Varun Gupta

Natalie Collina, Ira Globus-Harris, Surbhi Goel et al.

We give efficient "collaboration protocols" through which two parties, who observe different features about the same instances, can interact to arrive at predictions that are more accurate than either could have obtained on their own. The parties only need to iteratively share and update their own label predictions-without either party ever having to share the actual features that they observe. Our protocols are efficient reductions to the problem of learning on each party's feature space alone, and so can be used even in settings in which each party's feature space is illegible to the other-which arises in models of human/AI interaction and in multi-modal learning. The communication requirements of our protocols are independent of the dimensionality of the data. In an online adversarial setting we show how to give regret bounds on the predictions that the parties arrive at with respect to a class of benchmark policies defined on the joint feature space of the two parties, despite the fact that neither party has access to this joint feature space. We also give simpler algorithms for the same task in the batch setting in which we assume that there is a fixed but unknown data distribution. We generalize our protocols to a decision theoretic setting with high dimensional outcome spaces, where parties communicate only "best response actions." Our theorems give a computationally and statistically tractable generalization of past work on information aggregation amongst Bayesians who share a common and correct prior, as part of a literature studying "agreement" in the style of Aumann's agreement theorem. Our results require no knowledge of (or even the existence of) a prior distribution and are computationally efficient. Nevertheless we show how to lift our theorems back to this classical Bayesian setting, and in doing so, give new information aggregation theorems for Bayesian agreement.

Natalie Collina, Surbhi Goel, Varun Gupta et al.

We present an efficient reduction that converts any machine learning algorithm into an interactive protocol, enabling collaboration with another party (e.g., a human) to achieve consensus on predictions and improve accuracy. This approach imposes calibration conditions on each party, which are computationally and statistically tractable relaxations of Bayesian rationality. These conditions are sensible even in prior-free settings, representing a significant generalization of Aumann's classic "agreement theorem." In our protocol, the model first provides a prediction. The human then responds by either agreeing or offering feedback. The model updates its state and revises its prediction, while the human may adjust their beliefs. This iterative process continues until the two parties reach agreement. Initially, we study a setting that extends Aumann's Agreement Theorem, where parties aim to agree on a one-dimensional expectation by iteratively sharing their current estimates. Here, we recover the convergence theorem of Aaronson'05 under weaker assumptions. We then address the case where parties hold beliefs over distributions with d outcomes, exploring two feedback mechanisms. The first involves vector-valued estimates of predictions, while the second adopts a decision-theoretic approach: the human, needing to take an action from a finite set based on utility, communicates their utility-maximizing action at each round. In this setup, the number of rounds until agreement remains independent of d. Finally, we generalize to scenarios with more than two parties, where computational complexity scales linearly with the number of participants. Our protocols rely on simple, efficient conditions and produce predictions that surpass the accuracy of any individual party's alone.

Natalie Collina, Varun Gupta, Aaron Roth

We study a repeated contracting setting in which a Principal adaptively chooses amongst $k$ Agents at each of $T$ rounds. The Agents are non-myopic, and so a mechanism for the Principal induces a $T$-round extensive form game amongst the Agents. We give several results aimed at understanding an under-explored aspect of contract theory -- the game induced when choosing an Agent to contract with. First, we show that this game admits a pure-strategy \emph{non-responsive} equilibrium amongst the Agents -- informally an equilibrium in which the Agent's actions depend on the history of realized states of nature, but not on the history of each other's actions, and so avoids the complexities of collusion and threats. Next, we show that if the Principal selects Agents using a \emph{monotone} bandit algorithm, then for any concave contract, in any such equilibrium, the Principal obtains no regret to contracting with the best Agent in hindsight -- not just given their realized actions, but also to the counterfactual world in which they had offered a guaranteed $T$-round contract to the best Agent in hindsight, which would have induced a different sequence of actions. Finally, we show that if the Principal selects Agents using a monotone bandit algorithm which guarantees no swap-regret, then the Principal can additionally offer only limited liability contracts (in which the Agent never needs to pay the Principal) while getting no-regret to the counterfactual world in which she offered a linear contract to the best Agent in hindsight -- despite the fact that linear contracts are not limited liability. We instantiate this theorem by demonstrating the existence of a monotone no swap-regret bandit algorithm, which to our knowledge has not previously appeared in the literature.