Andreas Haupt

Brian Hu Zhang, Gabriele Farina, Ioannis Anagnostides et al.

A mediator observes no-regret learners playing an extensive-form game repeatedly across $T$ rounds. The mediator attempts to steer players toward some desirable predetermined equilibrium by giving (nonnegative) payments to players. We call this the steering problem. The steering problem captures problems several problems of interest, among them equilibrium selection and information design (persuasion). If the mediator's budget is unbounded, steering is trivial because the mediator can simply pay the players to play desirable actions. We study two bounds on the mediator's payments: a total budget and a per-round budget. If the mediator's total budget does not grow with $T$, we show that steering is impossible. However, we show that it is enough for the total budget to grow sublinearly with $T$, that is, for the average payment to vanish. When players' full strategies are observed at each round, we show that constant per-round budgets permit steering. In the more challenging setting where only trajectories through the game tree are observable, we show that steering is impossible with constant per-round budgets in general extensive-form games, but possible in normal-form games or if the per-round budget may itself depend on $T$. We also show how our results can be generalized to the case when the equilibrium is being computed online while steering is happening. We supplement our theoretical positive results with experiments highlighting the efficacy of steering in large games.

Enyi Jiang, Yibo Jacky Zhang, Yinglun Xu et al.

Learning from human feedback typically relies on preference optimization that constrains policy updates through token-level regularization. However, preference optimization for language models is particularly challenging because token-space similarity does not imply semantic or behavioral similarity. To address this challenge, we leverage latent-space regularization for language model preference optimization. We introduce GANPO, which achieves latent-space regularization by penalizing divergence between the internal representations of a policy model and a reference model. Given that latent representations are not associated with explicit probability densities, we adopt an adversarial approach inspired by GANs to minimize latent-space divergence. We integrate GANPO as a regularizer into existing offline preference optimization objectives. Experiments across multiple model architectures and tasks show consistent improvements from latent-space regularization. Further, by comparing GANPO-induced inferential biases with those from token-level regularization, we find that GANPO provides more robust structural feedback under distributional shift and noise while maintaining comparable downstream performance with minor computational overhead.

Andreas Haupt, Aroon Narayanan

Agents' learning from feedback shapes economic outcomes, and many economic decision-makers today employ learning algorithms to make consequential choices. This note shows that a widely used learning algorithm, $\varepsilon$-Greedy, exhibits emergent risk aversion: it prefers actions with lower variance. When presented with actions of the same expectation, under a wide range of conditions, $\varepsilon$-Greedy chooses the lower-variance action with probability approaching one. This emergent preference can have wide-ranging consequences, ranging from concerns about fairness to homogenization, and holds transiently even when the riskier action has a strictly higher expected payoff. We discuss two methods to correct this bias. The first method requires the algorithm to reweight data as a function of how likely the actions were to be chosen. The second requires the algorithm to have optimistic estimates of actions for which it has not collected much data. We show that risk-neutrality is restored with these corrections.

Andreas Haupt, Vaikkunth Mugunthan

Federated learning (FL) is a paradigm that allows distributed clients to learn a shared machine learning model without sharing their sensitive training data. While largely decentralized, FL requires resources to fund a central orchestrator or to reimburse contributors of datasets to incentivize participation. Inspired by insights from prior-independent auction design, we propose a mechanism, FIPIA (Federated Incentive Payments via Prior-Independent Auctions), to collect monetary contributions from self-interested clients. The mechanism operates in the semi-honest trust model and works even if clients have a heterogeneous interest in receiving high-quality models, and the server does not know the clients' level of interest. We run experiments on the MNIST, FashionMNIST, and CIFAR-10 datasets to test clients' model quality under FIPIA and FIPIA's incentive properties.

Andreas Haupt, Mohammad Khatami, Thomas Schultz et al.

When each data point is a large graph, graph statistics such as densities of certain subgraphs (motifs) can be used as feature vectors for machine learning. While intuitive, motif counts are expensive to compute and difficult to work with theoretically. Via graphon theory, we give an explicit quantitative bound for the ability of motif homomorphisms to distinguish large networks under both generative and sampling noise. Furthermore, we give similar bounds for the graph spectrum and connect it to homomorphism densities of cycles. This results in an easily computable classifier on graph data with theoretical performance guarantee. Our method yields competitive results on classification tasks for the autoimmune disease Lupus Erythematosus.