Ashish R. Hota

Ashish R. Hota, Siddharth Garg, Shreyas Sundaram

We study a common-pool resource game where the resource experiences failure with a probability that grows with the aggregate investment in the resource. To capture decision making under such uncertainty, we model each player's risk preference according to the value function from prospect theory. We show the existence and uniqueness of a pure Nash equilibrium when the players have heterogeneous risk preferences and under certain assumptions on the rate of return and failure probability of the resource. Greater competition, vis-a-vis the number of players, increases the failure probability at the Nash equilibrium; we quantify this effect by obtaining bounds on the ratio of the failure probability at the Nash equilibrium to the failure probability under investment by a single user. We further show that heterogeneity in attitudes towards loss aversion leads to higher failure probability of the resource at the equilibrium.

Ashish R. Hota, Shreyas Sundaram

We study decentralized protection strategies against Susceptible-Infected-Susceptible (SIS) epidemics on networks. We consider a population game framework where nodes choose whether or not to vaccinate themselves, and the epidemic risk is defined as the infection probability at the endemic state of the epidemic under a degree-based mean-field approximation. Motivated by studies in behavioral economics showing that humans perceive probabilities and risks in a nonlinear fashion, we specifically examine the impacts of such misperceptions on the Nash equilibrium protection strategies. We first establish the existence and uniqueness of a threshold equilibrium where nodes with degrees larger than a certain threshold vaccinate. When the vaccination cost is sufficiently high, we show that behavioral biases cause fewer players to vaccinate, and vice versa. We quantify this effect for a class of networks with power-law degree distributions by proving tight bounds on the ratio of equilibrium thresholds under behavioral and true perceptions of probabilities. We further characterize the socially optimal vaccination policy and investigate the inefficiency of Nash equilibrium.

Ashish R. Hota, Shreyas Sundaram

We consider a game-theoretic model where individuals compete over a shared failure-prone system or resource. We investigate the effectiveness of a taxation mechanism in controlling the utilization of the resource at the Nash equilibrium when the decision-makers have behavioral risk preferences, captured by prospect theory. We first observe that heterogeneous prospect-theoretic risk preferences can lead to counter-intuitive outcomes. In particular, for resources that exhibit network effects, utilization can increase under taxation and there may not exist a tax rate that achieves the socially optimal level of utilization. We identify conditions under which utilization is monotone and continuous, and then characterize the range of utilizations that can be achieved by a suitable choice of tax rate. We further show that resource utilization is higher when players are charged differentiated tax rates compared to the case when all players are charged an identical tax rate, under suitable assumptions.

Mayank Baranwal, Param Budhraja, Vishal Raj et al.

Gradient-based first-order convex optimization algorithms find widespread applicability in a variety of domains, including machine learning tasks. Motivated by the recent advances in fixed-time stability theory of continuous-time dynamical systems, we introduce a generalized framework for designing accelerated optimization algorithms with strongest convergence guarantees that further extend to a subclass of non-convex functions. In particular, we introduce the GenFlow algorithm and its momentum variant that provably converge to the optimal solution of objective functions satisfying the Polyak-Łojasiewicz (PL) inequality in a fixed time. Moreover, for functions that admit non-degenerate saddle-points, we show that for the proposed GenFlow algorithm, the time required to evade these saddle-points is uniformly bounded for all initial conditions. Finally, for strongly convex-strongly concave minimax problems whose optimal solution is a saddle point, a similar scheme is shown to arrive at the optimal solution again in a fixed time. The superior convergence properties of our algorithm are validated experimentally on a variety of benchmark datasets.

Dinesh Patra, Prajakta Surve, Ashish R. Hota et al.

We consider a pursuit-evasion scenario involving a group of pursuers and a single evader in a two-dimensional unbounded environment. The pursuers aim to capture the evader in finite time while ensuring the evader remains enclosed within the convex hull of their positions until capture, without knowledge of the evader's heading angle. Prior works have addressed the problem of encirclement and capture separately in different contexts. In this paper, we present a class of strategies for the pursuers that guarantee capture in finite time while maintaining encirclement, irrespective of the evader's strategy. Furthermore, we derive an upper bound on the time to capture. Numerical results highlight the effectiveness of the proposed framework against a range of evader strategies.

Ashish R. Hota, Ashish Cherukuri, John Lygeros

We present a data-driven approach for distributionally robust chance constrained optimization problems (DRCCPs). We consider the case where the decision maker has access to a finite number of samples or realizations of the uncertainty. The chance constraint is then required to hold for all distributions that are close to the empirical distribution constructed from the samples (where the distance between two distributions is defined via the Wasserstein metric). We first reformulate DRCCPs under data-driven Wasserstein ambiguity sets and a general class of constraint functions. When the feasibility set of the chance constraint program is replaced by its convex inner approximation, we present a convex reformulation of the program and show its tractability when the constraint function is affine in both the decision variable and the uncertainty. For constraint functions concave in the uncertainty, we show that a cutting-surface algorithm converges to an approximate solution of the convex inner approximation of DRCCPs. Finally, for constraint functions convex in the uncertainty, we compare the feasibility set with other sample-based approaches for chance constrained programs.

Ashish R. Hota, Shreyas Sundaram

We study networks of human decision-makers who independently decide how to protect themselves against Susceptible-Infected-Susceptible (SIS) epidemics. Motivated by studies in behavioral economics showing that humans perceive probabilities in a nonlinear fashion, we examine the impacts of such misperceptions on the equilibrium protection strategies. In our setting, nodes choose their curing rates to minimize the infection probability under the degree-based mean-field approximation of the SIS epidemic plus the cost of their selected curing rate. We establish the existence of a degree based equilibrium under both true and nonlinear perceptions of infection probabilities (under suitable assumptions). When the per-unit cost of curing rate is sufficiently high, we show that true expectation minimizers choose the curing rate to be zero at the equilibrium, while curing rate is nonzero under nonlinear probability weighting.

Ashish R. Hota, Shreyas Sundaram

We consider a class of interdependent security games on networks where each node chooses a personal level of security investment. The attack probability experienced by a node is a function of her own investment and the investment by her neighbors in the network. Most of the existing work in these settings considers players who are risk-neutral. In contrast, studies in behavioral decision theory have shown that individuals often deviate from risk-neutral behavior while making decisions under uncertainty. In particular, the true probabilities associated with uncertain outcomes are often transformed into perceived probabilities in a highly nonlinear fashion by the users, which then influence their decisions. In this paper, we investigate the effects of such behavioral probability weightings by the nodes on their optimal investment strategies and the resulting security risk profiles that arise at the Nash equilibria of interdependent network security games. We characterize graph topologies that achieve the largest and smallest worst case average attack probabilities at Nash equilibria in Total Effort games, and equilibrium investments in Weakest Link and Best Shot games.