Guillaume Wang

Guillaume Wang, Lénaïc Chizat

We consider the problem of computing mixed Nash equilibria of two-player zero-sum games with continuous sets of pure strategies and with first-order access to the payoff function. This problem arises for example in game-theory-inspired machine learning applications, such as distributionally-robust learning. In those applications, the strategy sets are high-dimensional and thus methods based on discretisation cannot tractably return high-accuracy solutions. In this paper, we introduce and analyze a particle-based method that enjoys guaranteed local convergence for this problem. This method consists in parametrizing the mixed strategies as atomic measures and applying proximal point updates to both the atoms' weights and positions. It can be interpreted as a time-implicit discretization of the "interacting" Wasserstein-Fisher-Rao gradient flow. We prove that, under non-degeneracy assumptions, this method converges at an exponential rate to the exact mixed Nash equilibrium from any initialization satisfying a natural notion of closeness to optimality. We illustrate our results with numerical experiments and discuss applications to max-margin and distributionally-robust classification using two-layer neural networks, where our method has a natural interpretation as a simultaneous training of the network's weights and of the adversarial distribution.

Guillaume Wang, Lénaïc Chizat

We study the convergence to local Nash equilibria of gradient methods for two-player zero-sum differentiable games. It is well-known that such dynamics converge locally when $S \succ 0$ and may diverge when $S=0$, where $S\succeq 0$ is the symmetric part of the Jacobian at equilibrium that accounts for the "potential" component of the game. We show that these dynamics also converge as soon as $S$ is nonzero (partial curvature) and the eigenvectors of the antisymmetric part $A$ are in general position with respect to the kernel of $S$. We then study the convergence rates when $S \ll A$ and prove that they typically depend on the average of the eigenvalues of $S$, instead of the minimum as an analogy with minimization problems would suggest. To illustrate our results, we consider the problem of computing mixed Nash equilibria of continuous games. We show that, thanks to partial curvature, conic particle methods -- which optimize over both weights and supports of the mixed strategies -- generically converge faster than fixed-support methods. For min-max games, it is thus beneficial to add degrees of freedom "with curvature": this can be interpreted as yet another benefit of over-parameterization.

Guillaume Wang, Konstantin Donhauser, Fanny Yang

We provide matching upper and lower bounds of order $σ^2/\log(d/n)$ for the prediction error of the minimum $\ell_1$-norm interpolator, a.k.a. basis pursuit. Our result is tight up to negligible terms when $d \gg n$, and is the first to imply asymptotic consistency of noisy minimum-norm interpolation for isotropic features and sparse ground truths. Our work complements the literature on "benign overfitting" for minimum $\ell_2$-norm interpolation, where asymptotic consistency can be achieved only when the features are effectively low-dimensional.