Marco Milanta

Luca Beurer-Kellner, Aleksei Kudrinskii, Marco Milanta et al.

We analyzed 3,984 AI agent skills from major marketplaces and found 76 confirmed malicious payloads, including credential theft, backdoor installation, and data exfiltration. 13.4% of all skills contain at least one critical-level security issue and at least 8 manually confirmed malicious skills remain publicly available on clawhub.ai as of the date of publication. This report documents our methodology, presents a threat taxonomy based on real-world samples, and details the attack patterns we observed. As skill marketplaces grow rapidly and AI agents gain access to sensitive credentials and systems, automated security analysis is no longer optional.

Michael Aerni, Marco Milanta, Konstantin Donhauser et al.

Classical wisdom suggests that estimators should avoid fitting noise to achieve good generalization. In contrast, modern overparameterized models can yield small test error despite interpolating noise -- a phenomenon often called "benign overfitting" or "harmless interpolation". This paper argues that the degree to which interpolation is harmless hinges upon the strength of an estimator's inductive bias, i.e., how heavily the estimator favors solutions with a certain structure: while strong inductive biases prevent harmless interpolation, weak inductive biases can even require fitting noise to generalize well. Our main theoretical result establishes tight non-asymptotic bounds for high-dimensional kernel regression that reflect this phenomenon for convolutional kernels, where the filter size regulates the strength of the inductive bias. We further provide empirical evidence of the same behavior for deep neural networks with varying filter sizes and rotational invariance.