Saswati Sarkar

Soheil Eshghi, Victor M. Preciado, Saswati Sarkar et al.

We analyze optimal strategies for the allocation of a finite budget that can be invested in different advertising channels over time with the objective of influencing social opinions in a network of individuals. In our analysis, we consider both exogenous influence mechanisms, such as advertising campaigns, as well as endogenous mechanisms of social influence, such as word-of-mouth and peer-pressure, which are modeled using diffusion dynamics. We show that for a broad family of objective functions, the optimal influence strategy at every time uses all channels at either their maximum rate or not at all, i.e., a bang-bang strategy. Furthermore, we prove that the number of switches between these extremes is bounded above by a term that is typically much smaller than the number of agents. This means that the optimal influence strategy is to exert maximum effort in waves for every channel, and then cease effort and let the effects propagate. We also show that, at the beginning of the campaign, the total cost-adjusted reach of an exogenous advertising channel determines its relative value. In contrast, as we approach our investment horizon (e.g., election day), the optimal strategy is to invest in channels able to target individuals instead of broad-reaching channels. We demonstrate that the optimal influence strategies are easily computable in several practical cases, and explicitly characterize the optimal controls for the case of linear objective functions in closed form. Finally, we see that, in the canonical example of designing an election campaign, identifying late-deciders is a critical component in the optimal design.

Xingran Chen, Hesam Nikpey, Jungyeol Kim et al.

The spread of an undesirable contact process, such as an infectious disease (e.g. COVID-19), is contained through testing and isolation of infected nodes. The temporal and spatial evolution of the process (along with containment through isolation) render such detection as fundamentally different from active search detection strategies. In this work, through an active learning approach, we design testing and isolation strategies to contain the spread and minimize the cumulative infections under a given test budget. We prove that the objective can be optimized, with performance guarantees, by greedily selecting the nodes to test. We further design reward-based methodologies that effectively minimize an upper bound on the cumulative infections and are computationally more tractable in large networks. These policies, however, need knowledge about the nodes' infection probabilities which are dynamically changing and have to be learned by sequential testing. We develop a message-passing framework for this purpose and, building on that, show novel tradeoffs between exploitation of knowledge through reward-based heuristics and exploration of the unknown through a carefully designed probabilistic testing. The tradeoffs are fundamentally distinct from the classical counterparts under active search or multi-armed bandit problems (MABs). We provably show the necessity of exploration in a stylized network and show through simulations that exploration can outperform exploitation in various synthetic and real-data networks depending on the parameters of the network and the spread.

Soheil Eshghi, Saswati Sarkar, Santosh S. Venkatesh

Recent innovations in the design of computer viruses have led to new trade-offs for the attacker. Multiple variants of a malware may spread at different rates and have different levels of visibility to the network. In this work we examine the optimal strategies for the attacker so as to trade off the extent of spread of the malware against the need for stealth. We show that in the mean-field deterministic regime, this spread-stealth trade-off is optimized by computationally simple single-threshold policies. Specifically, we show that only one variant of the malware is spread by the attacker at each time, as there exists a time up to which the attacker prioritizes maximizing the spread of the malware, and after which she prioritizes stealth.

Soheil Eshghi, MHR. Khouzani, Saswati Sarkar et al.

In this work, we investigate the use of epidemic routing in energy constrained Delay Tolerant Networks (DTNs). In epidemic routing, messages are relayed by intermediate nodes at contact opportunities, i.e., when pairs of nodes come within the transmission range of each other. Each node needs to decide whether to forward its message upon contact with a new node based on its own residual energy level and the age of that message. We mathematically characterize the fundamental trade-off between energy conservation and a measure of Quality of Service as a dynamic energy-dependent optimal control problem. We prove that in the mean-field regime, the optimal dynamic forwarding decisions follow simple threshold-based structures in which the forwarding threshold for each node depends on its current remaining energy. We then characterize the nature of this dependence. Our simulations reveal that the optimal dynamic policy significantly outperforms heuristics.

Soheil Eshghi, MHR. Khouzani, Saswati Sarkar et al.

Studies on the propagation of malware in mobile networks have revealed that the spread of malware can be highly inhomogeneous. Platform diversity, contact list utilization by the malware, clustering in the network structure, etc. can also lead to differing spreading rates. In this paper, a general formal framework is proposed for leveraging such heterogeneity to derive optimal patching policies that attain the minimum aggregate cost due to the spread of malware and the surcharge of patching. Using Pontryagin's Maximum Principle for a stratified epidemic model, it is analytically proven that in the mean-field deterministic regime, optimal patch disseminations are simple single-threshold policies. Through numerical simulations, the behavior of optimal patching policies is investigated in sample topologies and their advantages are demonstrated.