Alberto Naibo

Chantal Enguehard, Guillaume Munch-Maccagnoni, Alberto Naibo

The concept of 'undone science' emerged in the 2010s in research in social sciences at the intersection of studies on social movements and of science and technology studies. It refers to research questions that are neglected, ignored, or left unfunded, even though they deserve to be explored. The aim of this special issue is to apply this concept to computer science, by examining whether the way this discipline is structured (including its sociological, economic, and political dimensions), as well as the paradigms that shape it, make it possible to identify epistemological and ethical questions that are crucial for its development and conception.

Walter Dean, Alberto Naibo

This paper explores the relationship of artificial intelligence to the task of resolving open questions in mathematics. We first present an updated version of a traditional argument that limitative results from computability and complexity theory show that proof discovery is an inherently difficult problem. We then illustrate how several recent applications of artificial intelligence-inspired methods -- respectively involving automated theorem proving, SAT-solvers, and large language models -- do indeed raise novel questions about the nature of mathematical proof. We also argue that the results obtained by such techniques do not tell against our basic argument. This is so because they are embodiments of brute force search and are thus capable of deciding only statements of low logical complexity.

Andrea Asperti, Alberto Naibo, Claudio Sacerdoti Coen

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown remarkable abilities in structured reasoning and symbolic tasks, with coding emerging as a particular area of strength. This success has sparked growing interest in applying LLMs to mathematics, both in informal problem-solving and formal theorem proving. However, progress in formal mathematics has proven to be significantly more difficult, despite surface-level similarities between programming and proof construction. This discrepancy raises important questions about how LLMs ``reason'', how they are supervised, and whether they internally track a notion of computational or deductive state. In this article, we address the state-of-the-art of the discipline, focusing on recent models and benchmarks, and explore three central issues at the intersection of machine learning and mathematical cognition: (i) the trade-offs between formal and informal mathematics as training domains; (ii) the deeper reasons why proof generation remains more brittle than code synthesis; (iii) and the question of whether LLMs represent, or merely mimic, a notion of evolving logical state. Our goal is not to draw hard boundaries, but to identify where the current limits lie, and how they might be extended.