desirable normative property emerges as a result of derandomization.

Alexander Lam, Haris Aziz, Toby Walsh

We consider the problem of locating a facility to serve a set of agents located along a line. The Nash welfare objective function, defined as the product of the agents' utilities, is known to provide a compromise between fairness and efficiency in resource allocation problems. We apply this welfare notion to the facility location problem, converting individual costs to utilities and analyzing the facility placement that maximizes the Nash welfare. We give a polynomial-time approximation algorithm to compute this facility location, and prove results suggesting that it achieves a good balance of fairness and efficiency. Finally, we take a mechanism design perspective and propose a strategy-proof mechanism with a bounded approximation ratio for Nash welfare.

Denys Katkalo, Andrii Rohovyi, Toby Walsh

State-of-the-art multimodal journey-planning algorithms, such as ULTRA, have recently been adapted to account for delays. In this work, we extend this approach to be more memory-efficient, faster, and accurate. We also adapt this framework to other state-of-the-art algorithms, like CSA and RAPTOR. We demonstrate a speedup of 1.9-4.2x over existing algorithms in the single-criterion search. In the multicriteria setting, we achieve competitive speedup results but greater accurateness. We also found that our method scales much better as the delay increases.

Denys Katkalo, Andrii Rohovyi, Toby Walsh

In recent years, RAPTOR based algorithms have been considered the state-of-the-art for path-finding with unlimited transfers without preprocessing. However, this status largely stems from the evolution of routing research, where Dijkstra-based solutions were superseded by timetable-based algorithms without a systematic comparison. In this work, we revisit classical Dijkstra-based approaches for public transit routing with unlimited transfers and demonstrate that Time-Dependent Dijkstra (TD-Dijkstra) outperforms MR. However, efficient TD-Dijkstra implementations rely on filtering dominated connections during preprocessing, which assumes passengers can always switch to a faster connection. We show that this filtering is unsound when stops have buffer times, as it cannot distinguish between seated passengers who may continue without waiting and transferring passengers who must respect the buffer. To address this limitation, we introduce Transfer Aware Dijkstra (TAD), a modification that scans entire trip sequences rather than individual edges, correctly handling buffer times while maintaining performance advantages over MR. Our experiments on London and Switzerland networks show that we can achieve a greater than two time speed-up over MR while producing optimal results on both networks with and without buffer times.

Alicia Vidler, Toby Walsh

Playing games has a long history of describing intricate interactions in simplified forms. In this paper we explore if large language models (LLMs) can play games, investigating their capabilities for randomisation and strategic adaptation through both simultaneous and sequential game interactions. We focus on GPT-4o-Mini-2024-08-17 and test two games between LLMs: Rock Paper Scissors (RPS) and games of strategy (Prisoners Dilemma PD). LLMs are often described as stochastic parrots, and while they may indeed be parrots, our results suggest that they are not very stochastic in the sense that their outputs - when prompted to be random - are often very biased. Our research reveals that LLMs appear to develop loss aversion strategies in repeated games, with RPS converging to stalemate conditions while PD shows systematic shifts between cooperative and competitive outcomes based on prompt design. We detail programmatic tools for independent agent interactions and the Agentic AI challenges faced in implementation. We show that LLMs can indeed play games, just not very well. These results have implications for the use of LLMs in multi-agent LLM systems and showcase limitations in current approaches to model output for strategic decision-making.

Alicia Vidler, Toby Walsh

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly being used to simulate human-like decision making in agent-based financial market models (ABMs). As models become more powerful and accessible, researchers can now incorporate individual LLM decisions into ABM environments. However, integration may introduce inherent biases that need careful evaluation. In this paper we test three state-of-the-art GPT models for bias using two model sampling approaches: one-shot and few-shot API queries. We observe significant variations in distributions of outputs between specific models, and model sub versions, with GPT-4o-Mini-2024-07-18 showing notably better performance (32-43% yes responses) compared to GPT-4-0125-preview's extreme bias (98-99% yes responses). We show that sampling methods and model sub-versions significantly impact results: repeated independent API calls produce different distributions compared to batch sampling within a single call. While no current GPT model can simultaneously achieve a uniform distribution and Markovian properties in one-shot testing, few-shot sampling can approach uniform distributions under certain conditions. We explore the Temperature parameter, providing a definition and comparative results. We further compare our results to true random binary series and test specifically for the common human bias of Negative Recency - finding LLMs have a mixed ability to 'beat' humans in this one regard. These findings emphasise the critical importance of careful LLM integration into ABMs for financial markets and more broadly.

Alicia Vidler, Toby Walsh

The over-the-counter (OTC) government bond markets are characterised by their bilateral trading structures, which pose unique challenges to understanding and ensuring market stability and liquidity. In this paper, we develop a bespoke ABM that simulates market-maker interactions within a stylised government bond market. The model focuses on the dynamics of liquidity and stability in the secondary trading of government bonds, particularly in concentrated markets like those found in Australia and the UK. Through this simulation, we test key hypotheses around improving market stability, focusing on the effects of agent diversity, business costs, and client base size. We demonstrate that greater agent diversity enhances market liquidity and that reducing the costs of market-making can improve overall market stability. The model offers insights into computational finance by simulating trading without price transparency, highlighting how micro-structural elements can affect macro-level market outcomes. This research contributes to the evolving field of computational finance by employing computational intelligence techniques to better understand the fundamental mechanics of government bond markets, providing actionable insights for both academics and practitioners.

Alicia Vidler, Toby Walsh

Exploring complex adaptive financial trading environments through multi-agent based simulation methods presents an innovative approach within the realm of quantitative finance. Despite the dominance of multi-agent reinforcement learning approaches in financial markets with observable data, there exists a set of systematically significant financial markets that pose challenges due to their partial or obscured data availability. We, therefore, devise a multi-agent simulation approach employing small-scale meta-heuristic methods. This approach aims to represent the opaque bilateral market for Australian government bond trading, capturing the bilateral nature of bank-to-bank trading, also referred to as "over-the-counter" (OTC) trading, and commonly occurring between "market makers". The uniqueness of the bilateral market, characterized by negotiated transactions and a limited number of agents, yields valuable insights for agent-based modelling and quantitative finance. The inherent rigidity of this market structure, which is at odds with the global proliferation of multilateral platforms and the decentralization of finance, underscores the unique insights offered by our agent-based model. We explore the implications of market rigidity on market structure and consider the element of stability, in market design. This extends the ongoing discourse on complex financial trading environments, providing an enhanced understanding of their dynamics and implications.

Andrii Rohovyi, Abdallah Abuaisha, Toby Walsh

Routing algorithms for public transport, particularly the widely used RAPTOR and its variants, often face performance bottlenecks during the transfer relaxation phase, especially on dense transfer graphs, when supporting unlimited transfers. This inefficiency arises from iterating over many potential inter-stop connections (walks, bikes, e-scooters, etc.). To maintain acceptable performance, practitioners often limit transfer distances or exclude certain transfer options, which can reduce path optimality and restrict the multimodal options presented to travellers. This paper introduces Early Pruning, a low-overhead technique that accelerates routing algorithms without compromising optimality. By pre-sorting transfer connections by duration and applying a pruning rule within the transfer loop, the method discards longer transfers at a stop once they cannot yield an earlier arrival than the current best solution. Early Pruning can be integrated with minimal changes to existing codebases and requires only a one-time preprocessing step. Across multiple state-of-the-art RAPTOR-based solutions, including RAPTOR, ULTRA-RAPTOR, McRAPTOR, BM-RAPTOR, ULTRA-McRAPTOR, and UBM-RAPTOR and tested on the Switzerland and London transit networks, we achieved query time reductions of up to 57%. This approach provides a generalizable improvement to the efficiency of transit pathfinding algorithms. Beyond algorithmic performance, Early Pruning has practical implications for transport planning. By reducing computational costs, it enables transit agencies to expand transfer radii and incorporate additional mobility modes into journey planners without requiring extra server infrastructure. This is particularly relevant for passengers in areas with sparse direct transit coverage, such as outer suburbs and smaller towns, where richer multimodal routing can reveal viable alternatives to private car use.

Toby Walsh

We study mechanisms for the facility location problem augmented with predictions of the optimal facility location. We demonstrate that an egalitarian viewpoint which considers both the maximum distance of any agent from the facility and the minimum utility of any agent provides important new insights compared to a viewpoint that just considers the maximum distance. As in previous studies, we consider performance in terms of consistency (worst case when predictions are accurate) and robustness (worst case irrespective of the accuracy of predictions). By considering how mechanisms with predictions can perform poorly, we design new mechanisms that are more robust. Indeed, by adjusting parameters, we demonstrate how to trade robustness for consistency. We go beyond the single facility problem by designing novel strategy proof mechanisms for locating two facilities with bounded consistency and robustness that use two predictions for where to locate the two facilities.

Toby Walsh

We consider strategy proof mechanisms for facility location which maximize equitability between agents. As is common in the literature, we measure equitability with the Gini index. We first prove a simple but fundamental impossibility result that no strategy proof mechanism can bound the approximation ratio of the optimal Gini index of utilities for one or more facilities. We propose instead computing approximation ratios of the complemented Gini index of utilities, and consider how well both deterministic and randomized mechanisms approximate this. In addition, as Nash welfare is often put forwards as an equitable compromise between egalitarian and utilitarian outcomes, we consider how well mechanisms approximate the Nash welfare.

Yuekang Li, Wei Song, Bangshuo Zhu et al.

We introduce ai.txt, a novel domain-specific language (DSL) designed to explicitly regulate interactions between AI models, agents, and web content, addressing critical limitations of the widely adopted robots.txt standard. As AI increasingly engages with online materials for tasks such as training, summarization, and content modification, existing regulatory methods lack the necessary granularity and semantic expressiveness to ensure ethical and legal compliance. ai.txt extends traditional URL-based access controls by enabling precise element-level regulations and incorporating natural language instructions interpretable by AI systems. To facilitate practical deployment, we provide an integrated development environment with code autocompletion and automatic XML generation. Furthermore, we propose two compliance mechanisms: XML-based programmatic enforcement and natural language prompt integration, and demonstrate their effectiveness through preliminary experiments and case studies. Our approach aims to aid the governance of AI-Internet interactions, promoting responsible AI use in digital ecosystems.

Alicia Vidler, Toby Walsh

Bilateral markets, such as those for government bonds, involve decentralized and opaque transactions between market makers (MMs) and clients, posing significant challenges for traditional modeling approaches. To address these complexities, we introduce TRIBE an agent-based model augmented with a large language model (LLM) to simulate human-like decision-making in trading environments. TRIBE leverages publicly available data and stylized facts to capture realistic trading dynamics, integrating human biases like risk aversion and ambiguity sensitivity into the decision-making processes of agents. Our research yields three key contributions: first, we demonstrate that integrating LLMs into agent-based models to enhance client agency is feasible and enriches the simulation of agent behaviors in complex markets; second, we find that even slight trade aversion encoded within the LLM leads to a complete cessation of trading activity, highlighting the sensitivity of market dynamics to agents' risk profiles; third, we show that incorporating human-like variability shifts power dynamics towards clients and can disproportionately affect the entire system, often resulting in systemic agent collapse across simulations. These findings underscore the emergent properties that arise when introducing stochastic, human-like decision processes, revealing new system behaviors that enhance the realism and complexity of artificial societies.

Andrii Rohovyi, Peter J. Stuckey, Toby Walsh

Faster pathfinding in time-dependent transport networks is an important and challenging problem in navigation systems. There are two main types of transport networks: road networks for car driving and public transport route network. The solutions that work well in road networks, such as Time-dependent Contraction Hierarchies and other graph-based approaches, do not usually apply in transport networks. In transport networks, non-graph solutions such as CSA and RAPTOR show the best results compared to graph-based techniques. In our work, we propose a method that advances graph-based approaches by using different optimization techniques from computational geometry to speed up the search process in transport networks. We apply a new pre-computation step, which we call timetable nodes (TTN). Our inspiration comes from an iterative search problem in computational geometry. We implement two versions of the TTN: one uses a Combined Search Tree (TTN-CST), and the second uses Fractional Cascading (TTN-FC). Both of these approaches decrease the asymptotic complexity of reaching new nodes from $O(k\times \log|C|)$ to $O(k + \log(k) + \log(|C|))$, where $k$ is the number of outgoing edges from a node and $|C|$ is the size of the timetable information (total outgoing edges). Our solution suits any other time-dependent networks and can be integrated into other pathfinding algorithms. Our experiments indicate that this pre-computation significantly enhances the performance on high-density graphs. This study showcases how leveraging computational geometry can enhance pathfinding in transport networks, enabling faster pathfinding in scenarios involving large numbers of outgoing edges.

Wenbin Zhang, Shuigeng Zhou, Toby Walsh et al.

The growing importance of understanding and addressing algorithmic bias in artificial intelligence (AI) has led to a surge in research on AI fairness, which often assumes that the underlying data is independent and identically distributed (IID). However, real-world data frequently exists in non-IID graph structures that capture connections among individual units. To effectively mitigate bias in AI systems, it is essential to bridge the gap between traditional fairness literature, designed for IID data, and the prevalence of non-IID graph data. This survey reviews recent advancements in fairness amidst non-IID graph data, including the newly introduced fair graph generation and the commonly studied fair graph classification. In addition, available datasets and evaluation metrics for future research are identified, the limitations of existing work are highlighted, and promising future directions are proposed.

Haris Aziz, Alexander Lam, Barton E. Lee et al.

We focus on a simple, one-dimensional collective decision problem (often referred to as the facility location problem) and explore issues of strategyproofness and proportionality-based fairness. We introduce and analyze a hierarchy of proportionality-based fairness axioms of varying strength: Individual Fair Share (IFS), Unanimous Fair Share (UFS), Proportionality (as in Freeman et al, 2021), and Proportional Fairness (PF). For each axiom, we characterize the family of mechanisms that satisfy the axiom and strategyproofness. We show that imposing strategyproofness renders many of the axioms to be equivalent: the family of mechanisms that satisfy proportionality, unanimity, and strategyproofness is equivalent to the family of mechanisms that satisfy UFS and strategyproofness, which, in turn, is equivalent to the family of mechanisms that satisfy PF and strategyproofness. Furthermore, there is a unique such mechanism: the Uniform Phantom mechanism, which is studied in Freeman et al. (2021). We also characterize the outcomes of the Uniform Phantom mechanism as the unique (pure) equilibrium outcome for any mechanism that satisfies continuity, strict monotonicity, and UFS. Finally, we analyze the approximation guarantees, in terms of optimal social welfare and minimum total cost, obtained by mechanisms that are strategyproof and satisfy each proportionality-based fairness axiom. We show that the Uniform Phantom mechanism provides the best approximation of the optimal social welfare (and also minimum total cost) among all mechanisms that satisfy UFS.

Toby Walsh

An important feature of many real world facility location problems are capacity limits on the facilities. We show here how capacity constraints make it harder to design strategy proof mechanisms for facility location, but counter-intuitively can improve the guarantees on how well we can approximate the optimal solution.

Toby Walsh

We study the impact on mechanisms for facility location of moving from one dimension to two (or more) dimensions and Euclidean or Manhattan distances. We consider three fundamental axiomatic properties: anonymity which is a basic fairness property, Pareto optimality which is one of the most important efficiency properties, and strategy proofness which ensures agents do not have an incentive to mis-report. We also consider how well such mechanisms can approximate the optimal welfare. Our results are somewhat negative. Moving from one dimension to two (or more) dimensions often makes these axiomatic properties more difficult to achieve. For example, with two facilities in Euclidean space or with just a single facility in Manhattan space, no mechanism is anonymous, Pareto optimal and strategy proof. By contrast, mechanisms on the line exist with all three properties.We also show that approximation ratios may increase when moving to two (or more) dimensions. All our impossibility results are minimal. If we drop one of the three axioms (anonymity, Pareto optimality or strategy proofness) multiple mechanisms satisfy the other two axioms.

Toby Walsh

Facility location problems often permit facilities to be located at any position. But what if this is not the case in practice? What if facilities can only be located at particular locations like a highway exit or close to a bus stop? We consider here the impact of such constraints on the location of facilities on the performance of strategy proof mechanisms for locating facilities.We study four different performance objectives: the total distance agents must travel to their closest facility, the maximum distance any agent must travel to their closest facility, and the utilitarian and egalitarian welfare.We show that constraining facilities to a limited set of locations makes all four objectives harder to approximate in general.

Toby Walsh

"Mathematics is not a careful march down a well-cleared highway, but a journey into a strange wilderness, where the explorers often get lost. Rigour should be a signal to the historian that the maps have been made, and the real explorers have gone elsewhere." W.S. Anglin, the Mathematical Intelligencer, 4 (4), 1982.

Toby Walsh

We can break symmetry by eliminating solutions within a symmetry class that are not least in the lexicographical ordering. This is often referred to as the lex-leader method. Unfortunately, as symmetry groups can be large, the lexleader method is not tractable in general. We prove that using other total orderings besides the usual lexicographical ordering will not reduce the computational complexity of breaking symmetry in general. It follows that breaking symmetry with other orderings like the Gray code ordering or the Snake-Lex ordering is intractable in general.

Toby Walsh

I survey recent progress on a classic and challenging problem in social choice: the fair division of indivisible items. I discuss how a computational perspective has provided interesting insights into and understanding of how to divide items fairly and efficiently. This has involved bringing to bear tools such as those used in knowledge representation, computational complexity, approximation methods, game theory, online analysis and communication complexity

Toby Walsh

Bhutan is sometimes described as \a pebble between two boulders", a small country caught between the two most populous nations on earth: India and China. This pebble is, however, about to be caught up in a vortex: the transformation of our economic, political and social orders by new technologies like Artificial Intelligence. What can a small nation like Bhutan hope to do in the face of such change? What should the nation do, not just to weather this storm, but to become a better place in which to live?

Christian Bessiere, Clement Carbonnel, Anton Dries et al.

Learning constraint networks is known to require a number of membership queries exponential in the number of variables. In this paper, we learn constraint networks by asking the user partial queries. That is, we ask the user to classify assignments to subsets of the variables as positive or negative. We provide an algorithm, called QUACQ, that, given a negative example, focuses onto a constraint of the target network in a number of queries logarithmic in the size of the example. The whole constraint network can then be learned with a polynomial number of partial queries. We give information theoretic lower bounds for learning some simple classes of constraint networks and show that our generic algorithm is optimal in some cases.

Haris Aziz, Serge Gaspers, Zhaohong Sun et al.

In the past few years, several new matching models have been proposed and studied that take into account complex distributional constraints. Relevant lines of work include (1) school choice with diversity constraints where students have (possibly overlapping) types and (2) hospital-doctor matching where various regional quotas are imposed. In this paper, we present a polynomial-time reduction to transform an instance of (1) to an instance of (2) and we show how the feasibility and stability of corresponding matchings are preserved under the reduction. Our reduction provides a formal connection between two important strands of work on matching with distributional constraints. We then apply the reduction in two ways. Firstly, we show that it is NP-complete to check whether a feasible and stable outcome for (1) exists. Due to our reduction, these NP-completeness results carry over to setting (2). In view of this, we help unify some of the results that have been presented in the literature. Secondly, if we have positive results for (2), then we have corresponding results for (1). One key conclusion of our results is that further developments on axiomatic and algorithmic aspects of hospital-doctor matching with regional quotas will result in corresponding results for school choice with diversity constraints.

Martin Aleksandrov, Toby Walsh

We consider a multi-agent model for fair division of mixed manna (i.e. items for which agents can have positive, zero or negative utilities), in which agents have additive utilities for bundles of items. For this model, we give several general impossibility results and special possibility results for three common fairness concepts (i.e. EF1, EFX, EFX3) and one popular efficiency concept (i.e. PO). We also study how these interact with common welfare objectives such as the Nash, disutility Nash and egalitarian welfares. For example, we show that maximizing the Nash welfare with mixed manna (or minimizing the disutility Nash welfare) does not ensure an EF1 allocation whereas with goods and the Nash welfare it does. We also prove that an EFX3 allocation may not exist even with identical utilities. By comparison, with tertiary utilities, EFX and PO allocations, or EFX3 and PO allocations always exist. Also, with identical utilities, EFX and PO allocations always exist. For these cases, we give polynomial-time algorithms, returning such allocations and approximating further the Nash, disutility Nash and egalitarian welfares in special cases.

Haris Aziz, Hau Chan, Barton E. Lee et al.

We consider the facility location problem in the one-dimensional setting where each facility can serve a limited number of agents from the algorithmic and mechanism design perspectives. From the algorithmic perspective, we prove that the corresponding optimization problem, where the goal is to locate facilities to minimize either the total cost to all agents or the maximum cost of any agent is NP-hard. However, we show that the problem is fixed-parameter tractable, and the optimal solution can be computed in polynomial time whenever the number of facilities is bounded, or when all facilities have identical capacities. We then consider the problem from a mechanism design perspective where the agents are strategic and need not reveal their true locations. We show that several natural mechanisms studied in the uncapacitated setting either lose strategyproofness or a bound on the solution quality for the total or maximum cost objective. We then propose new mechanisms that are strategyproof and achieve approximation guarantees that almost match the lower bounds.

Martin Aleksandrov, Toby Walsh

We survey a burgeoning and promising new research area that considers the online nature of many practical fair division problems. We identify wide variety of such online fair division problems, as well as discuss new mechanisms and normative properties that apply to this online setting. The online nature of such fair division problems provides both opportunities and challenges such as the possibility to develop new online mechanisms as well as the difficulty of dealing with an uncertain future.

Alan M. Frisch, Brahim Hnich, Zeynep Kiziltan et al.

The CP 2002 paper entitled "Breaking Row and Column Symmetries in Matrix Models" by Flener et al. (https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F3-540-46135-3_31) describes some of the first work for identifying and analyzing row and column symmetry in matrix models and for efficiently and effectively dealing with such symmetry using static symmetry-breaking ordering constraints. This commentary provides a retrospective on that work and highlights some of the subsequent work on the topic.

Ian Gent, Toby Walsh

In 1999, we introduced CSPLib, a benchmark library for the constraints community. Our CP-1999 poster paper about CSPLib discussed the advantages and disadvantages of building such a library. Unlike some other domains such as theorem proving, or machine learning, representation was then and remains today a major issue in the success or failure to solve problems. Benchmarks in CSPLib are therefore specified in natural language as this allows users to find good representations for themselves. The community responded positively and CSPLib has become a valuable resource but, as we discuss here, we cannot rest.

Toby Walsh

In 2000, I published a relatively comprehensive study of mappings between propositional satisfiability (SAT) and constraint satisfaction problems (CSPs) [Wal00]. I analysed four different mappings of SAT problems into CSPs, and two of CSPs into SAT problems. For each mapping, I compared the impact of achieving arc-consistency on the CSP with unit propagation on the corresponding SAT problems, and lifted these results to CSP algorithms that maintain (some level of ) arc-consistency during search like FC and MAC, and to the Davis- Putnam procedure (which performs unit propagation at each search node). These results helped provide some insight into the relationship between propositional satisfiability and constraint satisfaction that set the scene for an important and valuable body of work that followed. I discuss here what prompted the paper, and what followed.

Toby Walsh

Despite efforts to increase the supply of organs from living donors, most kidney transplants performed in Australia still come from deceased donors. The age of these donated organs has increased substantially in recent decades as the rate of fatal accidents on roads has fallen. The Organ and Tissue Authority in Australia is therefore looking to design a new mechanism that better matches the age of the organ to the age of the patient. I discuss the design, axiomatics and performance of several candidate mechanisms that respect the special online nature of this fair division problem.

Nina Narodytska, Shiva Prasad Kasiviswanathan, Leonid Ryzhyk et al.

Understanding properties of deep neural networks is an important challenge in deep learning. In this paper, we take a step in this direction by proposing a rigorous way of verifying properties of a popular class of neural networks, Binarized Neural Networks, using the well-developed means of Boolean satisfiability. Our main contribution is a construction that creates a representation of a binarized neural network as a Boolean formula. Our encoding is the first exact Boolean representation of a deep neural network. Using this encoding, we leverage the power of modern SAT solvers along with a proposed counterexample-guided search procedure to verify various properties of these networks. A particular focus will be on the critical property of robustness to adversarial perturbations. For this property, our experimental results demonstrate that our approach scales to medium-size deep neural networks used in image classification tasks. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work on verifying properties of deep neural networks using an exact Boolean encoding of the network.

Toby Walsh

There is significant concern that technological advances, especially in Robotics and Artificial Intelligence (AI), could lead to high levels of unemployment in the coming decades. Studies have estimated that around half of all current jobs are at risk of automation. To look into this issue in more depth, we surveyed experts in Robotics and AI about the risk, and compared their views with those of non-experts. Whilst the experts predicted a significant number of occupations were at risk of automation in the next two decades, they were more cautious than people outside the field in predicting occupations at risk. Their predictions were consistent with their estimates for when computers might be expected to reach human level performance across a wide range of skills. These estimates were typically decades later than those of the non-experts. Technological barriers may therefore provide society with more time to prepare for an automated future than the public fear. In addition, public expectations may need to be dampened about the speed of progress to be expected in Robotics and AI.

Jing Wu Lian, Nicholas Mattei, Renee Noble et al.

Motivated by the common academic problem of allocating papers to referees for conference reviewing we propose a novel mechanism for solving the assignment problem when we have a two sided matching problem with preferences from one side (the agents/reviewers) over the other side (the objects/papers) and both sides have capacity constraints. The assignment problem is a fundamental problem in both computer science and economics with application in many areas including task and resource allocation. We draw inspiration from multi-criteria decision making and voting and use order weighted averages (OWAs) to propose a novel and flexible class of algorithms for the assignment problem. We show an algorithm for finding a $Σ$-OWA assignment in polynomial time, in contrast to the NP-hardness of finding an egalitarian assignment. Inspired by this setting we observe an interesting connection between our model and the classic proportional multi-winner election problem in social choice.

Emanuelle Burton, Judy Goldsmith, Sven Koenig et al.

The recent surge in interest in ethics in artificial intelligence may leave many educators wondering how to address moral, ethical, and philosophical issues in their AI courses. As instructors we want to develop curriculum that not only prepares students to be artificial intelligence practitioners, but also to understand the moral, ethical, and philosophical impacts that artificial intelligence will have on society. In this article we provide practical case studies and links to resources for use by AI educators. We also provide concrete suggestions on how to integrate AI ethics into a general artificial intelligence course and how to teach a stand-alone artificial intelligence ethics course.

Nicholas Mattei, Toby Walsh

Computational Social Choice (ComSoc) is a rapidly developing field at the intersection of computer science, economics, social choice, and political science. The study of tournaments is fundamental to ComSoc and many results have been published about tournament solution sets and reasoning in tournaments. Theoretical results in ComSoc tend to be worst case and tell us little about performance in practice. To this end we detail some experiments on tournaments using real wold data from soccer and tennis. We make three main contributions to the understanding of tournaments using real world data from English Premier League, the German Bundesliga, and the ATP World Tour: (1) we find that the NP-hard question of finding a seeding for which a given team can win a tournament is easily solvable in real world instances, (2) using detailed and principled methodology from statistical physics we show that our real world data obeys a log-normal distribution; and (3) leveraging our log-normal distribution result and using robust statistical methods, we show that the popular Condorcet Random (CR) tournament model does not generate realistic tournament data.

Andres Abeliuk, Haris Aziz, Gerardo Berbeglia et al.

We propose a model of interdependent scheduling games in which each player controls a set of services that they schedule independently. A player is free to schedule his own services at any time; however, each of these services only begins to accrue reward for the player when all predecessor services, which may or may not be controlled by the same player, have been activated. This model, where players have interdependent services, is motivated by the problems faced in planning and coordinating large-scale infrastructures, e.g., restoring electricity and gas to residents after a natural disaster or providing medical care in a crisis when different agencies are responsible for the delivery of staff, equipment, and medicine. We undertake a game-theoretic analysis of this setting and in particular consider the issues of welfare maximization, computing best responses, Nash dynamics, and existence and computation of Nash equilibria.

Haris Aziz, Omer Lev, Nicholas Mattei et al.

Peer reviews, evaluations, and selections are a fundamental aspect of modern science. Funding bodies the world over employ experts to review and select the best proposals from those submitted for funding. The problem of peer selection, however, is much more general: a professional society may want to give a subset of its members awards based on the opinions of all members; an instructor for a Massive Open Online Course (MOOC) or an online course may want to crowdsource grading; or a marketing company may select ideas from group brainstorming sessions based on peer evaluation. We make three fundamental contributions to the study of peer selection, a specific type of group decision-making problem, studied in computer science, economics, and political science. First, we propose a novel mechanism that is strategyproof, i.e., agents cannot benefit by reporting insincere valuations. Second, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our mechanism by a comprehensive simulation-based comparison with a suite of mechanisms found in the literature. Finally, our mechanism employs a randomized rounding technique that is of independent interest, as it solves the apportionment problem that arises in various settings where discrete resources such as parliamentary representation slots need to be divided proportionally.

Toby Walsh

There is both much optimism and pessimism around artificial intelligence (AI) today. The optimists are investing millions of dollars, and even in some cases billions of dollars into AI. The pessimists, on the other hand, predict that AI will end many things: jobs, warfare, and even the human race. Both the optimists and the pessimists often appeal to the idea of a technological singularity, a point in time where machine intelligence starts to run away, and a new, more intelligent species starts to inhabit the earth. If the optimists are right, this will be a moment that fundamentally changes our economy and our society. If the pessimists are right, this will be a moment that also fundamentally changes our economy and our society. It is therefore very worthwhile spending some time deciding if either of them might be right.

Haris Aziz, Thomas Kalinowski, Toby Walsh et al.

Sequential allocation is a simple and attractive mechanism for the allocation of indivisible goods. Agents take turns, according to a policy, to pick items. Sequential allocation is guaranteed to return an allocation which is efficient but may not have an optimal social welfare. We consider therefore the relation between welfare and efficiency. We study the (computational) questions of what welfare is possible or necessary depending on the choice of policy. We also consider a novel control problem in which the chair chooses a policy to improve social welfare.

Toby Walsh

Sometime in the future we will have to deal with the impact of AI's being mistaken for humans. For this reason, I propose that any autonomous system should be designed so that it is unlikely to be mistaken for anything besides an autonomous sysem, and should identify itself at the start of any interaction with another agent.

Martin Aleksandrov, Haris Aziz, Serge Gaspers et al.

We study an online model of fair division designed to capture features of a real world charity problem. We consider two simple mechanisms for this model in which agents simply declare what items they like. We analyse several axiomatic properties of these mechanisms like strategy-proofness and envy-freeness. Finally, we perform a competitive analysis and compute the price of anarchy.

Haris Aziz, Toby Walsh, Lirong Xia

A simple mechanism for allocating indivisible resources is sequential allocation in which agents take turns to pick items. We focus on possible and necessary allocation problems, checking whether allocations of a given form occur in some or all mechanisms for several commonly used classes of sequential allocation mechanisms. In particular, we consider whether a given agent receives a given item, a set of items, or a subset of items for five natural classes of sequential allocation mechanisms: balanced, recursively balanced, balanced alternating, strictly alternating and all policies. We identify characterizations of allocations produced balanced, recursively balanced, balanced alternating policies and strictly alternating policies respectively, which extend the well-known characterization by Brams and King [2005] for policies without restrictions. In addition, we examine the computational complexity of possible and necessary allocation problems for these classes.