Boris Velasevic

Boris Velasevic, Rohit Parasnis, Christopher G. Brinton et al. · mit

We consider the problem of solving a large-scale system of linear equations in a distributed or federated manner by a taskmaster and a set of machines, each possessing a subset of the equations. We provide a comprehensive comparison of two well-known classes of algorithms used to solve this problem: projection-based methods and optimization-based methods. First, we introduce a novel geometric notion of data heterogeneity called angular heterogeneity and discuss its generality. Using this notion, we characterize the optimal convergence rates of the most prominent algorithms from each class, capturing the effects of the number of machines, the number of equations, and that of both cross-machine and local data heterogeneity on these rates. Our analysis establishes the superiority of Accelerated Projected Consensus in realistic scenarios with significant data heterogeneity and offers several insights into how angular heterogeneity affects the efficiency of the methods studied. Additionally, we develop distributed algorithms for the efficient computation of the proposed angular heterogeneity metrics. Our extensive numerical analyses validate and complement our theoretical results.

Boris Velasevic, Nicolas Lanzetti, Eric Mazumdar

We study linear quadratic dynamic games where players are uncertain about each other's control policies or goals and consequently seek to be strategically robust. Building on recent work on strategically robust and risk-averse game theory, we first formalize the problem of strategically robust linear quadratic dynamic games. We show that these can be rewritten as simple transformations of linear quadratic games in which each player chooses a controller in a fictitious game in which they are faced with an adversary who is penalized for deviating from the other players' policies. This formulation naturally induces a novel notion of dynamic equilibrium, which we call a strategically robust dynamic equilibrium. We establish existence and uniqueness of such equilibria and furthermore show that the equilibrium policies are Markovian, linear, and can be efficiently computed via coupled backward Riccati equations. Through numerical simulations, including experiments in a network game, we illustrate the benefits of strategic robustness in designing robust and resilient decentralized control schemes. Our experiments also expose a "free-lunch" phenomenon in games in which robustness does not incur a corresponding loss in performance but can yield improvements in players' utilities and social welfare.