Kenneth Payne

Kenneth Payne

Today's leading AI models engage in sophisticated behaviour when placed in strategic competition. They spontaneously attempt deception, signaling intentions they do not intend to follow; they demonstrate rich theory of mind, reasoning about adversary beliefs and anticipating their actions; and they exhibit credible metacognitive self-awareness, assessing their own strategic abilities before deciding how to act. Here we present findings from a crisis simulation in which three frontier large language models (GPT-5.2, Claude Sonnet 4, Gemini 3 Flash) play opposing leaders in a nuclear crisis. Our simulation has direct application for national security professionals, but also, via its insights into AI reasoning under uncertainty, has applications far beyond international crisis decision-making. Our findings both validate and challenge central tenets of strategic theory. We find support for Schelling's ideas about commitment, Kahn's escalation framework, and Jervis's work on misperception, inter alia. Yet we also find that the nuclear taboo is no impediment to nuclear escalation by our models; that strategic nuclear attack, while rare, does occur; that threats more often provoke counter-escalation than compliance; that high mutual credibility accelerated rather than deterred conflict; and that no model ever chose accommodation or withdrawal even when under acute pressure, only reduced levels of violence. We argue that AI simulation represents a powerful tool for strategic analysis, but only if properly calibrated against known patterns of human reasoning. Understanding how frontier models do and do not imitate human strategic logic is essential preparation for a world in which AI increasingly shapes strategic outcomes.

Kenneth Payne, Baptiste Alloui-Cros

Are Large Language Models (LLMs) a new form of strategic intelligence, able to reason about goals in competitive settings? We present compelling supporting evidence. The Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) has long served as a model for studying decision-making. We conduct the first ever series of evolutionary IPD tournaments, pitting canonical strategies (e.g., Tit-for-Tat, Grim Trigger) against agents from the leading frontier AI companies OpenAI, Google, and Anthropic. By varying the termination probability in each tournament (the "shadow of the future"), we introduce complexity and chance, confounding memorisation. Our results show that LLMs are highly competitive, consistently surviving and sometimes even proliferating in these complex ecosystems. Furthermore, they exhibit distinctive and persistent "strategic fingerprints": Google's Gemini models proved strategically ruthless, exploiting cooperative opponents and retaliating against defectors, while OpenAI's models remained highly cooperative, a trait that proved catastrophic in hostile environments. Anthropic's Claude emerged as the most forgiving reciprocator, showing remarkable willingness to restore cooperation even after being exploited or successfully defecting. Analysis of nearly 32,000 prose rationales provided by the models reveals that they actively reason about both the time horizon and their opponent's likely strategy, and we demonstrate that this reasoning is instrumental to their decisions. This work connects classic game theory with machine psychology, offering a rich and granular view of algorithmic decision-making under uncertainty.

Kenneth Payne

Judgment of risk is key to decision-making under uncertainty. As Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky famously discovered, humans do so in a distinctive way that departs from mathematical rationalism. Specifically, they demonstrated experimentally that humans accept more risk when they feel themselves at risk of losing something than when they might gain. I report the first tests of Kahneman and Tversky's landmark 'prospect theory' with Large Language Models, including today's state of the art chain-of-thought 'reasoners'. In common with humans, I find that prospect theory often anticipates how these models approach risky decisions across a range of scenarios. I also demonstrate that context is key to explaining much of the variance in risk appetite. The 'frame' through which risk is apprehended appears to be embedded within the language of the scenarios tackled by the models. Specifically, I find that military scenarios generate far larger 'framing effects' than do civilian settings, ceteris paribus. My research suggests, therefore, that language models the world, capturing our human heuristics and biases. But also that these biases are uneven - the idea of a 'frame' is richer than simple gains and losses. Wittgenstein's notion of 'language games' explains the contingent, localised biases activated by these scenarios. Finally, I use my findings to reframe the ongoing debate about reasoning and memorisation in LLMs.