Riddhi J. Pitliya

Mahault Albarracin, Riddhi J. Pitliya, Maxwell J. D. Ramstead et al.

Phenomenology is the rigorous descriptive study of conscious experience. Recent attempts to formalize Husserlian phenomenology provide us with a mathematical model of perception as a function of prior knowledge and expectation. In this paper, we re-examine elements of Husserlian phenomenology through the lens of active inference. In doing so, we aim to advance the project of computational phenomenology, as recently outlined by proponents of active inference. We propose that key aspects of Husserl's descriptions of consciousness can be mapped onto aspects of the generative models associated with the active inference approach. We first briefly review active inference. We then discuss Husserl's phenomenology, with a focus on time consciousness. Finally, we present our mapping from Husserlian phenomenology to active inference.

Candice Pattisapu, Tim Verbelen, Riddhi J. Pitliya et al.

Previous active inference accounts of emotion translate fluctuations in free energy to a sense of emotion, mainly focusing on valence. However, in affective science, emotions are often represented as multi-dimensional. In this paper, we propose to adopt a Circumplex Model of emotion by mapping emotions into a two-dimensional spectrum of valence and arousal. We show how one can derive a valence and arousal signal from an agent's expected free energy, relating arousal to the entropy of posterior beliefs and valence to utility less expected utility. Under this formulation, we simulate artificial agents engaged in a search task. We show that the manipulation of priors and object presence results in commonsense variability in emotional states.

Ozan Catal, Toon Van de Maele, Riddhi J. Pitliya et al.

When collaborating with multiple parties, communicating relevant information is of utmost importance to efficiently completing the tasks at hand. Under active inference, communication can be cast as sharing beliefs between free-energy minimizing agents, where one agent's beliefs get transformed into an observation modality for the other. However, the best approach for transforming beliefs into observations remains an open question. In this paper, we demonstrate that naively sharing posterior beliefs can give rise to the negative social dynamics of echo chambers and self-doubt. We propose an alternate belief sharing strategy which mitigates these issues.

Riddhi J. Pitliya, Ozan Çatal, Toon Van de Maele et al.

Theory of Mind (ToM) -- the ability to understand that others can have differing knowledge and goals -- enables agents to reason about others' beliefs while planning their own actions. We present a novel approach to multi-agent cooperation by implementing ToM within active inference. Unlike previous active inference approaches to multi-agent cooperation, our method neither relies on task-specific shared generative models nor requires explicit communication. In our framework, ToM-equipped agents maintain distinct representations of their own and others' beliefs and goals. ToM agents then use an extended and adapted version of the sophisticated inference tree-based planning algorithm to systematically explore joint policy spaces through recursive reasoning. We evaluate our approach through collision avoidance and foraging simulations. Results suggest that ToM agents cooperate better compared to non-ToM counterparts by being able to avoid collisions and reduce redundant efforts. Crucially, ToM agents accomplish this by inferring others' beliefs solely from observable behaviour and considering them when planning their own actions. Our approach shows potential for generalisable and scalable multi-agent systems while providing computational insights into ToM mechanisms.