Mandar Pitale

Abhinaw Priyadershi, Mandar Pitale, Jelena Frtunikj et al.

Safety standards for ML-based autonomous driving specify the kind of evidence an assurance case must contain (directed cause-and-effect chains, quantified interventional effects, named root-cause variables), yet the XAI literature is organised by output type and technique family (saliency maps, feature attribution, counterfactuals, causal graphs, language traces). SHAP, the most-recommended ADS XAI method, returns a ranked feature list that no implementation effort can convert into a directed chain (Fig.1). We name this mismatch the evidence-type gap. From AMLAS, ISO 26262, ISO21448, ISO/PAS 8800 we derive 19 testable evidentiary criteria across 7 lifecycle stages with representative clause-cited derivations and score six XAI method classes structurally. Causal XAI emerges as structurally required to satisfy the derived criteria at three stages: hazard identification (+62% rubric gap), incident investigation (+50%), and data management (+50%); the verdict set is stable across thresholds T in (0%, 50%]$ and survives a worst-case single-cell flip down to T = 25%. At the remaining four stages, correlational or language-based methods are comparable or sufficient. The rubric identifies structural admissibility (necessary but not sufficient for compliance): an admissible method's specific output content may still be wrong, and validating that fidelity (the edges a fitted SCM produces, the cause a trace names) is the open assurance challenge. A single-VLA proof of concept on 1,996 real-world driving clips (79,840 rows, ten splits) is consistent with each method's observed output type matching its rubric prediction. XAI method selection for ADS safety assurance should be driven by lifecycle-stage evidence demand, not by method popularity.

Mandar Pitale, Alireza Abbaspour, Devesh Upadhyay

This paper explores the role and challenges of Artificial Intelligence (AI) algorithms, specifically AI-based software elements, in autonomous driving systems. These AI systems are fundamental in executing real-time critical functions in complex and high-dimensional environments. They handle vital tasks like multi-modal perception, cognition, and decision-making tasks such as motion planning, lane keeping, and emergency braking. A primary concern relates to the ability (and necessity) of AI models to generalize beyond their initial training data. This generalization issue becomes evident in real-time scenarios, where models frequently encounter inputs not represented in their training or validation data. In such cases, AI systems must still function effectively despite facing distributional or domain shifts. This paper investigates the risk associated with overconfident AI models in safety-critical applications like autonomous driving. To mitigate these risks, methods for training AI models that help maintain performance without overconfidence are proposed. This involves implementing certainty reporting architectures and ensuring diverse training data. While various distribution-based methods exist to provide safety mechanisms for AI models, there is a noted lack of systematic assessment of these methods, especially in the context of safety-critical automotive applications. Many methods in the literature do not adapt well to the quick response times required in safety-critical edge applications. This paper reviews these methods, discusses their suitability for safety-critical applications, and highlights their strengths and limitations. The paper also proposes potential improvements to enhance the safety and reliability of AI algorithms in autonomous vehicles in the context of rapid and accurate decision-making processes.

Mandar Pitale, Jelena Frtunikj, Abhinaw Priyadershi et al.

AI has become integral to safety-critical areas like autonomous driving systems (ADS) and robotics. The architecture of recent autonomous systems are trending toward end-to-end (E2E) monolithic architectures such as large language models (LLMs) and vision language models (VLMs). In this paper, we review different architectural solutions and then evaluate the efficacy of common safety analyses such as failure modes and effect analysis (FMEA) and fault tree analysis (FTA). We show how these techniques can be improved for the intricate nature of the foundational models, particularly in how they form and utilize latent representations. We introduce HySAFE-AI, Hybrid Safety Architectural Analysis Framework for AI Systems, a hybrid framework that adapts traditional methods to evaluate the safety of AI systems. Lastly, we offer hints of future work and suggestions to guide the evolution of future AI safety standards.

Sina Mohseni, Mandar Pitale, Vasu Singh et al.

Autonomous vehicles rely on machine learning to solve challenging tasks in perception and motion planning. However, automotive software safety standards have not fully evolved to address the challenges of machine learning safety such as interpretability, verification, and performance limitations. In this paper, we review and organize practical machine learning safety techniques that can complement engineering safety for machine learning based software in autonomous vehicles. Our organization maps safety strategies to state-of-the-art machine learning techniques in order to enhance dependability and safety of machine learning algorithms. We also discuss security limitations and user experience aspects of machine learning components in autonomous vehicles.