Ralf M. Haefner

Ralf M. Haefner, Jeff Beck, Cristina Savin et al.

This perspective piece is the result of a Generative Adversarial Collaboration (GAC) tackling the question `How does neural activity represent probability distributions?'. We have addressed three major obstacles to progress on answering this question: first, we provide a unified language for defining competing hypotheses. Second, we explain the fundamentals of three prominent proposals for probabilistic computations -- Probabilistic Population Codes (PPCs), Distributed Distributional Codes (DDCs), and Neural Sampling Codes (NSCs) -- and describe similarities and differences in that common language. Third, we review key empirical data previously taken as evidence for at least one of these proposal, and describe how it may or may not be explainable by alternative proposals. Finally, we describe some key challenges in resolving the debate, and propose potential directions to address them through a combination of theory and experiments.

Benjamin Peters, James J. DiCarlo, Todd Gureckis et al. · harvard

Vision is widely understood as an inference problem. However, two contrasting conceptions of the inference process have each been influential in research on biological vision as well as the engineering of machine vision. The first emphasizes bottom-up signal flow, describing vision as a largely feedforward, discriminative inference process that filters and transforms the visual information to remove irrelevant variation and represent behaviorally relevant information in a format suitable for downstream functions of cognition and behavioral control. In this conception, vision is driven by the sensory data, and perception is direct because the processing proceeds from the data to the latent variables of interest. The notion of "inference" in this conception is that of the engineering literature on neural networks, where feedforward convolutional neural networks processing images are said to perform inference. The alternative conception is that of vision as an inference process in Helmholtz's sense, where the sensory evidence is evaluated in the context of a generative model of the causal processes giving rise to it. In this conception, vision inverts a generative model through an interrogation of the evidence in a process often thought to involve top-down predictions of sensory data to evaluate the likelihood of alternative hypotheses. The authors include scientists rooted in roughly equal numbers in each of the conceptions and motivated to overcome what might be a false dichotomy between them and engage the other perspective in the realm of theory and experiment. The primate brain employs an unknown algorithm that may combine the advantages of both conceptions. We explain and clarify the terminology, review the key empirical evidence, and propose an empirical research program that transcends the dichotomy and sets the stage for revealing the mysterious hybrid algorithm of primate vision.

Richard D. Lange, Ari Benjamin, Ralf M. Haefner et al.

Sampling and Variational Inference (VI) are two large families of methods for approximate inference that have complementary strengths. Sampling methods excel at approximating arbitrary probability distributions, but can be inefficient. VI methods are efficient, but may misrepresent the true distribution. Here, we develop a general framework where approximations are stochastic mixtures of simple component distributions. Both sampling and VI can be seen as special cases: in sampling, each mixture component is a delta-function and is chosen stochastically, while in standard VI a single component is chosen to minimize divergence. We derive a practical method that interpolates between sampling and VI by solving an optimization problem over a mixing distribution. Intermediate inference methods then arise by varying a single parameter. Our method provably improves on sampling (reducing variance) and on VI (reducing bias+variance despite increasing variance). We demonstrate our method's bias/variance trade-off in practice on reference problems, and we compare outcomes to commonly used sampling and VI methods. This work takes a step towards a highly flexible yet simple family of inference methods that combines the complementary strengths of sampling and VI.