Tobias Werner

h-index55
2papers

2 Papers

CYAug 2, 2025
Recognising, Anticipating, and Mitigating LLM Pollution of Online Behavioural Research

Raluca Rilla, Tobias Werner, Hiromu Yakura et al.

Online behavioural research faces an emerging threat as participants increasingly turn to large language models (LLMs) for advice, translation, or task delegation: LLM Pollution. We identify three interacting variants through which LLM Pollution threatens the validity and integrity of online behavioural research. First, Partial LLM Mediation occurs when participants make selective use of LLMs for specific aspects of a task, such as translation or wording support, leading researchers to (mis)interpret LLM-shaped outputs as human ones. Second, Full LLM Delegation arises when agentic LLMs complete studies with little to no human oversight, undermining the central premise of human-subject research at a more foundational level. Third, LLM Spillover signifies human participants altering their behaviour as they begin to anticipate LLM presence in online studies, even when none are involved. While Partial Mediation and Full Delegation form a continuum of increasing automation, LLM Spillover reflects second-order reactivity effects. Together, these variants interact and generate cascading distortions that compromise sample authenticity, introduce biases that are difficult to detect post hoc, and ultimately undermine the epistemic grounding of online research on human cognition and behaviour. Crucially, the threat of LLM Pollution is already co-evolving with advances in generative AI, creating an escalating methodological arms race. To address this, we propose a multi-layered response spanning researcher practices, platform accountability, and community efforts. As the challenge evolves, coordinated adaptation will be essential to safeguard methodological integrity and preserve the validity of online behavioural research.

GNJan 13, 2025
The Spoils of Algorithmic Collusion: Profit Allocation Among Asymmetric Firms

Simon Martin, Hans-Theo Normann, Paul Püplichhuisen et al.

We study the propensity of independent algorithms to collude in repeated Cournot duopoly games. Specifically, we investigate the predictive power of different oligopoly and bargaining solutions regarding the effect of asymmetry between firms. We find that both consumers and firms can benefit from asymmetry. Algorithms produce more competitive outcomes when firms are symmetric, but less when they are very asymmetric. Although the static Nash equilibrium underestimates the effect on total quantity and overestimates the effect on profits, it delivers surprisingly accurate predictions in terms of total welfare. The best description of our results is provided by the equal relative gains solution. In particular, we find algorithms to agree on profits that are on or close to the Pareto frontier for all degrees of asymmetry. Our results suggest that the common belief that symmetric industries are more prone to collusion may no longer hold when algorithms increasingly drive managerial decisions.