Matthieu Queloz

Matthieu Queloz

This paper argues that explainability is only one facet of a broader ideal that shapes our expectations towards artificial intelligence (AI). Fundamentally, the issue is to what extent AI exhibits systematicity--not merely in being sensitive to how thoughts are composed of recombinable constituents, but in striving towards an integrated body of thought that is consistent, coherent, comprehensive, and parsimoniously principled. This richer conception of systematicity has been obscured by the long shadow of the "systematicity challenge" to connectionism, according to which network architectures are fundamentally at odds with what Fodor and colleagues termed "the systematicity of thought." I offer a conceptual framework for thinking about "the systematicity of thought" that distinguishes four senses of the phrase. I use these distinctions to defuse the perceived tension between systematicity and connectionism and show that the conception of systematicity that historically shaped our sense of what makes thought rational, authoritative, and scientific is more demanding than the Fodorian notion. To determine whether we have reason to hold AI models to this ideal of systematicity, I then argue, we must look to the rationales for systematization and explore to what extent they transfer to AI models. I identify five such rationales and apply them to AI. This brings into view the "hard systematicity challenge." However, the demand for systematization itself needs to be regulated by the rationales for systematization. This yields a dynamic understanding of the need to systematize thought, which tells us how systematic we need AI models to be and when.

Pierre Beckmann, Matthieu Queloz

Recent findings in mechanistic interpretability (MI), the field probing the inner workings of Large Language Models (LLMs), challenge the view that these models rely solely on superficial statistics. We offer an accessible synthesis of these findings that doubles as an introduction to MI while integrating these findings within a novel theoretical framework for thinking about machine understanding. We argue that LLMs develop internal structures that are functionally analogous to the kind of understanding that consists in seeing connections. To sharpen this idea, we propose a three-tiered conception of understanding. First, conceptual understanding emerges when a model forms "features" as directions in latent space, learning the connections between diverse manifestations of something. Second, state-of-the-world understanding emerges when a model learns contingent factual connections between features and dynamically tracks changes in the world. Third, principled understanding emerges when a model ceases to rely on a collection of memorized facts and discovers a "circuit" connecting these facts. However, these forms of understanding remain radically different from human understanding, as the phenomenon of "parallel mechanisms" shows. We conclude that the debate should move beyond the yes-or-no question of whether LLMs understand to investigate how their strange minds work and forge conceptions that fit them.