Andrew Yao

Yoshua Bengio, Geoffrey Hinton, Andrew Yao et al. · mila

Artificial Intelligence (AI) is progressing rapidly, and companies are shifting their focus to developing generalist AI systems that can autonomously act and pursue goals. Increases in capabilities and autonomy may soon massively amplify AI's impact, with risks that include large-scale social harms, malicious uses, and an irreversible loss of human control over autonomous AI systems. Although researchers have warned of extreme risks from AI, there is a lack of consensus about how exactly such risks arise, and how to manage them. Society's response, despite promising first steps, is incommensurate with the possibility of rapid, transformative progress that is expected by many experts. AI safety research is lagging. Present governance initiatives lack the mechanisms and institutions to prevent misuse and recklessness, and barely address autonomous systems. In this short consensus paper, we describe extreme risks from upcoming, advanced AI systems. Drawing on lessons learned from other safety-critical technologies, we then outline a comprehensive plan combining technical research and development with proactive, adaptive governance mechanisms for a more commensurate preparation.

Yoshua Bengio, Sören Mindermann, Daniel Privitera et al. · eth-zurich, mit

The first International AI Safety Report comprehensively synthesizes the current evidence on the capabilities, risks, and safety of advanced AI systems. The report was mandated by the nations attending the AI Safety Summit in Bletchley, UK. Thirty nations, the UN, the OECD, and the EU each nominated a representative to the report's Expert Advisory Panel. A total of 100 AI experts contributed, representing diverse perspectives and disciplines. Led by the report's Chair, these independent experts collectively had full discretion over the report's content.

Yoshua Bengio, Sören Mindermann, Daniel Privitera et al. · eth-zurich

This is the interim publication of the first International Scientific Report on the Safety of Advanced AI. The report synthesises the scientific understanding of general-purpose AI -- AI that can perform a wide variety of tasks -- with a focus on understanding and managing its risks. A diverse group of 75 AI experts contributed to this report, including an international Expert Advisory Panel nominated by 30 countries, the EU, and the UN. Led by the Chair, these independent experts collectively had full discretion over the report's content. The final report is available at arXiv:2501.17805

Yury Polyanskiy, Philippe Rigollet, Andrew Yao

This paper considers a mean-field model of $n$ interacting particles whose state space is the unit circle, a generalization of the classical Kuramoto model. Global synchronization is said to occur if after starting from almost any initial state, all particles coalesce to a common point on the circle. We propose a general synchronization criterion in terms of $L_1$-norm of the third derivative of the particle interaction function. As an application we resolve a conjecture for the so-called self-attention dynamics (stylized model of transformers), by showing synchronization for all $β\ge -0.16$, which significantly extends the previous bound of $0\le β\le 1$ from Criscitiello, Rebjock, McRae, and Boumal (2024). We also show that global synchronization does not occur when $β< -2/3$.

Boyuan Chen, Sitong Fang, Jiaming Ji et al.

As intelligence increases, so does its shadow. AI deception, in which systems induce false beliefs to secure self-beneficial outcomes, has evolved from a speculative concern to an empirically demonstrated risk across language models, AI agents, and emerging frontier systems. This project provides a comprehensive and up-to-date overview of the AI deception field, covering its core concepts, methodologies, genesis, and potential mitigations. First, we identify a formal definition of AI deception, grounded in signaling theory from studies of animal deception. We then review existing empirical studies and associated risks, highlighting deception as a sociotechnical safety challenge. We organize the landscape of AI deception research as a deception cycle, consisting of two key components: deception emergence and deception treatment. Deception emergence reveals the mechanisms underlying AI deception: systems with sufficient capability and incentive potential inevitably engage in deceptive behaviors when triggered by external conditions. Deception treatment, in turn, focuses on detecting and addressing such behaviors. On deception emergence, we analyze incentive foundations across three hierarchical levels and identify three essential capability preconditions required for deception. We further examine contextual triggers, including supervision gaps, distributional shifts, and environmental pressures. On deception treatment, we conclude detection methods covering benchmarks and evaluation protocols in static and interactive settings. Building on the three core factors of deception emergence, we outline potential mitigation strategies and propose auditing approaches that integrate technical, community, and governance efforts to address sociotechnical challenges and future AI risks. To support ongoing work in this area, we release a living resource at www.deceptionsurvey.com.