Luis Moniz Pereira

Theodor Cimpeanu, Luis Moniz Pereira, The Anh Han

Building ethical machines may involve bestowing upon them the emotional capacity to self-evaluate and repent on their actions. While apologies represent potential strategic interactions, the explicit evolution of guilt as a behavioural trait remains poorly understood. Our study delves into the co-evolution of two forms of emotional guilt: social guilt entails a cost, requiring agents to exert efforts to understand others' internal states and behaviours; and non-social guilt, which only involves awareness of one's own state, incurs no social cost. Resorting to methods from evolutionary game theory, we study analytically, and through extensive numerical and agent-based simulations, whether and how guilt can evolve and deploy, depending on the underlying structure of the systems of agents. Our findings reveal that in lattice and scale-free networks, strategies favouring emotional guilt dominate a broader range of guilt and social costs compared to non-structured well-mixed populations, so leading to higher levels of cooperation. In structured populations, both social and non-social guilt can thrive through clustering with emotionally inclined strategies, thereby providing protection against exploiters, particularly for less costly non-social strategies. These insights shed light on the complex interplay of guilt and cooperation, enhancing our understanding of ethical artificial intelligence.

The Anh Han, Tom Lenaerts, Francisco C. Santos et al.

With the introduction of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and related technologies in our daily lives, fear and anxiety about their misuse as well as the hidden biases in their creation have led to a demand for regulation to address such issues. Yet blindly regulating an innovation process that is not well understood, may stifle this process and reduce benefits that society may gain from the generated technology, even under the best intentions. In this paper, starting from a baseline model that captures the fundamental dynamics of a race for domain supremacy using AI technology, we demonstrate how socially unwanted outcomes may be produced when sanctioning is applied unconditionally to risk-taking, i.e. potentially unsafe, behaviours. As an alternative to resolve the detrimental effect of over-regulation, we propose a voluntary commitment approach wherein technologists have the freedom of choice between independently pursuing their course of actions or establishing binding agreements to act safely, with sanctioning of those that do not abide to what they pledged. Overall, this work reveals for the first time how voluntary commitments, with sanctions either by peers or an institution, leads to socially beneficial outcomes in all scenarios envisageable in a short-term race towards domain supremacy through AI technology. These results are directly relevant for the design of governance and regulatory policies that aim to ensure an ethical and responsible AI technology development process.

Theodor Cimpeanu, Francisco C. Santos, Luis Moniz Pereira et al.

Regulation of advanced technologies such as Artificial Intelligence (AI) has become increasingly important, given the associated risks and apparent ethical issues. With the great benefits promised from being able to first supply such technologies, safety precautions and societal consequences might be ignored or shortchanged in exchange for speeding up the development, therefore engendering a racing narrative among the developers. Starting from a game-theoretical model describing an idealised technology race in a fully connected world of players, here we investigate how different interaction structures among race participants can alter collective choices and requirements for regulatory actions. Our findings indicate that, when participants portray a strong diversity in terms of connections and peer-influence (e.g., when scale-free networks shape interactions among parties), the conflicts that exist in homogeneous settings are significantly reduced, thereby lessening the need for regulatory actions. Furthermore, our results suggest that technology governance and regulation may profit from the world's patent heterogeneity and inequality among firms and nations, so as to enable the design and implementation of meticulous interventions on a minority of participants, which is capable of influencing an entire population towards an ethical and sustainable use of advanced technologies.

The Anh Han, Luis Moniz Pereira, Tom Lenaerts et al.

The field of Artificial Intelligence (AI) is going through a period of great expectations, introducing a certain level of anxiety in research, business and also policy. This anxiety is further energised by an AI race narrative that makes people believe they might be missing out. Whether real or not, a belief in this narrative may be detrimental as some stake-holders will feel obliged to cut corners on safety precautions, or ignore societal consequences just to "win". Starting from a baseline model that describes a broad class of technology races where winners draw a significant benefit compared to others (such as AI advances, patent race, pharmaceutical technologies), we investigate here how positive (rewards) and negative (punishments) incentives may beneficially influence the outcomes. We uncover conditions in which punishment is either capable of reducing the development speed of unsafe participants or has the capacity to reduce innovation through over-regulation. Alternatively, we show that, in several scenarios, rewarding those that follow safety measures may increase the development speed while ensuring safe choices. Moreover, in {the latter} regimes, rewards do not suffer from the issue of over-regulation as is the case for punishment. Overall, our findings provide valuable insights into the nature and kinds of regulatory actions most suitable to improve safety compliance in the contexts of both smooth and sudden technological shifts.

Luis Moniz Pereira, Francisco C. Santos

Counterfactual Thinking is a human cognitive ability studied in a wide variety of domains. It captures the process of reasoning about a past event that did not occur, namely what would have happened had this event occurred, or, otherwise, to reason about an event that did occur but what would ensue had it not. Given the wide cognitive empowerment of counterfactual reasoning in the human individual, the question arises of how the presence of individuals with this capability may improve cooperation in populations of self-regarding individuals. Here we propose a mathematical model, grounded on Evolutionary Game Theory, to examine the population dynamics emerging from the interplay between counterfactual thinking and social learning (i.e., individuals that learn from the actions and success of others) whenever the individuals in the population face a collective dilemma. Our results suggest that counterfactual reasoning fosters coordination in collective action problems occurring in large populations, and has a limited impact on cooperation dilemmas in which coordination is not required. Moreover, we show that a small prevalence of individuals resorting to counterfactual thinking is enough to nudge an entire population towards highly cooperative standards.

The Anh Han, Luis Moniz Pereira, Francisco C. Santos et al.

Rapid technological advancements in AI as well as the growing deployment of intelligent technologies in new application domains are currently driving the competition between businesses, nations and regions. This race for technological supremacy creates a complex ecology of choices that may lead to negative consequences, in particular, when ethical and safety procedures are underestimated or even ignored. As a consequence, different actors are urging to consider both the normative and social impact of these technological advancements. As there is no easy access to data describing this AI race, theoretical models are necessary to understand its dynamics, allowing for the identification of when, how and which procedures need to be put in place to favour outcomes beneficial for all. We show that, next to the risks of setbacks and being reprimanded for unsafe behaviour, the time-scale in which AI supremacy can be achieved plays a crucial role. When this supremacy can be achieved in a short term, those who completely ignore the safety precautions are bound to win the race but at a cost to society, apparently requiring regulatory actions. Our analysis reveals that blindly imposing regulations may not have anticipated effect as only for specific conditions a dilemma arises between what individually preferred and globally beneficial. Similar observations can be made for the long-term development case. Yet different from the short term situation, certain conditions require the promotion of risk-taking as opposed to compliance to safety regulations in order to improve social welfare. These results remain robust when two or several actors are involved in the race and when collective rather than individual setbacks are produced by risk-taking behaviour. When defining codes of conduct and regulatory policies for AI, a clear understanding about the time-scale of the race is required.