Y. Dong

M. Yin, B. Wang, Y. Dong et al. · mila

Most previous unsupervised domain adaptation (UDA) methods for question answering(QA) require access to source domain data while fine-tuning the model for the target domain. Source domain data may, however, contain sensitive information and may be restricted. In this study, we investigate a more challenging setting, source-free UDA, in which we have only the pretrained source model and target domain data, without access to source domain data. We propose a novel self-training approach to QA models that integrates a unique mask module for domain adaptation. The mask is auto-adjusted to extract key domain knowledge while trained on the source domain. To maintain previously learned domain knowledge, certain mask weights are frozen during adaptation, while other weights are adjusted to mitigate domain shifts with pseudo-labeled samples generated in the target domain. %As part of the self-training process, we generate pseudo-labeled samples in the target domain based on models trained in the source domain. Our empirical results on four benchmark datasets suggest that our approach significantly enhances the performance of pretrained QA models on the target domain, and even outperforms models that have access to the source data during adaptation.

S. Bensalem, Y. Dong, M. Franzle et al.

This position paper argues that enforcing LLM agent safety within a single abstraction layer is not merely suboptimal but categorically insufficient for deployed LLM agents -- a structural consequence of how agent execution works, not a contingent limitation of current systems. The three dimensions that jointly constitute safe operation -- semantic intent and policy compliance, environmental validity, and dynamical feasibility -- each depend on a strictly distinct set of information that becomes available at different stages of execution. No single guardrail can certify all three. We argue that the community must respond with a contract-based architecture in which each safety dimension is enforced by an independently certified layer whose probabilistic guarantee satisfies the next layer's assumption. We sketch such an architecture and derive the compositional system-level safety bounds it admits via the chain rule of probability. Three open problems stand between this and a deployable standard: bound estimation from non-i.i.d.\ traces, graceful degradation of contracts under deployment drift, and extension to multi-agent settings -- the most important unfinished business in LLM agent runtime assurance.