Haris Pervaiz

CR
3papers
33citations
Novelty50%
AI Score24

3 Papers

SPJan 8, 2023
Energy Disaggregation & Appliance Identification in a Smart Home: Transfer Learning enables Edge Computing

M. Hashim Shahab, Hasan Mujtaba Buttar, Ahsan Mehmood et al.

Non-intrusive load monitoring (NILM) or energy disaggregation aims to extract the load profiles of individual consumer electronic appliances, given an aggregate load profile of the mains of a smart home. This work proposes a novel deep-learning and edge computing approach to solve the NILM problem and a few related problems as follows. 1) We build upon the reputed seq2-point convolutional neural network (CNN) model to come up with the proposed seq2-[3]-point CNN model to solve the (home) NILM problem and site-NILM problem (basically, NILM at a smaller scale). 2) We solve the related problem of appliance identification by building upon the state-of-the-art (pre-trained) 2D-CNN models, i.e., AlexNet, ResNet-18, and DenseNet-121, which are fine-tuned two custom datasets that consist of Wavelets and short-time Fourier transform (STFT)-based 2D electrical signatures of the appliances. 3) Finally, we do some basic qualitative inference about an individual appliance's health by comparing the power consumption of the same appliance across multiple homes. Low-frequency REDD dataset is used for all problems, except site-NILM where REFIT dataset has been used. As for the results, we achieve a maximum accuracy of 94.6\% for home-NILM, 81\% for site-NILM, and 88.9\% for appliance identification (with Resnet-based model).

CRFeb 28, 2019
Shared Secret Key Generation via Carrier Frequency Offsets

Waqas Aman, Aneeqa Ijaz, M. Mahboob Ur Rahman et al.

This work presents a novel method to generate secret keys shared between a legitimate node pair (Alice and Bob) to safeguard the communication between them from an unauthorized node (Eve). To this end, we exploit the {\it reciprocal carrier frequency offset} (CFO) between the legitimate node pair to extract common randomness out of it to generate shared secret keys. The proposed key generation algorithm involves standard steps: the legitimate nodes exchange binary phase-shift keying (BPSK) signals to perform blind CFO estimation on the received signals, and do equi-probable quantization of the noisy CFO estimates followed by information reconciliation--to distil a shared secret key. Furthermore, guided by the Allan deviation curve, we distinguish between the two frequency-stability regimes---when the randomly time-varying CFO process i) has memory, ii) is memoryless; thereafter, we compute the key generation rate for both regimes. Simulation results show that the key disagreement rate decreases exponentially with increase in the signal to noise ratio of the link between Alice and Bob. Additionally, the decipher probability of Eve decreases as soon as either of the two links observed by the Eve becomes more degraded compared to the link between Alice and Bob.

CRMay 31, 2018
Impersonation Detection in Line-of-Sight Underwater Acoustic Sensor Networks

Waqas Aman, Muhammad Mahboob Ur Rahman, Junaid Qadir et al.

This work considers a line-of-sight underwater acoustic sensor network (UWASN) consisting of $M$ underwater sensor nodes randomly deployed according to uniform distribution within a vertical half-disc (the so-called trusted zone). The sensor nodes report their sensed data to a sink node on water surface on a shared underwater acoustic (UWA) reporting channel in a time-division multiple-access (TDMA) fashion, while an active-yet-invisible adversary (so-called Eve) is present in the close vicinity who aims to inject malicious data into the system by impersonating some Alice node. To this end, this work first considers an additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) UWA channel, and proposes a novel, multiple-features based, two-step method at the sink node to thwart the potential impersonation attack by Eve. Specifically, the sink node exploits the noisy estimates of the distance, the angle of arrival, and the location of the transmit node as device fingerprints to carry out a number of binary hypothesis tests (for impersonation detection) as well as a number of maximum likelihood hypothesis tests (for transmitter identification when no impersonation is detected). We provide closed-form expressions for the error probabilities (i.e., the performance) of most of the hypothesis tests. We then consider the case of a UWA with colored noise and frequency-dependent pathloss, and derive a maximum-likelihood (ML) distance estimator as well as the corresponding Cramer-Rao bound (CRB). We then invoke the proposed two-step, impersonation detection framework by utilizing distance as the sole feature. Finally, we provide detailed simulation results for both AWGN UWA channel and the UWA channel with colored noise. Simulation results verify that the proposed scheme is indeed effective for a UWA channel with colored noise and frequency-dependent pathloss.