Idan A. Blank

Kyle Mahowald, Anna A. Ivanova, Idan A. Blank et al.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have come closest among all models to date to mastering human language, yet opinions about their linguistic and cognitive capabilities remain split. Here, we evaluate LLMs using a distinction between formal linguistic competence -- knowledge of linguistic rules and patterns -- and functional linguistic competence -- understanding and using language in the world. We ground this distinction in human neuroscience, which has shown that formal and functional competence rely on different neural mechanisms. Although LLMs are surprisingly good at formal competence, their performance on functional competence tasks remains spotty and often requires specialized fine-tuning and/or coupling with external modules. We posit that models that use language in human-like ways would need to master both of these competence types, which, in turn, could require the emergence of mechanisms specialized for formal linguistic competence, distinct from functional competence.

Joseph M. Denning, Xiaohan Hannah Guo, Bryor Snefjella et al.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are commonly criticized for not understanding language. However, many critiques focus on cognitive abilities that, in humans, are distinct from language processing. Here, we instead study a kind of understanding tightly linked to language: inferring who did what to whom (thematic roles) in a sentence. Does the central training objective of LLMs-word prediction-result in sentence representations that capture thematic roles? In two experiments, we characterized sentence representations in four LLMs. In contrast to human similarity judgments, in LLMs the overall representational similarity of sentence pairs reflected syntactic similarity but not whether their agent and patient assignments were identical vs. reversed. Furthermore, we found little evidence that thematic role information was available in any subset of hidden units. However, some attention heads robustly captured thematic roles, independently of syntax. Therefore, LLMs can extract thematic roles but, relative to humans, this information influences their representations more weakly.

Woojae Jeong, Aditya Kommineni, Kleanthis Avramidis et al.

Depression and suicidality affect cognitive and emotional processes, yet objective, task-evoked neural readouts of mental health remain limited. We investigated the spatiotemporal dynamics of affective semantic processing using multivariate decoding of time-resolved, 64-channel electroencephalography (EEG). Participants (N=137) performed a sentence-evaluation task with emotionally salient, self-referential statements. We identified robust neural signatures of semantic processing, with peak decoding accuracy between 300-600 ms -- a window associated with rapid, stimulus-driven semantic evaluation and conflict monitoring. Relative to healthy controls, individuals with depression and suicidal ideation showed earlier onset, longer duration, and greater amplitude decoding responses, along with broader cross-temporal generalization and enhanced contributions from frontocentral and parietotemporal components. These findings suggest altered sensitivity and impaired disengagement from emotionally salient content in the clinical groups, advancing our understanding of the neurocognitive basis of mental health and establishing a compact and interpretable EEG-based index of semantic-evaluation dynamics with potential diagnostic relevance.

Kleanthis Avramidis, Woojae Jeong, Aditya Kommineni et al.

Identifying physiological and behavioral markers for mental health conditions is a longstanding challenge in psychiatry. Depression and suicidal ideation, in particular, lack objective biomarkers, with screening and diagnosis primarily relying on self-reports and clinical interviews. Here, we investigate eye tracking as a potential marker modality for screening purposes. Eye movements are directly modulated by neuronal networks and have been associated with attentional and mood-related patterns; however, their predictive value for depression and suicidality remains unclear. We recorded eye-tracking sequences from 126 young adults as they read and responded to affective sentences, and subsequently developed a deep learning framework to predict their clinical status. The proposed model included separate branches for trials of positive and negative sentiment, and used 2D time-series representations to account for both intra-trial and inter-trial variations. We were able to identify depression and suicidal ideation with an area under the receiver operating curve (AUC) of 0.793 (95% CI: 0.765-0.819) against healthy controls, and suicidality specifically with 0.826 AUC (95% CI: 0.797-0.852). The model also exhibited moderate, yet significant, accuracy in differentiating depressed from suicidal participants, with 0.609 AUC (95% CI 0.571-0.646). Discriminative patterns emerge more strongly when assessing the data relative to response generation than relative to the onset time of the final word of the sentences. The most pronounced effects were observed for negative-sentiment sentences, that are congruent to depressed and suicidal participants. Our findings highlight eye tracking as an objective tool for mental health assessment and underscore the modulatory impact of emotional stimuli on cognitive processes affecting oculomotor control.

Ebrahim Feghhi, Nima Hadidi, Bryan Song et al.

Given the remarkable capabilities of large language models (LLMs), there has been a growing interest in evaluating their similarity to the human brain. One approach towards quantifying this similarity is by measuring how well a model predicts neural signals, also called "brain score". Internal representations from LLMs achieve state-of-the-art brain scores, leading to speculation that they share computational principles with human language processing. This inference is only valid if the subset of neural activity predicted by LLMs reflects core elements of language processing. Here, we question this assumption by analyzing three neural datasets used in an impactful study on LLM-to-brain mappings, with a particular focus on an fMRI dataset where participants read short passages. We first find that when using shuffled train-test splits, as done in previous studies with these datasets, a trivial feature that encodes temporal autocorrelation not only outperforms LLMs but also accounts for the majority of neural variance that LLMs explain. We therefore use contiguous splits moving forward. Second, we explain the surprisingly high brain scores of untrained LLMs by showing they do not account for additional neural variance beyond two simple features: sentence length and sentence position. This undermines evidence used to claim that the transformer architecture biases computations to be more brain-like. Third, we find that brain scores of trained LLMs on this dataset can largely be explained by sentence length, position, and pronoun-dereferenced static word embeddings; a small, additional amount is explained by sense-specific embeddings and contextual representations of sentence structure. We conclude that over-reliance on brain scores can lead to over-interpretations of similarity between LLMs and brains, and emphasize the importance of deconstructing what LLMs are mapping to in neural signals.