Denis Nekipelov

Fan Yao, Chuanhao Li, Denis Nekipelov et al.

Content creators compete for exposure on recommendation platforms, and such strategic behavior leads to a dynamic shift over the content distribution. However, how the creators' competition impacts user welfare and how the relevance-driven recommendation influences the dynamics in the long run are still largely unknown. This work provides theoretical insights into these research questions. We model the creators' competition under the assumptions that: 1) the platform employs an innocuous top-$K$ recommendation policy; 2) user decisions follow the Random Utility model; 3) content creators compete for user engagement and, without knowing their utility function in hindsight, apply arbitrary no-regret learning algorithms to update their strategies. We study the user welfare guarantee through the lens of Price of Anarchy and show that the fraction of user welfare loss due to creator competition is always upper bounded by a small constant depending on $K$ and randomness in user decisions; we also prove the tightness of this bound. Our result discloses an intrinsic merit of the myopic approach to the recommendation, i.e., relevance-driven matching performs reasonably well in the long run, as long as users' decisions involve randomness and the platform provides reasonably many alternatives to its users.

Fan Yao, Chuanhao Li, Denis Nekipelov et al.

In real-world recommendation problems, especially those with a formidably large item space, users have to gradually learn to estimate the utility of any fresh recommendations from their experience about previously consumed items. This in turn affects their interaction dynamics with the system and can invalidate previous algorithms built on the omniscient user assumption. In this paper, we formalize a model to capture such "learning users" and design an efficient system-side learning solution, coined Noise-Robust Active Ellipsoid Search (RAES), to confront the challenges brought by the non-stationary feedback from such a learning user. Interestingly, we prove that the regret of RAES deteriorates gracefully as the convergence rate of user learning becomes worse, until reaching linear regret when the user's learning fails to converge. Experiments on synthetic datasets demonstrate the strength of RAES for such a contemporaneous system-user learning problem. Our study provides a novel perspective on modeling the feedback loop in recommendation problems.

Fan Yao, Chuanhao Li, Denis Nekipelov et al.

We propose a new problem setting to study the sequential interactions between a recommender system and a user. Instead of assuming the user is omniscient, static, and explicit, as the classical practice does, we sketch a more realistic user behavior model, under which the user: 1) rejects recommendations if they are clearly worse than others; 2) updates her utility estimation based on rewards from her accepted recommendations; 3) withholds realized rewards from the system. We formulate the interactions between the system and such an explorative user in a $K$-armed bandit framework and study the problem of learning the optimal recommendation on the system side. We show that efficient system learning is still possible but is more difficult. In particular, the system can identify the best arm with probability at least $1-δ$ within $O(1/δ)$ interactions, and we prove this is tight. Our finding contrasts the result for the problem of best arm identification with fixed confidence, in which the best arm can be identified with probability $1-δ$ within $O(\log(1/δ))$ interactions. This gap illustrates the inevitable cost the system has to pay when it learns from an explorative user's revealed preferences on its recommendations rather than from the realized rewards.

Denis Nekipelov, Vira Semenova, Vasilis Syrgkanis

This paper proposes a Lasso-type estimator for a high-dimensional sparse parameter identified by a single index conditional moment restriction (CMR). In addition to this parameter, the moment function can also depend on a nuisance function, such as the propensity score or the conditional choice probability, which we estimate by modern machine learning tools. We first adjust the moment function so that the gradient of the future loss function is insensitive (formally, Neyman-orthogonal) with respect to the first-stage regularization bias, preserving the single index property. We then take the loss function to be an indefinite integral of the adjusted moment function with respect to the single index. The proposed Lasso estimator converges at the oracle rate, where the oracle knows the nuisance function and solves only the parametric problem. We demonstrate our method by estimating the short-term heterogeneous impact of Connecticut's Jobs First welfare reform experiment on women's welfare participation decision.