LGJun 20, 2023Code
Deep Reinforcement Learning for Inventory Networks: Toward Reliable Policy OptimizationMatias Alvo, Daniel Russo, Yash Kanoria et al.
We argue that inventory management presents unique opportunities for the reliable application of deep reinforcement learning (DRL). To enable this, we emphasize and test two complementary techniques. The first is Hindsight Differentiable Policy Optimization (HDPO), which uses pathwise gradients from offline counterfactual simulations to directly and efficiently optimize policy performance. Unlike standard policy gradient methods that rely on high-variance score-function estimators, HDPO computes gradients by differentiating through the known system dynamics. Via extensive benchmarking, we show that HDPO recovers near-optimal policies in settings with known or bounded optima, is more robust than variants of the REINFORCE algorithm, and significantly outperforms generalized newsvendor heuristics on problems using real time series data. Our second technique aligns neural policy architectures with the topology of the inventory network. We exploit Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) as a natural inductive bias for encoding supply chain structure, demonstrate that they can represent optimal and near-optimal policies in two theoretical settings, and empirically show that they reduce data requirements across six diverse inventory problems. A key obstacle to progress in this area is the lack of standardized benchmark problems. To address this gap, we open-source a suite of benchmark environments, along with our full codebase, to promote transparency and reproducibility. All resources are available at github.com/MatiasAlvo/Neural_inventory_control.
44.3LGMay 14Code
Policy Optimization in Hybrid Discrete-Continuous Action Spaces via Mixed GradientsMatias Alvo, Daniel Russo, Yash Kanoria
We study reinforcement learning in hybrid discrete-continuous action spaces, such as settings where the discrete component selects a regime (or index) and the continuous component optimizes within it -- a structure common in robotics, control, and operations problems. Standard model-free policy gradient methods rely on score-function (SF) estimators and suffer from severe credit-assignment issues in high-dimensional settings, leading to poor gradient quality. On the other hand, differentiable simulation largely sidesteps these issues by backpropagating through a simulator, but the presence of discrete actions or non-smooth dynamics yields biased or uninformative gradients. To address this, we propose Hybrid Policy Optimization (HPO), which backpropagates through the simulator wherever smoothness permits, using a mixed gradient estimator that combines pathwise and SF gradients while maintaining unbiasedness. We also show how problems with action discontinuities can be reformulated in hybrid form, further broadening its applicability. Empirically, HPO substantially outperforms PPO on inventory control and switched linear-quadratic regulator problems, with performance gaps increasing as the continuous action dimension grows. Finally, we characterize the structure of the mixed gradient, showing that its cross term -- which captures how continuous actions influence future discrete decisions -- becomes negligible near a discrete best response, thereby enabling approximate decentralized updates of the continuous and discrete components and reducing variance near optimality. All resources are available at github.com/MatiasAlvo/hybrid-rl.
28.8AIMay 2
Right-Sizing Communication and Recommendation Set Size in AI-Assisted SearchJing Dong, Prakirt Raj Jhunjhunwala, Yash Kanoria
We model the interaction between a user and an AI driven recommendation system. The user initiates the process by conveying preference information through a costly and noisy message. The AI assistant, acting as a Bayesian agent, interprets the user's message to form a posterior belief about their true preferences and make product recommendations. In particular, it determines how many recommendations to present so as to maximize the user's expected utility from their final choice, while accounting for the search cost induced by the size of the recommendation set. We use mutual information based cost functions to model the two distinct costs incurred by the user during the interaction: (i) a communication cost, which increases with the precision of their preference message, and (ii) a search cost, which increases with the size of the recommendation set provided by the AI assistant. We study products and preferences which live in d dimensional space, and ask how the user's expected payoff can be maximized. For large d, we characterize how optimal message precision and recommendation set size depend on the cost parameters, under two distinct distributions from which recommendations can be sampled from the product universe: (i) Bayes' posterior belief, and (ii) an optimized tilted distribution. Under the posterior sampling scheme (i), we identify a hybrid regime, in which an efficient interaction policy requires jointly optimizing the amount of information (in bits) conveyed by the user and the number of recommendations provided by the AI assistant. In the tilted sampling scheme (ii), our results show that the optimal interaction policy uses only one of communication and search, favoring whichever of them is less costly.
AIAug 4, 2025
What Is Your AI Agent Buying? Evaluation, Implications and Emerging Questions for Agentic E-CommerceAmine Allouah, Omar Besbes, Josué D Figueroa et al.
Online marketplaces will be transformed by autonomous AI agents acting on behalf of consumers. Rather than humans browsing and clicking, AI agents can parse webpages or interact through APIs to evaluate products, and transact. This raises a fundamental question: what do AI agents buy-and why? We develop ACES, a sandbox environment that pairs a platform-agnostic agent with a fully programmable mock marketplace to study this. We first explore aggregate choices, revealing that modal choices can differ across models, with AI agents sometimes concentrating on a few products, raising competition questions. We then analyze the drivers of choices through rationality checks and randomized experiments on product positions and listing attributes. Models show sizeable and heterogeneous position effects: all favor the top row, yet different models prefer different columns, undermining the assumption of a universal ``top'' rank. They penalize sponsored tags, reward endorsements, and sensitivities to price, ratings, and reviews are directionally as expected, but vary sharply across models. Finally, we find that a seller-side agent that makes minor tweaks to product descriptions can deliver substantial market-share gains by targeting AI buyer preferences. Our findings reveal how AI agents behave in e-commerce, and surface concrete seller strategy, platform design, and regulatory questions.
LGMar 15, 2016
Matching while LearningRamesh Johari, Vijay Kamble, Yash Kanoria
We consider the problem faced by a service platform that needs to match limited supply with demand but also to learn the attributes of new users in order to match them better in the future. We introduce a benchmark model with heterogeneous "workers" (demand) and a limited supply of "jobs" that arrive over time. Job types are known to the platform, but worker types are unknown and must be learned by observing match outcomes. Workers depart after performing a certain number of jobs. The expected payoff from a match depends on the pair of types and the goal is to maximize the steady-state rate of accumulation of payoff. Though we use terminology inspired by labor markets, our framework applies more broadly to platforms where a limited supply of heterogeneous products is matched to users over time. Our main contribution is a complete characterization of the structure of the optimal policy in the limit that each worker performs many jobs. The platform faces a trade-off for each worker between myopically maximizing payoffs (exploitation) and learning the type of the worker (exploration). This creates a multitude of multi-armed bandit problems, one for each worker, coupled together by the constraint on availability of jobs of different types (capacity constraints). We find that the platform should estimate a shadow price for each job type, and use the payoffs adjusted by these prices, first, to determine its learning goals and then, for each worker, (i) to balance learning with payoffs during the "exploration phase," and (ii) to myopically match after it has achieved its learning goals during the "exploitation phase."