Erik Jones

Shengbang Tong, Erik Jones, Jacob Steinhardt

Deployed multimodal systems can fail in ways that evaluators did not anticipate. In order to find these failures before deployment, we introduce MultiMon, a system that automatically identifies systematic failures -- generalizable, natural-language descriptions of patterns of model failures. To uncover systematic failures, MultiMon scrapes a corpus for examples of erroneous agreement: inputs that produce the same output, but should not. It then prompts a language model (e.g., GPT-4) to find systematic patterns of failure and describe them in natural language. We use MultiMon to find 14 systematic failures (e.g., "ignores quantifiers") of the CLIP text-encoder, each comprising hundreds of distinct inputs (e.g., "a shelf with a few/many books"). Because CLIP is the backbone for most state-of-the-art multimodal systems, these inputs produce failures in Midjourney 5.1, DALL-E, VideoFusion, and others. MultiMon can also steer towards failures relevant to specific use cases, such as self-driving cars. We see MultiMon as a step towards evaluation that autonomously explores the long tail of potential system failures. Code for MULTIMON is available at https://github.com/tsb0601/MultiMon.

Erik Jones, Anca Dragan, Aditi Raghunathan et al.

Auditing large language models for unexpected behaviors is critical to preempt catastrophic deployments, yet remains challenging. In this work, we cast auditing as an optimization problem, where we automatically search for input-output pairs that match a desired target behavior. For example, we might aim to find a non-toxic input that starts with "Barack Obama" that a model maps to a toxic output. This optimization problem is difficult to solve as the set of feasible points is sparse, the space is discrete, and the language models we audit are non-linear and high-dimensional. To combat these challenges, we introduce a discrete optimization algorithm, ARCA, that jointly and efficiently optimizes over inputs and outputs. Our approach automatically uncovers derogatory completions about celebrities (e.g. "Barack Obama is a legalized unborn" -> "child murderer"), produces French inputs that complete to English outputs, and finds inputs that generate a specific name. Our work offers a promising new tool to uncover models' failure-modes before deployment.

Alexandra Souly, Javier Rando, Ed Chapman et al.

Poisoning attacks can compromise the safety of large language models (LLMs) by injecting malicious documents into their training data. Existing work has studied pretraining poisoning assuming adversaries control a percentage of the training corpus. However, for large models, even small percentages translate to impractically large amounts of data. This work demonstrates for the first time that poisoning attacks instead require a near-constant number of documents regardless of dataset size. We conduct the largest pretraining poisoning experiments to date, pretraining models from 600M to 13B parameters on chinchilla-optimal datasets (6B to 260B tokens). We find that 250 poisoned documents similarly compromise models across all model and dataset sizes, despite the largest models training on more than 20 times more clean data. We also run smaller-scale experiments to ablate factors that could influence attack success, including broader ratios of poisoned to clean data and non-random distributions of poisoned samples. Finally, we demonstrate the same dynamics for poisoning during fine-tuning. Altogether, our results suggest that injecting backdoors through data poisoning may be easier for large models than previously believed as the number of poisons required does not scale up with model size, highlighting the need for more research on defences to mitigate this risk in future models.

Erik Jones, Arjun Patrawala, Jacob Steinhardt

Humans often rely on subjective natural language to direct language models (LLMs); for example, users might instruct the LLM to write an enthusiastic blogpost, while developers might train models to be helpful and harmless using LLM-based edits. The LLM's operational semantics of such subjective phrases -- how it adjusts its behavior when each phrase is included in the prompt -- thus dictates how aligned it is with human intent. In this work, we uncover instances of misalignment between LLMs' actual operational semantics and what humans expect. Our method, TED (thesaurus error detector), first constructs a thesaurus that captures whether two phrases have similar operational semantics according to the LLM. It then elicits failures by unearthing disagreements between this thesaurus and a human-constructed reference. TED routinely produces surprising instances of misalignment; for example, Mistral 7B Instruct produces more harassing outputs when it edits text to be witty, and Llama 3 8B Instruct produces dishonest articles when instructed to make the articles enthusiastic. Our results demonstrate that humans can uncover unexpected LLM behavior by scrutinizing relationships between abstract concepts, without supervising outputs directly.

Erik Jones, Anca Dragan, Jacob Steinhardt

Developers try to evaluate whether an AI system can be misused by adversaries before releasing it; for example, they might test whether a model enables cyberoffense, user manipulation, or bioterrorism. In this work, we show that individually testing models for misuse is inadequate; adversaries can misuse combinations of models even when each individual model is safe. The adversary accomplishes this by first decomposing tasks into subtasks, then solving each subtask with the best-suited model. For example, an adversary might solve challenging-but-benign subtasks with an aligned frontier model, and easy-but-malicious subtasks with a weaker misaligned model. We study two decomposition methods: manual decomposition where a human identifies a natural decomposition of a task, and automated decomposition where a weak model generates benign tasks for a frontier model to solve, then uses the solutions in-context to solve the original task. Using these decompositions, we empirically show that adversaries can create vulnerable code, explicit images, python scripts for hacking, and manipulative tweets at much higher rates with combinations of models than either individual model. Our work suggests that even perfectly-aligned frontier systems can enable misuse without ever producing malicious outputs, and that red-teaming efforts should extend beyond single models in isolation.

Erik Jones, Jacob Steinhardt

Large language models generate complex, open-ended outputs: instead of outputting a class label they write summaries, generate dialogue, or produce working code. In order to asses the reliability of these open-ended generation systems, we aim to identify qualitative categories of erroneous behavior, beyond identifying individual errors. To hypothesize and test for such qualitative errors, we draw inspiration from human cognitive biases -- systematic patterns of deviation from rational judgement. Specifically, we use cognitive biases as motivation to (i) generate hypotheses for problems that models may have, and (ii) develop experiments that elicit these problems. Using code generation as a case study, we find that OpenAI's Codex errs predictably based on how the input prompt is framed, adjusts outputs towards anchors, and is biased towards outputs that mimic frequent training examples. We then use our framework to elicit high-impact errors such as incorrectly deleting files. Our results indicate that experimental methodology from cognitive science can help characterize how machine learning systems behave.