Jaime Morales

Naoya Yoshimura, Jaime Morales, Takuya Maekawa et al.

Unlike human daily activities, existing publicly available sensor datasets for work activity recognition in industrial domains are limited by difficulties in collecting realistic data as close collaboration with industrial sites is required. This also limits research on and development of methods for industrial applications. To address these challenges and contribute to research on machine recognition of work activities in industrial domains, in this study, we introduce a new large-scale dataset for packaging work recognition called OpenPack. OpenPack contains 53.8 hours of multimodal sensor data, including acceleration data, keypoints, depth images, and readings from IoT-enabled devices (e.g., handheld barcode scanners), collected from 16 distinct subjects with different levels of packaging work experience. We apply state-of-the-art human activity recognition techniques to the dataset and provide future directions of complex work activity recognition studies in the pervasive computing community based on the results. We believe that OpenPack will contribute to the sensor-based action/activity recognition community by providing challenging tasks. The OpenPack dataset is available at https://open-pack.github.io.

Jaime Morales, Sergio Pastrana, Juan Tapiador

Software obfuscation and encryption present persistent challenges for program comprehension and security analysis, particularly when adversaries conceal Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) such as IP addresses within source code. While Large Language Models (LLMs) have recently demonstrated remarkable progress in code reasoning and transformation, their resilience against adversarial concealment techniques remains largely uncharted. This paper introduces a systematic benchmark for secret detection under adversarial code transformations, designed to evaluate the capacity of LLMs to recover IoCs embedded in obfuscated and encrypted JavaScript programs. We construct a dataset of 336 programs, progressively transformed through 12 levels of obfuscation and cryptographic concealment (including XOR and AES-256), to emulate realistic threat scenarios. An automated evaluation framework standardizes LLM queries and responses, enabling reproducible, large-scale testing across diverse models. Our results reveal a dichotomy: while LLMs exhibit high success against lightweight transformations such as variable renaming and Base64 encoding, encryption-based concealment severely degrades detection performance. These findings establish encryption as a critical frontier for LLM-driven code analysis and highlight both current limitations and avenues for advancing automated threat intelligence.