Lesia Mitridati

Ognjen Stanojev, Lesia Mitridati, Riccardo de Nardis di Prata et al.

This paper presents a novel safe reinforcement learning algorithm for strategic bidding of Virtual Power Plants (VPPs) in day-ahead electricity markets. The proposed algorithm utilizes the Deep Deterministic Policy Gradient (DDPG) method to learn competitive bidding policies without requiring an accurate market model. Furthermore, to account for the complex internal physical constraints of VPPs we introduce two enhancements to the DDPG method. Firstly, a projection-based safety shield that restricts the agent's actions to the feasible space defined by the non-linear power flow equations and operating constraints of distributed energy resources is derived. Secondly, a penalty for the shield activation in the reward function that incentivizes the agent to learn a safer policy is introduced. A case study based on the IEEE 13-bus network demonstrates the effectiveness of the proposed approach in enabling the agent to learn a highly competitive, safe strategic policy.

Shobhit Singhal, Lesia Mitridati, Licio Romao

Renewable power sources have low marginal pro-duction costs, but may result in high balancing costs due to the inherent production uncertainty. Current day-ahead markets elicit only point production profiles and neglect the degree of uncertainty associated with each generating asset, preventing the market operator from accounting for balancing costs in day-ahead dispatch and ancillary service procurement. This increases total system costs and undermines market efficiency, especially in renewable-heavy power systems. To address this, we propose a new market clearing paradigm based on a two-stage mechanism, where producers report their production forecast distribution in the day-ahead stage, followed by the realized production in the real-time stage. By extending the Vickery-Clarke-Groves (VCG) payments to the two-stage setting, we show appealing properties in terms of incentive compatibility and individual rationality. An electricity market case study validates the theoretical claims, and illustrates the effectiveness of the proposed mechanism to reduce system costs.

Ferdinando Fioretto, Lesia Mitridati, Pascal Van Hentenryck

This paper introduces a differentially private (DP) mechanism to protect the information exchanged during the coordination of sequential and interdependent markets. This coordination represents a classic Stackelberg game and relies on the exchange of sensitive information between the system agents. The paper is motivated by the observation that the perturbation introduced by traditional DP mechanisms fundamentally changes the underlying optimization problem and even leads to unsatisfiable instances. To remedy such limitation, the paper introduces the Privacy-Preserving Stackelberg Mechanism (PPSM), a framework that enforces the notions of feasibility and fidelity of the privacy-preserving information to the original problem objective. PPSM complies with the notion of differential privacy and ensures that the outcomes of the privacy-preserving coordination mechanism are close-to-optimality for each agent. Experimental results on several gas and electricity market benchmarks based on a real case study demonstrate the effectiveness of the approach.

Ferdinando Fioretto, Lesia Mitridati, Pascal Van Hentenryck

This paper introduces a differentially private mechanism to protect the information exchanged during the coordination of the sequential market-clearing of electricity and natural gas systems. The coordination between these sequential and interdependent markets represents a classic Stackelberg game and relies on the exchange of sensitive information between the system agents, including the supply and demand bids in each market or the characteristics of the systems. The paper is motivated by the observation that traditional differential privacy mechanisms are unsuitable for the problem of interest: The perturbation introduced by these mechanisms fundamentally changes the underlying optimization problem and even leads to unsatisfiable instances. To remedy such limitation, the paper introduces the Privacy-Preserving Stackelberg Mechanism (PPSM), a framework that enforces the notions of consistency and fidelity of the privacy-preserving information to the original problem objective. The PPSM has strong properties: It complies with the notion of differential privacy and ensures that the outcomes of the privacy-preserving coordination mechanisms are close-to-optimality for each agent. The fidelity property is analyzed by providing theoretical guarantees on the cost of privacy of PPSM and experimental results on several gas and electricity market benchmarks based on a real case study demonstrate the effectiveness of the approach.