Peter D. Kvam

Jerome R. Busemeyer, Peter D. Kvam, Timothy J. Pleskac

Two different dynamic models for belief change during evidence monitoring were evaluated: Markov and quantum. They were empirically tested with an experiment in which participants monitored evidence for an initial period of time, made a probability rating, then monitored more evidence, before making a second rating. The models were qualitatively tested by manipulating the time intervals in a manner that provided a test for interference effects of the first rating on the second. The Markov model predicted no interference whereas the quantum model predicted interference. A quantitative comparison of the two models was also carried out using a generalization criterion method: the parameters were fit to data from one set of time intervals, and then these same parameters were used to predict data from another set of time intervals. The results indicated that some features of both Markov and quantum models are needed to accurately account for the results.

Arend Hintze, Jeffrey A. Edlund, Randal S. Olson et al.

Markov Brains are a class of evolvable artificial neural networks (ANN). They differ from conventional ANNs in many aspects, but the key difference is that instead of a layered architecture, with each node performing the same function, Markov Brains are networks built from individual computational components. These computational components interact with each other, receive inputs from sensors, and control motor outputs. The function of the computational components, their connections to each other, as well as connections to sensors and motors are all subject to evolutionary optimization. Here we describe in detail how a Markov Brain works, what techniques can be used to study them, and how they can be evolved.

Peter Kvam, Joseph Cesario, Jory Schossau et al.

Most research on adaptive decision-making takes a strategy-first approach, proposing a method of solving a problem and then examining whether it can be implemented in the brain and in what environments it succeeds. We present a method for studying strategy development based on computational evolution that takes the opposite approach, allowing strategies to develop in response to the decision-making environment via Darwinian evolution. We apply this approach to a dynamic decision-making problem where artificial agents make decisions about the source of incoming information. In doing so, we show that the complexity of the brains and strategies of evolved agents are a function of the environment in which they develop. More difficult environments lead to larger brains and more information use, resulting in strategies resembling a sequential sampling approach. Less difficult environments drive evolution toward smaller brains and less information use, resulting in simpler heuristic-like strategies.