Kentrell Owens

Pratyusha Ria Kalluri, William Agnew, Myra Cheng et al. · allen-ai

A rapidly growing number of voices argue that AI research, and computer vision in particular, is powering mass surveillance. Yet the direct path from computer vision research to surveillance has remained obscured and difficult to assess. Here, we reveal the Surveillance AI pipeline by analyzing three decades of computer vision research papers and downstream patents, more than 40,000 documents. We find the large majority of annotated computer vision papers and patents self-report their technology enables extracting data about humans. Moreover, the majority of these technologies specifically enable extracting data about human bodies and body parts. We present both quantitative and rich qualitative analysis illuminating these practices of human data extraction. Studying the roots of this pipeline, we find that institutions that prolifically produce computer vision research, namely elite universities and "big tech" corporations, are subsequently cited in thousands of surveillance patents. Further, we find consistent evidence against the narrative that only these few rogue entities are contributing to surveillance. Rather, we expose the fieldwide norm that when an institution, nation, or subfield authors computer vision papers with downstream patents, the majority of these papers are used in surveillance patents. In total, we find the number of papers with downstream surveillance patents increased more than five-fold between the 1990s and the 2010s, with computer vision research now having been used in more than 11,000 surveillance patents. Finally, in addition to the high levels of surveillance we find documented in computer vision papers and patents, we unearth pervasive patterns of documents using language that obfuscates the extent of surveillance. Our analysis reveals the pipeline by which computer vision research has powered the ongoing expansion of surveillance.

Yael Eiger, Nino Migineishvili, Emi Yoshikawa et al.

Digital devices like tablets, media players, and kiosks are increasingly deployed in U.S. prisons. These technologies can enable incarcerated people to access education, communicate with loved ones, and develop vital reentry skills. However, they can also introduce new privacy and security risks for incarcerated people who have little agency over their usage and contracts, and are currently carved out of many consumer protection safeguards. To investigate these issues, we conducted focus groups and interviews with system-impacted people (n=17), i.e., those formerly incarcerated, and their relatives, to investigate experiences with device-related security and privacy vulnerabilities and the power dynamics that affect their use. In our findings, participants describe pervasive surveillance, censorship, and usability problems with the technology available to them, including shifting and seemingly arbitrary usage policies. These policies strain relationships both inside and outside prisons and contribute to negative downstream effects for incarcerated users. We recommend ways to better balance prison security concerns with privacy-related needs of system-impacted individuals by promoting accountability for technology-related decisions, providing public oversight of digital purchasing and use policies, and designing digital tools with them -- the actual end-users -- in mind.