Daniel L. Chen

Wei Lu, Daniel L. Chen, Christian B. Hansen

Understanding how large language model (LLM) agents behave in strategic interactions is essential as these systems increasingly participate autonomously in economically and morally consequential decisions. We evaluate LLM preferences using canonical economic games, finding substantial deviations from human behavior. Models like GPT-4o show excessive cooperation and limited incentive sensitivity, while reasoning models, such as o3-mini, align more consistently with payoff-maximizing strategies. We propose a supervised fine-tuning pipeline that uses synthetic datasets derived from economic reasoning to align LLM agents with economic preferences, focusing on two stylized preference structures. In the first, utility depends only on individual payoffs (homo economicus), while utility also depends on a notion of Kantian universalizability in the second preference structure (homo moralis). We find that fine-tuning based on small datasets shifts LLM agent behavior toward the corresponding economic agent. We further assess the fine-tuned agents' behavior in two applications: Moral dilemmas involving autonomous vehicles and algorithmic pricing in competitive markets. These examples illustrate how different normative objectives embedded via realizations from structured preference structures can influence market and moral outcomes. This work contributes a replicable, cost-efficient, and economically grounded pipeline to align AI preferences using moral-economic principles.

Jiafeng Chen, Daniel L. Chen, Greg Lewis

We offer straightforward theoretical results that justify incorporating machine learning in the standard linear instrumental variable setting. The key idea is to use machine learning, combined with sample-splitting, to predict the treatment variable from the instrument and any exogenous covariates, and then use this predicted treatment and the covariates as technical instruments to recover the coefficients in the second-stage. This allows the researcher to extract non-linear co-variation between the treatment and instrument that may dramatically improve estimation precision and robustness by boosting instrument strength. Importantly, we constrain the machine-learned predictions to be linear in the exogenous covariates, thus avoiding spurious identification arising from non-linear relationships between the treatment and the covariates. We show that this approach delivers consistent and asymptotically normal estimates under weak conditions and that it may be adapted to be semiparametrically efficient (Chamberlain, 1992). Our method preserves standard intuitions and interpretations of linear instrumental variable methods, including under weak identification, and provides a simple, user-friendly upgrade to the applied economics toolbox. We illustrate our method with an example in law and criminal justice, examining the causal effect of appellate court reversals on district court sentencing decisions.