Jun Han

CR
h-index19
4papers
17citations
Novelty46%
AI Score24

4 Papers

8.8CRSep 28, 2021
Touchtone leakage attacks via smartphone sensors: mitigation without hardware modification

Connor Bolton, Yan Long, Jun Han et al.

Smartphone motion sensors provide a concealed mechanism for eavesdropping on acoustic information, like touchtones, emitted by a device. Eavesdropping on touchtones exposes credit card information, banking pins, and social security card numbers to malicious 3rd party apps requiring only motion sensor data. This paper's primary contribution is an analysis rooted in physics and signal processing theory of several eavesdropping mitigations, which could be implemented in a smartphone update. We verify our analysis imperially to show how previously suggested mitigations, i.e. a low-pass filter, can undesirably reduce the motion sensor data to all applications by 83% but only reduce an advanced adversary's accuracy by less than one percent. Other designs, i.e. anti-aliasing filters, can fully preserve the motion sensor data to support benign application functionality while reducing attack accuracy by 50.1%. We intend for this analysis to motivate the need for deployable mitigations against acoustic leakage on smartphone motion sensors, including but not limited to touchtones, while also providing a basis for future mitigations to improve upon.

6.6CRJun 9, 2021Code
FastZIP: Faster and More Secure Zero-Interaction Pairing

Mikhail Fomichev, Julia Hesse, Lars Almon et al.

With the advent of the Internet of Things (IoT), establishing a secure channel between smart devices becomes crucial. Recent research proposes zero-interaction pairing (ZIP), which enables pairing without user assistance by utilizing devices' physical context (e.g., ambient audio) to obtain a shared secret key. The state-of-the-art ZIP schemes suffer from three limitations: (1) prolonged pairing time (i.e., minutes or hours), (2) vulnerability to brute-force offline attacks on a shared key, and (3) susceptibility to attacks caused by predictable context (e.g., replay attack) because they rely on limited entropy of physical context to protect a shared key. We address these limitations, proposing FastZIP, a novel ZIP scheme that significantly reduces pairing time while preventing offline and predictable context attacks. In particular, we adapt a recently introduced Fuzzy Password-Authenticated Key Exchange (fPAKE) protocol and utilize sensor fusion, maximizing their advantages. We instantiate FastZIP for intra-car device pairing to demonstrate its feasibility and show how the design of FastZIP can be adapted to other ZIP use cases. We implement FastZIP and evaluate it by driving four cars for a total of 800 km. We achieve up to three times shorter pairing time compared to the state-of-the-art ZIP schemes while assuring robust security with adversarial error rates below 0.5%.

1.2CVApr 6, 2020
LaNet: Real-time Lane Identification by Learning Road SurfaceCharacteristics from Accelerometer Data

Madhumitha Harishankar, Jun Han, Sai Vineeth Kalluru Srinivas et al.

The resolution of GPS measurements, especially in urban areas, is insufficient for identifying a vehicle's lane. In this work, we develop a deep LSTM neural network model LaNet that determines the lane vehicles are on by periodically classifying accelerometer samples collected by vehicles as they drive in real time. Our key finding is that even adjacent patches of road surfaces contain characteristics that are sufficiently unique to differentiate between lanes, i.e., roads inherently exhibit differing bumps, cracks, potholes, and surface unevenness. Cars can capture this road surface information as they drive using inexpensive, easy-to-install accelerometers that increasingly come fitted in cars and can be accessed via the CAN-bus. We collect an aggregate of 60 km driving data and synthesize more based on this that capture factors such as variable driving speed, vehicle suspensions, and accelerometer noise. Our formulated LSTM-based deep learning model, LaNet, learns lane-specific sequences of road surface events (bumps, cracks etc.) and yields 100% lane classification accuracy with 200 meters of driving data, achieving over 90% with just 100 m (correspondingly to roughly one minute of driving). We design the LaNet model to be practical for use in real-time lane classification and show with extensive experiments that LaNet yields high classification accuracy even on smooth roads, on large multi-lane roads, and on drives with frequent lane changes. Since different road surfaces have different inherent characteristics or entropy, we excavate our neural network model and discover a mechanism to easily characterize the achievable classification accuracies in a road over various driving distances by training the model just once. We present LaNet as a low-cost, easily deployable and highly accurate way to achieve fine-grained lane identification.

4.9CRApr 2, 2019
SurFi: Detecting Surveillance Camera Looping Attacks with Wi-Fi Channel State Information (Extended Version)

Nitya Lakshmanan, Inkyu Bang, Min Suk Kang et al.

The proliferation of surveillance cameras has greatly improved the physical security of many security-critical properties including buildings, stores, and homes. However, recent surveillance camera looping attacks demonstrate new security threats - adversaries can replay a seemingly benign video feed of a place of interest while trespassing or stealing valuables without getting caught. Unfortunately, such attacks are extremely difficult to detect in real-time due to cost and implementation constraints. In this paper, we propose SurFi to detect these attacks in real-time by utilizing commonly available Wi-Fi signals. In particular, we leverage that channel state information (CSI) from Wi-Fi signals also perceives human activities in the place of interest in addition to surveillance cameras. SurFi processes and correlates the live video feeds and the Wi-Fi CSI signals to detect any mismatches that would identify the presence of the surveillance camera looping attacks. SurFi does not require the deployment of additional infrastructure because Wi-Fi transceivers are easily found in the urban indoor environment. We design and implement the SurFi system and evaluate its effectiveness in detecting surveillance camera looping attacks. Our evaluation demonstrates that SurFi effectively identifies attacks with up to an attack detection accuracy of 98.8% and 0.1% false positive rate