Liudong Chen

Liudong Chen, Bolun Xu

We show that incorporating fairness constraints into virtual power plant (VPP) operations can incentivize consumer participation and thus improve the aggregator's long-run profitability. VPPs rely on sustained participation from heterogeneous consumers to provide a variety of grid services whose timing and frequency are often uncertain. As a result, consumers' willingness and ability to provide flexibility evolve over time, creating a dynamic link between past participation and future resource availability. We develop a dynamic aggregation framework to study how fairness in service allocation affects future participation and long-run profitability. By linking current dispatch decisions to future resource availability, we show that fairer allocations can strengthen consumer engagement, expand aggregate availability, and create additional value during high-price and high-demand events. To balance fairness and operational efficiency, we introduce a slack-augmented allocation mechanism that preserves most of the participation benefits from fairness while avoiding unnecessary reductions in service procurement. We derive conditions under which the resulting availability gains outweigh the short-run cost of redistribution and validate the approach using real-world consumer behavior and electricity market data from Norway.

Liudong Chen, Hyemi Kim, Adam N. Elmachtoub et al.

A virtual power plant (VPP) is operated by an aggregator that acts as a market intermediary, aggregating consumers to participate in wholesale power markets. By setting incentive prices, the aggregator induces consumers to sell energy and profits by providing this aggregated energy to the market. This supply is enabled by consumers' flexibility to adjust electricity consumption in response to market conditions. However, heterogeneity in flexibility means that profit-maximizing VPP pricing can create inequalities in participation and benefit allocation across consumers. In this paper, we develop a fairness-aware pricing framework to analyze how different fairness notions reshape system performance, measured by consumer Nash welfare, total consumer utility, and social welfare. We consider three fairness criteria: energy fairness, which ensures equitable energy provision; price fairness, which ensures similar incentive prices; and utility fairness, which ensures comparable levels of consumer utility. We model the aggregator-consumer interaction as a Stackelberg game and derive consumers' optimal responses to incentive prices. Using a stylized model, we show that profit-only pricing systematically disadvantages less flexible consumers. We further show that energy fairness can either improve or worsen all performance measures, and gains across most measures arise only at moderate fairness levels. Surprisingly, price fairness never benefits less flexible consumers, even when it reduces price disparities. By contrast, utility fairness protects less flexible consumers without benefiting more flexible ones. We validate our findings using data from an experiment in Norway under a tiered pricing scheme. Our results provide regulators and VPP operators with a systematic map linking fairness definitions and enforcement levels to operational and welfare outcomes.

Liudong Chen, Bolun Xu

Time-varying pricing tariffs incentivize consumers to shift their electricity demand and reduce costs, but may increase the energy burden for consumers with limited response capability. The utility must thus balance affordability and response incentives when designing these tariffs by considering consumers' response expectations. This paper proposes a joint learning-based identification and optimization method to design equitable time-varying tariffs. Our proposed method encodes historical prices and demand response data into a recurrent neural network (RNN) to capture high-dimensional and non-linear consumer price response behaviors. We then embed the RNN into the tariff design optimization, formulating a non-linear optimization problem with a quadratic objective. We propose a gradient-based solution method that achieves fast and scalable computation. Simulation using real-world consumer data shows that our equitable tariffs protect low-income consumers from price surges while effectively motivating consumers to reduce peak demand. The method also ensures revenue recovery for the utility company and achieves robust performance against demand response uncertainties and prediction errors.