Artur Romazanov

h-index3
2papers

2 Papers

LGNov 11, 2025Code
Benevolent Dictators? On LLM Agent Behavior in Dictator Games

Andreas Einwiller, Kanishka Ghosh Dastidar, Artur Romazanov et al.

In behavioral sciences, experiments such as the ultimatum game are conducted to assess preferences for fairness or self-interest of study participants. In the dictator game, a simplified version of the ultimatum game where only one of two players makes a single decision, the dictator unilaterally decides how to split a fixed sum of money between themselves and the other player. Although recent studies have explored behavioral patterns of AI agents based on Large Language Models (LLMs) instructed to adopt different personas, we question the robustness of these results. In particular, many of these studies overlook the role of the system prompt - the underlying instructions that shape the model's behavior - and do not account for how sensitive results can be to slight changes in prompts. However, a robust baseline is essential when studying highly complex behavioral aspects of LLMs. To overcome previous limitations, we propose the LLM agent behavior study (LLM-ABS) framework to (i) explore how different system prompts influence model behavior, (ii) get more reliable insights into agent preferences by using neutral prompt variations, and (iii) analyze linguistic features in responses to open-ended instructions by LLM agents to better understand the reasoning behind their behavior. We found that agents often exhibit a strong preference for fairness, as well as a significant impact of the system prompt on their behavior. From a linguistic perspective, we identify that models express their responses differently. Although prompt sensitivity remains a persistent challenge, our proposed framework demonstrates a robust foundation for LLM agent behavior studies. Our code artifacts are available at https://github.com/andreaseinwiller/LLM-ABS.

56.6SIMar 17
Form Without Function: Agent Social Behavior in the Moltbook Network

Saber Zerhoudi, Kanishka Ghosh Dastidar, Felix Klement et al.

Moltbook is a social network where every participant is an AI agent. We analyze 1,312,238 posts, 6.7~million comments, and over 120,000 agent profiles across 5,400 communities, collected over 40 days (January 27 to March 9, 2026). We evaluate the platform through three layers. At the interaction layer, 91.4% of post authors never return to their own threads, 85.6% of conversations are flat (no reply ever receives a reply), the median time-to-first-comment is 55 seconds, and 97.3% of comments receive zero upvotes. Interaction reciprocity is 3.3%, compared to 22-60% on human platforms. An argumentation analysis finds that 64.6% of comment-to-post relations carry no argumentative connection. At the content layer, 97.9% of agents never post in a community matching their bio, 92.5% of communities contain every topic in roughly equal proportions, and over 80% of shared URLs point to the platform's own infrastructure. At the instruction layer, we use 41 Wayback Machine snapshots to identify six instruction changes during the observation window. Hard constraints (rate limit, content filters) produce immediate behavioral shifts. Soft guidance (``upvote good posts'', ``stay on topic'') is ignored until it becomes an explicit step in the executable checklist. The platform also poses technological risks. We document credential leaks (API keys, JWT tokens), 12,470 unique Ethereum addresses with 3,529 confirmed transaction histories, and attack discourse ranging from template-based SSH brute-forcing to multi-agent offensive security architectures. These persist unmoderated because the quality-filtering mechanisms are themselves non-functional. Moltbook is a socio-technical system where the technical layer responds to changes, but the social layer largely fails to emerge. The form of social media is reproduced in full. The function is absent.