The NP-hardness of the closest vector problem (CVP) is an important basis for quantum-secure cryptography, in much the same way that integer factorisation's conjectured hardness is at the foundation of cryptosystems like RSA. Recent work with heuristic quantum algorithms (arXiv:2212.12372) indicates the possibility to find close approximations to (constrained) CVP instances that could be incorporated within fast sieving approaches for factorisation. This work explores both the practicality and scalability of the proposed heuristic approach to explore the potential for a quantum advantage for approximate CVP, without regard for the subsequent factoring claims. We also extend the proposal to include an antecedent "pre-training" scheme to find and fix a set of parameters that generalise well to increasingly large lattices, which both optimises the scalability of the algorithm, and permits direct numerical analyses. Our results further indicate a noteworthy quantum speed-up for lattice problems obeying a certain `prime' structure, approaching fifth order advantage for QAOA of fixed depth p=10 compared to classical brute-force, motivating renewed discussions about the necessary lattice dimensions for quantum-secure cryptosystems in the near-term.
Martin R. Albrecht, Miloš Prokop, Yixin Shen et al.
A fundamental computational problem is to find a shortest non-zero vector in Euclidean lattices, a problem known as the Shortest Vector Problem (SVP). This problem is believed to be hard even on quantum computers and thus plays a pivotal role in post-quantum cryptography. In this work we explore how (efficiently) Noisy Intermediate Scale Quantum (NISQ) devices may be used to solve SVP. Specifically, we map the problem to that of finding the ground state of a suitable Hamiltonian. In particular, (i) we establish new bounds for lattice enumeration, this allows us to obtain new bounds (resp.~estimates) for the number of qubits required per dimension for any lattices (resp.~random q-ary lattices) to solve SVP; (ii) we exclude the zero vector from the optimization space by proposing (a) a different classical optimisation loop or alternatively (b) a new mapping to the Hamiltonian. These improvements allow us to solve SVP in dimension up to 28 in a quantum emulation, significantly more than what was previously achieved, even for special cases. Finally, we extrapolate the size of NISQ devices that is required to be able to solve instances of lattices that are hard even for the best classical algorithms and find that with approximately $10^3$ noisy qubits such instances can be tackled.
Self-testing is a method to verify that one has a particular quantum state from purely classical statistics. For practical applications, such as device-independent delegated verifiable quantum computation, it is crucial that one self-tests multiple Bell states in parallel while keeping the quantum capabilities required of one side to a minimum. In this work, we use the $3 \times n$ magic rectangle games (generalizations of the magic square game) to obtain a self-test for $n$ Bell states where the one side needs only to measure single-qubit Pauli observables. The protocol requires small input sizes [constant for Alice and $O(\log n)$ bits for Bob] and is robust with robustness $O(n^{5/2} \sqrt{\varepsilon})$, where $\varepsilon$ is the closeness of the ideal (perfect) correlations to those observed. To achieve the desired self-test, we introduce a one-side-local quantum strategy for the magic square game that wins with certainty, we generalize this strategy to the family of $3 \times n$ magic rectangle games, and we supplement these nonlocal games with extra check rounds (of single and pairs of observables).
Alexandru Cojocaru, Juan Garay, Aggelos Kiayias et al.
A proof of work (PoW) is an important cryptographic construct enabling a party to convince others that they invested some effort in solving a computational task. Arguably, its main impact has been in the setting of cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin and its underlying blockchain protocol, which received significant attention in recent years due to its potential for various applications as well as for solving fundamental distributed computing questions in novel threat models. PoWs enable the linking of blocks in the blockchain data structure and thus the problem of interest is the feasibility of obtaining a sequence (chain) of such proofs. In this work, we examine the hardness of finding such chain of PoWs against quantum strategies. We prove that the chain of PoWs problem reduces to a problem we call multi-solution Bernoulli search, for which we establish its quantum query complexity. Effectively, this is an extension of a threshold direct product theorem to an average-case unstructured search problem. Our proof, adding to active recent efforts, simplifies and generalizes the recording technique of Zhandry (Crypto'19). As an application, we revisit the formal treatment of security of the core of the Bitcoin consensus protocol, the Bitcoin backbone (Eurocrypt'15), against quantum adversaries, while honest parties are classical and show that protocol's security holds under a quantum analogue of the classical ``honest majority'' assumption. Our analysis indicates that the security of Bitcoin backbone is guaranteed provided the number of adversarial quantum queries is bounded so that each quantum query is worth $O(p^{-1/2})$ classical ones, where $p$ is the success probability of a single classical query to the protocol's underlying hash function. Somewhat surprisingly, the wait time for safe settlement in the case of quantum adversaries matches the safe settlement time in the classical case.
We study a generalization of the Mermin-Peres magic square game to arbitrary rectangular dimensions. After exhibiting some general properties, these rectangular games are fully characterized in terms of their optimal win probabilities for quantum strategies. We find that for $m \times n$ rectangular games of dimensions $m,n \geq 3$ there are quantum strategies that win with certainty, while for dimensions $1 \times n$ quantum strategies do not outperform classical strategies. The final case of dimensions $2 \times n$ is richer, and we give upper and lower bounds that both outperform the classical strategies. Finally, we apply our findings to quantum certified randomness expansion to find the noise tolerance and rates for all magic rectangle games. To do this, we use our previous results to obtain the winning probability of games with a distinguished input for which the devices give a deterministic outcome, and follow the analysis of C. A. Miller and Y. Shi [SIAM J. Comput. 46, 1304 (2017)].
Alexandru Cojocaru, Léo Colisson, Elham Kashefi et al.
The functionality of classically-instructed remotely prepared random secret qubits was introduced in (Cojocaru et al 2018) as a way to enable classical parties to participate in secure quantum computation and communications protocols. The idea is that a classical party (client) instructs a quantum party (server) to generate a qubit to the server's side that is random, unknown to the server but known to the client. Such task is only possible under computational assumptions. In this contribution we define a simpler (basic) primitive consisting of only BB84 states, and give a protocol that realizes this primitive and that is secure against the strongest possible adversary (an arbitrarily deviating malicious server). The specific functions used, were constructed based on known trapdoor one-way functions, resulting to the security of our basic primitive being reduced to the hardness of the Learning With Errors problem. We then give a number of extensions, building on this basic module: extension to larger set of states (that includes non-Clifford states); proper consideration of the abort case; and verifiablity on the module level. The latter is based on "blind self-testing", a notion we introduced, proved in a limited setting and conjectured its validity for the most general case.
The application and analysis of the Cut-and-Choose technique in protocols secure against quantum adversaries is not a straightforward transposition of the classical case, among other reasons due to the difficulty to use rewinding in the quantum realm. We introduce a Quantum Computation Cut-and-Choose (QC-CC) technique which is a generalisation of the classical Cut-and-Choose in order to build quantum protocols secure against quantum covert adversaries. Such adversaries can deviate arbitrarily provided that their deviation is not detected. As an application of the QC-CC we give a protocol for securely performing two-party quantum computation with classical input/output. As basis we use secure delegated quantum computing (Broadbent et al 2009), and in particular the garbled quantum computation of (Kashefi et al 2016) that is secure against only a weak specious adversaries, defined in (Dupuis et al 2010). A unique property of these protocols is the separation between classical and quantum communications and the asymmetry between client and server, which enables us to sidestep the quantum rewinding issues. This opens the prospect of using the QC-CC to other quantum protocols with this separation. In our proof of security we adapt and use (at different parts) two quantum rewinding techniques, namely Watrous' oblivious q-rewinding (Watrous 2009) and Unruh's special q-rewinding (Unruh 2012). Our protocol achieves the same functionality as in previous works (e.g. Dupuis et al 2012), however using the QC-CC technique on the protocol from (Kashefi et al 2016) leads to the following key improvements: (i) only one-way offline quantum communication is necessary , (ii) only one party (server) needs to have involved quantum technological abilities, (iii) only minimal extra cryptographic primitives are required, namely one oblivious transfer for each input bit and quantum-safe commitments.
Juan Miguel Arrazola, Petros Wallden, Erika Andersson
Digital signatures are widely used in electronic communications to secure important tasks such as financial transactions, software updates, and legal contracts. The signature schemes that are in use today are based on public-key cryptography and derive their security from computational assumptions. However, it is possible to construct unconditionally secure signature protocols. In particular, using quantum communication, it is possible to construct signature schemes with security based on fundamental principles of quantum mechanics. Several quantum signature protocols have been proposed, but none of them has been explicitly generalized to more than three participants, and their security goals have not been formally defined. Here, we first extend the security definitions of Swanson and Stinson (2011) so that they can apply also to the quantum case, and introduce a formal definition of transferability based on different verification levels. We then prove several properties that multiparty signature protocols with information-theoretic security -- quantum or classical -- must satisfy in order to achieve their security goals. We also express two existing quantum signature protocols with three parties in the security framework we have introduced. Finally, we generalize a quantum signature protocol given in Wallden-Dunjko-Kent-Andersson (2015) to the multiparty case, proving its security against forging, repudiation and non-transferability. Notably, this protocol can be implemented using any point-to-point quantum key distribution network and therefore is ready to be experimentally demonstrated.