Qiongkai Xu

Yujin Huang, Terry Yue Zhuo, Qiongkai Xu et al.

Large-scale language models have achieved tremendous success across various natural language processing (NLP) applications. Nevertheless, language models are vulnerable to backdoor attacks, which inject stealthy triggers into models for steering them to undesirable behaviors. Most existing backdoor attacks, such as data poisoning, require further (re)training or fine-tuning language models to learn the intended backdoor patterns. The additional training process however diminishes the stealthiness of the attacks, as training a language model usually requires long optimization time, a massive amount of data, and considerable modifications to the model parameters. In this work, we propose Training-Free Lexical Backdoor Attack (TFLexAttack) as the first training-free backdoor attack on language models. Our attack is achieved by injecting lexical triggers into the tokenizer of a language model via manipulating its embedding dictionary using carefully designed rules. These rules are explainable to human developers which inspires attacks from a wider range of hackers. The sparse manipulation of the dictionary also habilitates the stealthiness of our attack. We conduct extensive experiments on three dominant NLP tasks based on nine language models to demonstrate the effectiveness and universality of our attack. The code of this work is available at https://github.com/Jinxhy/TFLexAttack.

Terry Yue Zhuo, Qiongkai Xu, Xuanli He et al.

Automatic evaluation on low-resource language translation suffers from a deficiency of parallel corpora. Round-trip translation could be served as a clever and straightforward technique to alleviate the requirement of the parallel evaluation corpus. However, there was an observation of obscure correlations between the evaluation scores by forward and round-trip translations in the era of statistical machine translation (SMT). In this paper, we report the surprising finding that round-trip translation can be used for automatic evaluation without the references. Firstly, our revisit on the round-trip translation in SMT evaluation unveils that its long-standing misunderstanding is essentially caused by copying mechanism. After removing copying mechanism in SMT, round-trip translation scores can appropriately reflect the forward translation performance. Then, we demonstrate the rectification is overdue as round-trip translation could benefit multiple machine translation evaluation tasks. To be more specific, round-trip translation could be used i) to predict corresponding forward translation scores; ii) to improve the performance of the recently advanced quality estimation model; and iii) to identify adversarial competitors in shared tasks via cross-system verification.

Anudeex Shetty, Qiongkai Xu, Jey Han Lau

Embeddings-as-a-Service (EaaS) is a service offered by large language model (LLM) developers to supply embeddings generated by LLMs. Previous research suggests that EaaS is prone to imitation attacks -- attacks that clone the underlying EaaS model by training another model on the queried embeddings. As a result, EaaS watermarks are introduced to protect the intellectual property of EaaS providers. In this paper, we first show that existing EaaS watermarks can be removed by paraphrasing when attackers clone the model. Subsequently, we propose a novel watermarking technique that involves linearly transforming the embeddings, and show that it is empirically and theoretically robust against paraphrasing.

Fan Jiang, Qiongkai Xu, Tom Drummond et al.

Neural 'dense' retrieval models are state of the art for many datasets, however these models often exhibit limited domain transfer ability. Existing approaches to adaptation are unwieldy, such as requiring explicit supervision, complex model architectures, or massive external models. We present $\texttt{ABEL}$, a simple but effective unsupervised method to enhance passage retrieval in zero-shot settings. Our technique follows a straightforward loop: a dense retriever learns from supervision signals provided by a reranker, and subsequently, the reranker is updated based on feedback from the improved retriever. By iterating this loop, the two components mutually enhance one another's performance. Experimental results demonstrate that our unsupervised $\texttt{ABEL}$ model outperforms both leading supervised and unsupervised retrievers on the BEIR benchmark. Meanwhile, it exhibits strong adaptation abilities to tasks and domains that were unseen during training. By either fine-tuning $\texttt{ABEL}$ on labelled data or integrating it with existing supervised dense retrievers, we achieve state-of-the-art results.\footnote{Source code is available at \url{https://github.com/Fantabulous-J/BootSwitch}.}

Anudeex Shetty, Qiongkai Xu, Olga Ohrimenko et al.

In this paper, we introduce GhostWriteBench, a dataset for LLM authorship attribution. It comprises long-form texts (50K+ words per book) generated by frontier LLMs, and is designed to test generalisation across multiple out-of-distribution (OOD) dimensions, including domain and unseen LLM author. We also propose TRACE -- a novel fingerprinting method that is interpretable and lightweight -- that works for both open- and closed-source models. TRACE creates the fingerprint by capturing token-level transition patterns (e.g., word rank) estimated by another lightweight language model. Experiments on GhostWriteBench demonstrate that TRACE achieves state-of-the-art performance, remains robust in OOD settings, and works well in limited training data scenarios.

Xuanli He, Jun Wang, Qiongkai Xu et al.

The implications of backdoor attacks on English-centric large language models (LLMs) have been widely examined - such attacks can be achieved by embedding malicious behaviors during training and activated under specific conditions that trigger malicious outputs. Despite the increasing support for multilingual capabilities in open-source and proprietary LLMs, the impact of backdoor attacks on these systems remains largely under-explored. Our research focuses on cross-lingual backdoor attacks against multilingual LLMs, particularly investigating how poisoning the instruction-tuning data for one or two languages can affect the outputs for languages whose instruction-tuning data were not poisoned. Despite its simplicity, our empirical analysis reveals that our method exhibits remarkable efficacy in models like mT5 and GPT-4o, with high attack success rates, surpassing 90% in more than 7 out of 12 languages across various scenarios. Our findings also indicate that more powerful models show increased susceptibility to transferable cross-lingual backdoor attacks, which also applies to LLMs predominantly pre-trained on English data, such as Llama2, Llama3, and Gemma. Moreover, our experiments demonstrate 1) High Transferability: the backdoor mechanism operates successfully in cross-lingual response scenarios across 26 languages, achieving an average attack success rate of 99%, and 2) Robustness: the proposed attack remains effective even after defenses are applied. These findings expose critical security vulnerabilities in multilingual LLMs and highlight the urgent need for more robust, targeted defense strategies to address the unique challenges posed by cross-lingual backdoor transfer.

Wanru Zhao, Vidit Khazanchi, Haodi Xing et al.

Large language model (LLM) services have recently begun offering a plugin ecosystem to interact with third-party API services. This innovation enhances the capabilities of LLMs, but it also introduces risks, as these plugins developed by various third parties cannot be easily trusted. This paper proposes a new attacking framework to examine security and safety vulnerabilities within LLM platforms that incorporate third-party services. Applying our framework specifically to widely used LLMs, we identify real-world malicious attacks across various domains on third-party APIs that can imperceptibly modify LLM outputs. The paper discusses the unique challenges posed by third-party API integration and offers strategic possibilities to improve the security and safety of LLM ecosystems moving forward. Our code is released at https://github.com/vk0812/Third-Party-Attacks-on-LLMs.

Qiongkai Xu, Trevor Cohn, Olga Ohrimenko

Federated Learning allows collaborative training without data sharing in settings where participants do not trust the central server and one another. Privacy can be further improved by ensuring that communication between the participants and the server is anonymized through a shuffle; decoupling the participant identity from their data. This paper seeks to examine whether such a defense is adequate to guarantee anonymity, by proposing a novel fingerprinting attack over gradients sent by the participants to the server. We show that clustering of gradients can easily break the anonymization in an empirical study of learning federated language models on two language corpora. We then show that training with differential privacy can provide a practical defense against our fingerprint attack.

Weijun Li, Ansh Arora, Xuanli He et al.

The exponential increase in the parameters of Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) has significantly raised the cost of independent training, particularly for resource-constrained entities. As a result, there is a growing reliance on open-source models. However, the opacity of training processes exacerbates security risks, making these models more vulnerable to malicious threats, such as backdoor attacks, while simultaneously complicating defense mechanisms. Merging homogeneous models has gained attention as a cost-effective post-training defense. However, we notice that existing strategies, such as weight averaging, only partially mitigate the influence of poisoned parameters and remain ineffective in disrupting the pervasive spurious correlations embedded across model parameters. We propose a novel module-switching strategy to break such spurious correlations within the model's propagation path. By leveraging evolutionary algorithms to optimize fusion strategies, we validate our approach against backdoor attacks targeting text and vision domains. Our method achieves effective backdoor mitigation even when incorporating a couple of compromised models, e.g., reducing the average attack success rate (ASR) to 22% compared to 31.9% with the best-performing baseline on SST-2.

Anudeex Shetty, Yue Teng, Ke He et al.

Embedding as a Service (EaaS) has become a widely adopted solution, which offers feature extraction capabilities for addressing various downstream tasks in Natural Language Processing (NLP). Prior studies have shown that EaaS can be prone to model extraction attacks; nevertheless, this concern could be mitigated by adding backdoor watermarks to the text embeddings and subsequently verifying the attack models post-publication. Through the analysis of the recent watermarking strategy for EaaS, EmbMarker, we design a novel CSE (Clustering, Selection, Elimination) attack that removes the backdoor watermark while maintaining the high utility of embeddings, indicating that the previous watermarking approach can be breached. In response to this new threat, we propose a new protocol to make the removal of watermarks more challenging by incorporating multiple possible watermark directions. Our defense approach, WARDEN, notably increases the stealthiness of watermarks and has been empirically shown to be effective against CSE attack.

Jun Wang, Qiongkai Xu, Xuanli He et al.

While multilingual machine translation (MNMT) systems hold substantial promise, they also have security vulnerabilities. Our research highlights that MNMT systems can be susceptible to a particularly devious style of backdoor attack, whereby an attacker injects poisoned data into a low-resource language pair to cause malicious translations in other languages, including high-resource languages. Our experimental results reveal that injecting less than 0.01% poisoned data into a low-resource language pair can achieve an average 20% attack success rate in attacking high-resource language pairs. This type of attack is of particular concern, given the larger attack surface of languages inherent to low-resource settings. Our aim is to bring attention to these vulnerabilities within MNMT systems with the hope of encouraging the community to address security concerns in machine translation, especially in the context of low-resource languages.

Xuanli He, Qiongkai Xu, Jun Wang et al.

Modern NLP models are often trained on public datasets drawn from diverse sources, rendering them vulnerable to data poisoning attacks. These attacks can manipulate the model's behavior in ways engineered by the attacker. One such tactic involves the implantation of backdoors, achieved by poisoning specific training instances with a textual trigger and a target class label. Several strategies have been proposed to mitigate the risks associated with backdoor attacks by identifying and removing suspected poisoned examples. However, we observe that these strategies fail to offer effective protection against several advanced backdoor attacks. To remedy this deficiency, we propose a novel defensive mechanism that first exploits training dynamics to identify poisoned samples with high precision, followed by a label propagation step to improve recall and thus remove the majority of poisoned instances. Compared with recent advanced defense methods, our method considerably reduces the success rates of several backdoor attacks while maintaining high classification accuracy on clean test sets.

Yiyi Chen, Qiongkai Xu, Johannes Bjerva

With the growing popularity of Large Language Models (LLMs) and vector databases, private textual data is increasingly processed and stored as numerical embeddings. However, recent studies have proven that such embeddings are vulnerable to inversion attacks, where original text is reconstructed to reveal sensitive information. Previous research has largely assumed access to millions of sentences to train attack models, e.g., through data leakage or nearly unrestricted API access. With our method, a single data point is sufficient for a partially successful inversion attack. With as little as 1k data samples, performance reaches an optimum across a range of black-box encoders, without training on leaked data. We present a Few-shot Textual Embedding Inversion Attack using ALignment and GENeration (ALGEN), by aligning victim embeddings to the attack space and using a generative model to reconstruct text. We find that ALGEN attacks can be effectively transferred across domains and languages, revealing key information. We further examine a variety of defense mechanisms against ALGEN, and find that none are effective, highlighting the vulnerabilities posed by inversion attacks. By significantly lowering the cost of inversion and proving that embedding spaces can be aligned through one-step optimization, we establish a new textual embedding inversion paradigm with broader applications for embedding alignment in NLP.

Diego Mollá, Qiongkai Xu, Zijie Zeng et al.

The ALTA shared tasks have been running annually since 2010. In 2024, the purpose of the task is to detect machine-generated text in a hybrid setting where the text may contain portions of human text and portions machine-generated. In this paper, we present the task, the evaluation criteria, and the results of the systems participating in the shared task.

Aditya Desu, Xuanli He, Qiongkai Xu et al.

As machine- and AI-generated content proliferates, protecting the intellectual property of generative models has become imperative, yet verifying data ownership poses formidable challenges, particularly in cases of unauthorized reuse of generated data. The challenge of verifying data ownership is further amplified by using Machine Learning as a Service (MLaaS), which often functions as a black-box system. Our work is dedicated to detecting data reuse from even an individual sample. Traditionally, watermarking has been leveraged to detect AI-generated content. However, unlike watermarking techniques that embed additional information as triggers into models or generated content, potentially compromising output quality, our approach identifies latent fingerprints inherently present within the outputs through re-generation. We propose an explainable verification procedure that attributes data ownership through re-generation, and further amplifies these fingerprints in the generative models through iterative data re-generation. This methodology is theoretically grounded and demonstrates viability and robustness using recent advanced text and image generative models. Our methodology is significant as it goes beyond protecting the intellectual property of APIs and addresses important issues such as the spread of misinformation and academic misconduct. It provides a useful tool to ensure the integrity of sources and authorship, expanding its application in different scenarios where authenticity and ownership verification are essential.

Jingjie Zheng, Aryo Pradipta Gema, Giwon Hong et al.

Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG) frameworks improve the accuracy of large language models (LLMs) by integrating external knowledge from retrieved documents, thereby overcoming the limitations of models' static intrinsic knowledge. However, these systems are susceptible to adversarial attacks that manipulate the retrieval process by introducing documents that are adversarial yet semantically similar to the query. Notably, while these adversarial documents resemble the query, they exhibit weak similarity to benign documents in the retrieval set. Thus, we propose a simple yet effective Graph-based Reranking against Adversarial Document Attacks (GRADA) framework aiming at preserving retrieval quality while significantly reducing the success of adversaries. Our study evaluates the effectiveness of our approach through experiments conducted on five LLMs: GPT-3.5-Turbo, GPT-4o, Llama3.1-8b, Llama3.1-70b, and Qwen2.5-7b. We use three datasets to assess performance, with results from the Natural Questions dataset demonstrating up to an 80% reduction in attack success rates while maintaining minimal loss in accuracy.

Yao Tong, Weijun Li, Xuanli He et al.

Model NLP models are commonly trained (or fine-tuned) on datasets from untrusted platforms like HuggingFace, posing significant risks of data poisoning attacks. A practical yet underexplored challenge arises when such backdoors are discovered after model deployment, making retraining-required defenses less desirable due to computational costs and data constraints. In this work, we propose Guided Module Substitution (GMS), an effective retraining-free method based on guided merging of the victim model with just a single proxy model. Unlike prior ad-hoc merging defenses, GMS uses a guided trade-off signal between utility and backdoor to selectively replaces modules in the victim model. GMS offers four desirable properties: (1) robustness to the choice and trustworthiness of the proxy model, (2) applicability under inaccurate data knowledge, (3) stability across hyperparameters, and (4) transferability across different attacks. Extensive experiments on encoder models and decoder LLMs demonstrate the strong effectiveness of GMS. GMS significantly outperforms even the strongest defense baseline, particularly against challenging attacks like LWS.

Pedro Faustini, Shakila Mahjabin Tonni, Annabelle McIver et al.

Natural language processing (NLP) models may leak private information in different ways, including membership inference, reconstruction or attribute inference attacks. Sensitive information may not be explicit in the text, but hidden in underlying writing characteristics. Methods to protect privacy can involve using representations inside models that are demonstrated not to detect sensitive attributes or -- for instance, in cases where users might not trust a model, the sort of scenario of interest here -- changing the raw text before models can have access to it. The goal is to rewrite text to prevent someone from inferring a sensitive attribute (e.g. the gender of the author, or their location by the writing style) whilst keeping the text useful for its original intention (e.g. the sentiment of a product review). The few works tackling this have focused on generative techniques. However, these often create extensively different texts from the original ones or face problems such as mode collapse. This paper explores a novel adaptation of adversarial attack techniques to manipulate a text to deceive a classifier w.r.t one task (privacy) whilst keeping the predictions of another classifier trained for another task (utility) unchanged. We propose IDT, a method that analyses predictions made by auxiliary and interpretable models to identify which tokens are important to change for the privacy task, and which ones should be kept for the utility task. We evaluate different datasets for NLP suitable for different tasks. Automatic and human evaluations show that IDT retains the utility of text, while also outperforming existing methods when deceiving a classifier w.r.t privacy task.

Shuo Huang, William MacLean, Xiaoxi Kang et al.

The widespread use of cloud-based Large Language Models (LLMs) has heightened concerns over user privacy, as sensitive information may be inadvertently exposed during interactions with these services. To protect privacy before sending sensitive data to those models, we suggest sanitizing sensitive text using two common strategies used by humans: i) deleting sensitive expressions, and ii) obscuring sensitive details by abstracting them. To explore the issues and develop a tool for text rewriting, we curate the first corpus, coined NAP^2, through both crowdsourcing and the use of large language models (LLMs). Compared to the prior works on anonymization, the human-inspired approaches result in more natural rewrites and offer an improved balance between privacy protection and data utility, as demonstrated by our extensive experiments. Researchers interested in accessing the dataset are encouraged to contact the first or corresponding author via email.

Weijun Li, Qiongkai Xu, Mark Dras

Recent studies have shown that distributed machine learning is vulnerable to gradient inversion attacks, where private training data can be reconstructed by analyzing the gradients of the models shared in training. Previous attacks established that such reconstructions are possible using gradients from all parameters in the entire models. However, we hypothesize that most of the involved modules, or even their sub-modules, are at risk of training data leakage, and we validate such vulnerabilities in various intermediate layers of language models. Our extensive experiments reveal that gradients from a single Transformer layer, or even a single linear component with 0.54% parameters, are susceptible to training data leakage. Additionally, we show that applying differential privacy on gradients during training offers limited protection against the novel vulnerability of data disclosure.

Haolan Zhan, Xuanli He, Qiongkai Xu et al.

The burgeoning progress in the field of Large Language Models (LLMs) heralds significant benefits due to their unparalleled capacities. However, it is critical to acknowledge the potential misuse of these models, which could give rise to a spectrum of social and ethical dilemmas. Despite numerous preceding efforts centered around distinguishing synthetic text, most existing detection systems fail to identify data synthesized by the latest LLMs, such as ChatGPT and GPT-4. In response to this challenge, we introduce an unpretentious yet potent detection approach proficient in identifying synthetic text across a wide array of fields. Moreover, our detector demonstrates outstanding performance uniformly across various model architectures and decoding strategies. It also possesses the capability to identify text generated utilizing a potent detection-evasion technique. Our comprehensive research underlines our commitment to boosting the robustness and efficiency of machine-generated text detection mechanisms, particularly in the context of swiftly progressing and increasingly adaptive AI technologies.

Xuanli He, Qiongkai Xu, Jun Wang et al.

Modern NLP models are often trained over large untrusted datasets, raising the potential for a malicious adversary to compromise model behaviour. For instance, backdoors can be implanted through crafting training instances with a specific textual trigger and a target label. This paper posits that backdoor poisoning attacks exhibit \emph{spurious correlation} between simple text features and classification labels, and accordingly, proposes methods for mitigating spurious correlation as means of defence. Our empirical study reveals that the malicious triggers are highly correlated to their target labels; therefore such correlations are extremely distinguishable compared to those scores of benign features, and can be used to filter out potentially problematic instances. Compared with several existing defences, our defence method significantly reduces attack success rates across backdoor attacks, and in the case of insertion-based attacks, our method provides a near-perfect defence.

Zhuang Li, Lizhen Qu, Qiongkai Xu et al.

In this paper, we propose a variational autoencoder with disentanglement priors, VAE-DPRIOR, for task-specific natural language generation with none or a handful of task-specific labeled examples. In order to tackle compositional generalization across tasks, our model performs disentangled representation learning by introducing a conditional prior for the latent content space and another conditional prior for the latent label space. Both types of priors satisfy a novel property called $ε$-disentangled. We show both empirically and theoretically that the novel priors can disentangle representations even without specific regularizations as in the prior work. The content prior enables directly sampling diverse content representations from the content space learned from the seen tasks, and fuse them with the representations of novel tasks for generating semantically diverse texts in the low-resource settings. Our extensive experiments demonstrate the superior performance of our model over competitive baselines in terms of i) data augmentation in continuous zero/few-shot learning, and ii) text style transfer in the few-shot setting.

Xuanli He, Qiongkai Xu, Lingjuan Lyu et al.

Nowadays, due to the breakthrough in natural language generation (NLG), including machine translation, document summarization, image captioning, etc NLG models have been encapsulated in cloud APIs to serve over half a billion people worldwide and process over one hundred billion word generations per day. Thus, NLG APIs have already become essential profitable services in many commercial companies. Due to the substantial financial and intellectual investments, service providers adopt a pay-as-you-use policy to promote sustainable market growth. However, recent works have shown that cloud platforms suffer from financial losses imposed by model extraction attacks, which aim to imitate the functionality and utility of the victim services, thus violating the intellectual property (IP) of cloud APIs. This work targets at protecting IP of NLG APIs by identifying the attackers who have utilized watermarked responses from the victim NLG APIs. However, most existing watermarking techniques are not directly amenable for IP protection of NLG APIs. To bridge this gap, we first present a novel watermarking method for text generation APIs by conducting lexical modification to the original outputs. Compared with the competitive baselines, our watermark approach achieves better identifiable performance in terms of p-value, with fewer semantic losses. In addition, our watermarks are more understandable and intuitive to humans than the baselines. Finally, the empirical studies show our approach is also applicable to queries from different domains, and is effective on the attacker trained on a mixture of the corpus which includes less than 10\% watermarked samples.

Qiongkai Xu, Christian Walder, Chenchen Xu

Estimating the performance of a machine learning system is a longstanding challenge in artificial intelligence research. Today, this challenge is especially relevant given the emergence of systems which appear to increasingly outperform human beings. In some cases, this "superhuman" performance is readily demonstrated; for example by defeating legendary human players in traditional two player games. On the other hand, it can be challenging to evaluate classification models that potentially surpass human performance. Indeed, human annotations are often treated as a ground truth, which implicitly assumes the superiority of the human over any models trained on human annotations. In reality, human annotators can make mistakes and be subjective. Evaluating the performance with respect to a genuine oracle may be more objective and reliable, even when querying the oracle is expensive or impossible. In this paper, we first raise the challenge of evaluating the performance of both humans and models with respect to an oracle which is unobserved. We develop a theory for estimating the accuracy compared to the oracle, using only imperfect human annotations for reference. Our analysis provides a simple recipe for detecting and certifying superhuman performance in this setting, which we believe will assist in understanding the stage of current research on classification. We validate the convergence of the bounds and the assumptions of our theory on carefully designed toy experiments with known oracles. Moreover, we demonstrate the utility of our theory by meta-analyzing large-scale natural language processing tasks, for which an oracle does not exist, and show that under our assumptions a number of models from recent years are with high probability superhuman.

Qiongkai Xu, Xuanli He, Lingjuan Lyu et al.

Machine-learning-as-a-service (MLaaS) has attracted millions of users to their splendid large-scale models. Although published as black-box APIs, the valuable models behind these services are still vulnerable to imitation attacks. Recently, a series of works have demonstrated that attackers manage to steal or extract the victim models. Nonetheless, none of the previous stolen models can outperform the original black-box APIs. In this work, we conduct unsupervised domain adaptation and multi-victim ensemble to showing that attackers could potentially surpass victims, which is beyond previous understanding of model extraction. Extensive experiments on both benchmark datasets and real-world APIs validate that the imitators can succeed in outperforming the original black-box models on transferred domains. We consider our work as a milestone in the research of imitation attack, especially on NLP APIs, as the superior performance could influence the defense or even publishing strategy of API providers.

Xuanli He, Lingjuan Lyu, Qiongkai Xu et al.

Natural language processing (NLP) tasks, ranging from text classification to text generation, have been revolutionised by the pre-trained language models, such as BERT. This allows corporations to easily build powerful APIs by encapsulating fine-tuned BERT models for downstream tasks. However, when a fine-tuned BERT model is deployed as a service, it may suffer from different attacks launched by malicious users. In this work, we first present how an adversary can steal a BERT-based API service (the victim/target model) on multiple benchmark datasets with limited prior knowledge and queries. We further show that the extracted model can lead to highly transferable adversarial attacks against the victim model. Our studies indicate that the potential vulnerabilities of BERT-based API services still hold, even when there is an architectural mismatch between the victim model and the attack model. Finally, we investigate two defence strategies to protect the victim model and find that unless the performance of the victim model is sacrificed, both model ex-traction and adversarial transferability can effectively compromise the target models

Qiongkai Xu, Chenchen Xu, Lizhen Qu

In this paper, we describe ALTER, an auxiliary text rewriting tool that facilitates the rewriting process for natural language generation tasks, such as paraphrasing, text simplification, fairness-aware text rewriting, and text style transfer. Our tool is characterized by two features, i) recording of word-level revision histories and ii) flexible auxiliary edit support and feedback to annotators. The text rewriting assist and traceable rewriting history are potentially beneficial to the future research of natural language generation.

Qiongkai Xu, Juyan Zhang, Lizhen Qu et al.

In this paper, we investigate the diversity aspect of paraphrase generation. Prior deep learning models employ either decoding methods or add random input noise for varying outputs. We propose a simple method Diverse Paraphrase Generation (D-PAGE), which extends neural machine translation (NMT) models to support the generation of diverse paraphrases with implicit rewriting patterns. Our experimental results on two real-world benchmark datasets demonstrate that our model generates at least one order of magnitude more diverse outputs than the baselines in terms of a new evaluation metric Jeffrey's Divergence. We have also conducted extensive experiments to understand various properties of our model with a focus on diversity.

Qiongkai Xu, Qing Wang, Chenchen Xu et al.

Collective classification of vertices is a task of assigning categories to each vertex in a graph based on both vertex attributes and link structure. Nevertheless, some existing approaches do not use the features of neighbouring vertices properly, due to the noise introduced by these features. In this paper, we propose a graph-based recursive neural network framework for collective vertex classification. In this framework, we generate hidden representations from both attributes of vertices and representations of neighbouring vertices via recursive neural networks. Under this framework, we explore two types of recursive neural units, naive recursive neural unit and long short-term memory unit. We have conducted experiments on four real-world network datasets. The experimental results show that our frame- work with long short-term memory model achieves better results and outperforms several competitive baseline methods.