Augustin Kelava

Tom Sühr, Florian E. Dorner, Samira Samadi et al.

With large language models (LLMs) like GPT-4 appearing to behave increasingly human-like in text-based interactions, it has become popular to attempt to evaluate personality traits of LLMs using questionnaires originally developed for humans. While reusing measures is a resource-efficient way to evaluate LLMs, careful adaptations are usually required to ensure that assessment results are valid even across human subpopulations. In this work, we provide evidence that LLMs' responses to personality tests systematically deviate from human responses, implying that the results of these tests cannot be interpreted in the same way. Concretely, reverse-coded items ("I am introverted" vs. "I am extraverted") are often both answered affirmatively. Furthermore, variation across prompts designed to "steer" LLMs to simulate particular personality types does not follow the clear separation into five independent personality factors from human samples. In light of these results, we believe that it is important to investigate tests' validity for LLMs before drawing strong conclusions about potentially ill-defined concepts like LLMs' "personality".

Tom Sühr, Florian E. Dorner, Olawale Salaudeen et al.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable results on a range of standardized tests originally designed to assess human cognitive and psychological traits, such as intelligence and personality. While these results are often interpreted as strong evidence of human-like characteristics in LLMs, this paper argues that such interpretations constitute an ontological error. Human psychological and educational tests are theory-driven measurement instruments, calibrated to a specific human population. Applying these tests to non-human subjects without empirical validation, risks mischaracterizing what is being measured. Furthermore, a growing trend frames AI performance on benchmarks as measurements of traits such as ``intelligence'', despite known issues with validity, data contamination, cultural bias and sensitivity to superficial prompt changes. We argue that interpreting benchmark performance as measurements of human-like traits, lacks sufficient theoretical and empirical justification. This leads to our position: Stop Evaluating AI with Human Tests, Develop Principled, AI-specific Tests instead. We call for the development of principled, AI-specific evaluation frameworks tailored to AI systems. Such frameworks might build on existing frameworks for constructing and validating psychometrics tests, or could be created entirely from scratch to fit the unique context of AI.