Bin Ling

Jiaxi Cui, Munan Ning, Zongjian Li et al.

AI legal assistants based on Large Language Models (LLMs) can provide accessible legal consulting services, but the hallucination problem poses potential legal risks. This paper presents Chatlaw, an innovative legal assistant utilizing a Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) model and a multi-agent system to enhance the reliability and accuracy of AI-driven legal services. By integrating knowledge graphs with artificial screening, we construct a high-quality legal dataset to train the MoE model. This model utilizes different experts to address various legal issues, optimizing the accuracy of legal responses. Additionally, Standardized Operating Procedures (SOP), modeled after real law firm workflows, significantly reduce errors and hallucinations in legal services. Our MoE model outperforms GPT-4 in the Lawbench and Unified Qualification Exam for Legal Professionals by 7.73% in accuracy and 11 points, respectively, and also surpasses other models in multiple dimensions during real-case consultations, demonstrating our robust capability for legal consultation.

Yizhe Huang, Bin Ling, Song-Chun Zhu et al.

Standard rational actor models often attribute cooperation failures in social dilemmas to insufficient incentives, overlooking the destabilizing effects of continuous utility maximization. To address this, we propose a framework of ``will" defined as a mechanism that persistently pursues goals while ignoring local cost-benefit fluctuations. We formalize the Willed Agents as potential minimizers, distinguishing them from cumulative utility maximization. Dynamical analysis of infinite population demonstrates that willed agents shrink the feasible state space, acting as boundary constraints that accelerate convergence in canonical social dilemmas. Through multi-agent simulations in a spatiotemporal Stag Hunt Game, we show that willed agents function as ``cooperation catalysts", enabling groups to surmount high-risk thresholds where purely utility maximization fails. We find that heterogeneous will strength promotes cooperation, and that agents who autonomously suspend rational re-evaluation can significantly outperform continuous optimizers. These findings suggest that successful cooperation relies on the cognitive capacity to strategically constrain calculation.