49.8AIMay 27
Show, Don't TELL: Explainable AI-Generated Text DetectionAldan Creo, Suraj Ranganath
Research on AI-generated text detection has presented a number of approaches to discern human from AI prose, some of which achieving high in-distribution performance. However, real-world applicability has stalled because their outputs are misaligned with the needs of users, such as professors, who are presented with a numeric score that has no attached explanation. We tackle this issue with a novel architecture, TELL, that bakes explainability from the ground-up. While our system still offers a numerical score like other detectors for comparability, TELL takes a fundamentally different approach where we aim to show the user the "tells" by which the model believes a text is AI or human-written, to empower the user to decide who wrote a text using their own judgment and understanding of the context of the writing and its alleged author. We train TELL on a custom SFT dataset of domain-specific authorship annotations, and further refine the system using GRPO with curriculum learning to improve performance. We achieve competitive performance with state-of-the-art detectors (AUROC 0.927) while natively providing annotations that explain the basis for the detector's decision. We further evaluate the quality of our explanations using a dataset of human annotations and report a high (mean 72.3%) win-rate on annotation concreteness, falsifiability, coherence, plausibility and grounding, allowing users to critically think and decide for themselves. Our work thus reframes the problem of AI-generated text detection in a human-centric perspective and paves the way for a new family of detectors that focus on native explainability.
63.7LGMay 19
Fine-Tuning Without Forgetting via Loss-Adaptive Learning RatesParjanya Prajakta Prashant, Jiongli Zhu, Aldan Creo et al.
Fine-tuning large language models on new data improves task performance but degrades capabilities learned during pretraining, a phenomenon known as catastrophic forgetting. Existing methods mitigate this by modifying the fine-tuning objective to suppress high-loss tokens or sequences, but these tokens are essential for learning new tasks, especially those with poor pretraining coverage. In such settings, hard tokens should still contribute to learning, so forgetting must be controlled without suppressing them. We identify a simple mechanism for doing so: per-step forgetting is bounded by the product of the learning rate and the square root of the current training loss. This suggests that high-loss batches are especially prone to inducing forgetting. Motivated by this observation, we introduce FINCH, a loss-adaptive learning-rate schedule that reduces the learning rate on high-loss batches and increases it as the model converges, while leaving the fine-tuning objective unchanged. Across knowledge acquisition, science, and low-resource language adaptation benchmarks, FINCH reduces forgetting by 93% on average while matching the task performance of standard fine-tuning. On Qwen3-4B knowledge acquisition, FINCH cuts TruthfulQA degradation by 5x and reverses HaluEval degradation, while better preserving confidence calibration. Overall, our results show that learning-rate schedules are an effective tool to shape model behavior during fine-tuning, beyond just target-task optimization.
CRAug 3, 2025Code
Complete Evasion, Zero Modification: PDF Attacks on AI Text DetectionAldan Creo
AI-generated text detectors have become essential tools for maintaining content authenticity, yet their robustness against evasion attacks remains questionable. We present PDFuzz, a novel attack that exploits the discrepancy between visual text layout and extraction order in PDF documents. Our method preserves exact textual content while manipulating character positioning to scramble extraction sequences. We evaluate this approach against the ArguGPT detector using a dataset of human and AI-generated text. Our results demonstrate complete evasion: detector performance drops from (93.6 $\pm$ 1.4) % accuracy and 0.938 $\pm$ 0.014 F1 score to random-level performance ((50.4 $\pm$ 3.2) % accuracy, 0.0 F1 score) while maintaining perfect visual fidelity. Our work reveals a vulnerability in current detection systems that is inherent to PDF document structures and underscores the need for implementing sturdy safeguards against such attacks. We make our code publicly available at https://github.com/ACMCMC/PDFuzz.
CLJun 3, 2025Code
Ask a Local: Detecting Hallucinations With Specialized Model DivergenceAldan Creo, Héctor Cerezo-Costas, Pedro Alonso-Doval et al.
Hallucinations in large language models (LLMs) - instances where models generate plausible but factually incorrect information - present a significant challenge for AI. We introduce "Ask a Local", a novel hallucination detection method exploiting the intuition that specialized models exhibit greater surprise when encountering domain-specific inaccuracies. Our approach computes divergence between perplexity distributions of language-specialized models to identify potentially hallucinated spans. Our method is particularly well-suited for a multilingual context, as it naturally scales to multiple languages without the need for adaptation, relying on external data sources, or performing training. Moreover, we select computationally efficient models, providing a scalable solution that can be applied to a wide range of languages and domains. Our results on a human-annotated question-answer dataset spanning 14 languages demonstrate consistent performance across languages, with Intersection-over-Union (IoU) scores around 0.3 and comparable Spearman correlation values. Our model shows particularly strong performance on Italian and Catalan, with IoU scores of 0.42 and 0.38, respectively, while maintaining cross-lingual effectiveness without language-specific adaptations. We release our code and architecture to facilitate further research in multilingual hallucination detection.
CLDec 13, 2023
Prompting LLMs with content plans to enhance the summarization of scientific articlesAldan Creo, Manuel Lama, Juan C. Vidal
This paper presents novel prompting techniques to improve the performance of automatic summarization systems for scientific articles. Scientific article summarization is highly challenging due to the length and complexity of these documents. We conceive, implement, and evaluate prompting techniques that provide additional contextual information to guide summarization systems. Specifically, we feed summarizers with lists of key terms extracted from articles, such as author keywords or automatically generated keywords. Our techniques are tested with various summarization models and input texts. Results show performance gains, especially for smaller models summarizing sections separately. This evidences that prompting is a promising approach to overcoming the limitations of less powerful systems. Our findings introduce a new research direction of using prompts to aid smaller models.
CLJul 6, 2025
Mass-Scale Analysis of In-the-Wild Conversations Reveals Complexity Bounds on LLM JailbreakingAldan Creo, Raul Castro Fernandez, Manuel Cebrian
As large language models (LLMs) become increasingly deployed, understanding the complexity and evolution of jailbreaking strategies is critical for AI safety. We present a mass-scale empirical analysis of jailbreak complexity across over 2 million real-world conversations from diverse platforms, including dedicated jailbreaking communities and general-purpose chatbots. Using a range of complexity metrics spanning probabilistic measures, lexical diversity, compression ratios, and cognitive load indicators, we find that jailbreak attempts do not exhibit significantly higher complexity than normal conversations. This pattern holds consistently across specialized jailbreaking communities and general user populations, suggesting practical bounds on attack sophistication. Temporal analysis reveals that while user attack toxicity and complexity remains stable over time, assistant response toxicity has decreased, indicating improving safety mechanisms. The absence of power-law scaling in complexity distributions further points to natural limits on jailbreak development. Our findings challenge the prevailing narrative of an escalating arms race between attackers and defenders, instead suggesting that LLM safety evolution is bounded by human ingenuity constraints while defensive measures continue advancing. Our results highlight critical information hazards in academic jailbreak disclosure, as sophisticated attacks exceeding current complexity baselines could disrupt the observed equilibrium and enable widespread harm before defensive adaptation.
CLJun 17, 2024
SilverSpeak: Evading AI-Generated Text Detectors using HomoglyphsAldan Creo, Shushanta Pudasaini
The advent of Large Language Models (LLMs) has enabled the generation of text that increasingly exhibits human-like characteristics. As the detection of such content is of significant importance, substantial research has been conducted with the objective of developing reliable AI-generated text detectors. These detectors have demonstrated promising results on test data, but recent research has revealed that they can be circumvented by employing different techniques. In this paper, we present homoglyph-based attacks (A $\rightarrow$ Cyrillic A) as a means of circumventing existing detectors. We conduct a comprehensive evaluation to assess the effectiveness of these attacks on seven detectors, including ArguGPT, Binoculars, DetectGPT, Fast-DetectGPT, Ghostbuster, OpenAI's detector, and watermarking techniques, on five different datasets. Our findings demonstrate that homoglyph-based attacks can effectively circumvent state-of-the-art detectors, leading them to classify all texts as either AI-generated or human-written (decreasing the average Matthews Correlation Coefficient from 0.64 to -0.01). Through further examination, we extract the technical justification underlying the success of the attacks, which varies across detectors. Finally, we discuss the implications of these findings and potential defenses against such attacks.