Alain Jean-Marie

Samir M. Perlaza, Gaetan Bisson, Iñaki Esnaola et al.

The empirical risk minimization (ERM) problem with relative entropy regularization (ERM-RER) is investigated under the assumption that the reference measure is a $σ$-finite measure, and not necessarily a probability measure. Under this assumption, which leads to a generalization of the ERM-RER problem allowing a larger degree of flexibility for incorporating prior knowledge, numerous relevant properties are stated. Among these properties, the solution to this problem, if it exists, is shown to be a unique probability measure, mutually absolutely continuous with the reference measure. Such a solution exhibits a probably-approximately-correct guarantee for the ERM problem independently of whether the latter possesses a solution. For a fixed dataset and under a specific condition, the empirical risk is shown to be a sub-Gaussian random variable when the models are sampled from the solution to the ERM-RER problem. The generalization capabilities of the solution to the ERM-RER problem (the Gibbs algorithm) are studied via the sensitivity of the expected empirical risk to deviations from such a solution towards alternative probability measures. Finally, an interesting connection between sensitivity, generalization error, and lautum information is established.

Ke Sun, Samir M. Perlaza, Alain Jean-Marie

In this paper, $2\times2$ zero-sum games are studied under the following assumptions: $(1)$ One of the players (the leader) commits to choose its actions by sampling a given probability measure (strategy); $(2)$ The leader announces its action, which is observed by its opponent (the follower) through a binary channel; and $(3)$ the follower chooses its strategy based on the knowledge of the leader's strategy and the noisy observation of the leader's action. Under these conditions, the equilibrium is shown to always exist. Interestingly, even subject to noise, observing the actions of the leader is shown to be either beneficial or immaterial for the follower. More specifically, the payoff at the equilibrium of this game is upper bounded by the payoff at the Stackelberg equilibrium (SE) in pure strategies; and lower bounded by the payoff at the Nash equilibrium, which is equivalent to the SE in mixed strategies.Finally, necessary and sufficient conditions for observing the payoff at equilibrium to be equal to its lower bound are presented. Sufficient conditions for the payoff at equilibrium to be equal to its upper bound are also presented.

Samir M. Perlaza, Gaetan Bisson, Iñaki Esnaola et al.

The optimality and sensitivity of the empirical risk minimization problem with relative entropy regularization (ERM-RER) are investigated for the case in which the reference is a sigma-finite measure instead of a probability measure. This generalization allows for a larger degree of flexibility in the incorporation of prior knowledge over the set of models. In this setting, the interplay of the regularization parameter, the reference measure, the risk function, and the empirical risk induced by the solution of the ERM-RER problem is characterized. This characterization yields necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a regularization parameter that achieves an arbitrarily small empirical risk with arbitrarily high probability. The sensitivity of the expected empirical risk to deviations from the solution of the ERM-RER problem is studied. The sensitivity is then used to provide upper and lower bounds on the expected empirical risk. Moreover, it is shown that the expectation of the sensitivity is upper bounded, up to a constant factor, by the square root of the lautum information between the models and the datasets.