Shijing Yuan

Shijing Yuan, Hongze Liu, Hongtao Lv et al.

Cross-silo federated learning (FL) is a typical FL that enables organizations(e.g., financial or medical entities) to train global models on isolated data. Reasonable incentive is key to encouraging organizations to contribute data. However, existing works on incentivizing cross-silo FL lack consideration of the environmental dynamics (e.g., precision of the trained global model and data owned by uncertain clients during the training processes). Moreover, most of them assume that organizations share private information, which is unrealistic. To overcome these limitations, we propose a novel adaptive mechanism for cross-silo FL, towards incentivizing organizations to contribute data to maximize their long-term payoffs in a real dynamic training environment. The mechanism is based on multi-agent reinforcement learning, which learns near-optimal data contribution strategy from the history of potential games without organizations' private information. Experiments demonstrate that our mechanism achieves adaptive incentive and effectively improves the long-term payoffs for organizations.

Hongze Liu, Chang Guo, Yingzeng Li et al.

The transition to open, distributed Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) promises scalable intelligence but introduces a non-trivial tension: maximizing global efficiency requires cooperative, resource-aware scheduling, yet autonomous agents may be self-interested and cannot be managed by a centralized controller. Prior approaches fall short in two key areas: they typically focus on single-query routing, neglecting long-term resource reuse (e.g., KV-caching) and the complexities of system-level many-to-many matching; furthermore, they rely on generic incentive mechanisms that ignore the distinct characteristics of LLM inference. To bridge this gap, we propose IEMAS (Incentive-Efficiency Mechanism for Multi-Agent Systems), a distributed framework that aligns economic incentives with system performance. IEMAS integrates a probabilistic predictive model to estimate Quality of Service (QoS) under uncertainty, which feeds into a VCG-based bipartite matching mechanism. This design guarantees truthful capability reporting and social optimality while explicitly leveraging KV cache-affinity to minimize computational redundancy. We implement IEMAS on top of vLLM and evaluate it via extensive simulations. Results demonstrate that our incentive-efficiency co-design reducing average service cost by 35% and end-to-end latency by up to 2.9 compared to baselines.