Hoda Heidari

Michael Feffer, Nikolas Martelaro, Hoda Heidari · cmu

Prior work has established the importance of integrating AI ethics topics into computer and data sciences curricula. We provide evidence suggesting that one of the critical objectives of AI Ethics education must be to raise awareness of AI harms. While there are various sources to learn about such harms, The AI Incident Database (AIID) is one of the few attempts at offering a relatively comprehensive database indexing prior instances of harms or near harms stemming from the deployment of AI technologies in the real world. This study assesses the effectiveness of AIID as an educational tool to raise awareness regarding the prevalence and severity of AI harms in socially high-stakes domains. We present findings obtained through a classroom study conducted at an R1 institution as part of a course focused on the societal and ethical considerations around AI and ML. Our qualitative findings characterize students' initial perceptions of core topics in AI ethics and their desire to close the educational gap between their technical skills and their ability to think systematically about ethical and societal aspects of their work. We find that interacting with the database helps students better understand the magnitude and severity of AI harms and instills in them a sense of urgency around (a) designing functional and safe AI and (b) strengthening governance and accountability mechanisms. Finally, we compile students' feedback about the tool and our class activity into actionable recommendations for the database development team and the broader community to improve awareness of AI harms in AI ethics education.

Benjamin Laufer, Jon Kleinberg, Hoda Heidari

Recent advances in Machine Learning (ML) and Artificial Intelligence (AI) follow a familiar structure: A firm releases a large, pretrained model. It is designed to be adapted and tweaked by other entities to perform particular, domain-specific functions. The model is described as `general-purpose,' meaning it can be transferred to a wide range of downstream tasks, in a process known as adaptation or fine-tuning. Understanding this process - the strategies, incentives, and interactions involved in the development of AI tools - is crucial for making conclusions about societal implications and regulatory responses, and may provide insights beyond AI about general-purpose technologies. We propose a model of this adaptation process. A Generalist brings the technology to a certain level of performance, and one or more Domain specialist(s) adapt it for use in particular domain(s). Players incur costs when they invest in the technology, so they need to reach a bargaining agreement on how to share the resulting revenue before making their investment decisions. We find that for a broad class of cost and revenue functions, there exists a set of Pareto-optimal profit-sharing arrangements where the players jointly contribute to the technology. Our analysis, which utilizes methods based on bargaining solutions and sub-game perfect equilibria, provides insights into the strategic behaviors of firms in these types of interactions. For example, profit-sharing can arise even when one firm faces significantly higher costs than another. After demonstrating findings in the case of one domain-specialist, we provide closed-form and numerical bargaining solutions in the generalized setting with $n$ domain specialists. We find that any potential domain specialization will either contribute, free-ride, or abstain in their uptake of the technology, and provide conditions yielding these different responses.

Emily Black, Rakshit Naidu, Rayid Ghani et al.

While algorithmic fairness is a thriving area of research, in practice, mitigating issues of bias often gets reduced to enforcing an arbitrarily chosen fairness metric, either by enforcing fairness constraints during the optimization step, post-processing model outputs, or by manipulating the training data. Recent work has called on the ML community to take a more holistic approach to tackle fairness issues by systematically investigating the many design choices made through the ML pipeline, and identifying interventions that target the issue's root cause, as opposed to its symptoms. While we share the conviction that this pipeline-based approach is the most appropriate for combating algorithmic unfairness on the ground, we believe there are currently very few methods of \emph{operationalizing} this approach in practice. Drawing on our experience as educators and practitioners, we first demonstrate that without clear guidelines and toolkits, even individuals with specialized ML knowledge find it challenging to hypothesize how various design choices influence model behavior. We then consult the fair-ML literature to understand the progress to date toward operationalizing the pipeline-aware approach: we systematically collect and organize the prior work that attempts to detect, measure, and mitigate various sources of unfairness through the ML pipeline. We utilize this extensive categorization of previous contributions to sketch a research agenda for the community. We hope this work serves as the stepping stone toward a more comprehensive set of resources for ML researchers, practitioners, and students interested in exploring, designing, and testing pipeline-oriented approaches to algorithmic fairness.

Ningjing Tang, Megan Li, Amy Winecoff et al.

Model documentation plays a crucial role in promoting transparency and responsible development of AI systems. With the rise of Generative AI (GenAI), open-source platforms have increasingly become hubs for hosting and distributing these models, prompting platforms like Hugging Face to develop dedicated model documentation guidelines that align with responsible AI principles. Despite these growing efforts, there remains a lack of understanding of how developers document their GenAI models on open-source platforms. Through interviews with 13 GenAI developers active on open-source platforms, we provide empirical insights into their documentation practices and challenges. Our analysis reveals that despite existing resources, developers of GenAI models still face multiple layers of uncertainties in their model documentation: (1) uncertainties about what specific content should be included; (2) uncertainties about how to effectively report key components of their models; and (3) uncertainties in deciding who should take responsibilities for various aspects of model documentation. Based on our findings, we discuss the implications for policymakers, open-source platforms, and the research community to support meaningful, effective and actionable model documentation in the GenAI era, including cultivating better community norms, building robust evaluation infrastructures, and clarifying roles and responsibilities.

Kyle Boerstler, Vijay Keswani, Lok Chan et al.

Preference elicitation frameworks feature heavily in the research on participatory ethical AI tools and provide a viable mechanism to enquire and incorporate the moral values of various stakeholders. As part of the elicitation process, surveys about moral preferences, opinions, and judgments are typically administered only once to each participant. This methodological practice is reasonable if participants' responses are stable over time such that, all other relevant factors being held constant, their responses today will be the same as their responses to the same questions at a later time. However, we do not know how often that is the case. It is possible that participants' true moral preferences change, are subject to temporary moods or whims, or are influenced by environmental factors we don't track. If participants' moral responses are unstable in such ways, it would raise important methodological and theoretical issues for how participants' true moral preferences, opinions, and judgments can be ascertained. We address this possibility here by asking the same survey participants the same moral questions about which patient should receive a kidney when only one is available ten times in ten different sessions over two weeks, varying only presentation order across sessions. We measured how often participants gave different responses to simple (Study One) and more complicated (Study Two) repeated scenarios. On average, the fraction of times participants changed their responses to controversial scenarios was around 10-18% across studies, and this instability is observed to have positive associations with response time and decision-making difficulty. We discuss the implications of these results for the efficacy of moral preference elicitation, highlighting the role of response instability in causing value misalignment between stakeholders and AI tools trained on their moral judgments.

Vijay Keswani, Vincent Conitzer, Hoda Heidari et al.

Computational preference elicitation methods are tools used to learn people's preferences quantitatively in a given context. Recent works on preference elicitation advocate for active learning as an efficient method to iteratively construct queries (framed as comparisons between context-specific cases) that are likely to be most informative about an agent's underlying preferences. In this work, we argue that the use of active learning for moral preference elicitation relies on certain assumptions about the underlying moral preferences, which can be violated in practice. Specifically, we highlight the following common assumptions (a) preferences are stable over time and not sensitive to the sequence of presented queries, (b) the appropriate hypothesis class is chosen to model moral preferences, and (c) noise in the agent's responses is limited. While these assumptions can be appropriate for preference elicitation in certain domains, prior research on moral psychology suggests they may not be valid for moral judgments. Through a synthetic simulation of preferences that violate the above assumptions, we observe that active learning can have similar or worse performance than a basic random query selection method in certain settings. Yet, simulation results also demonstrate that active learning can still be viable if the degree of instability or noise is relatively small and when the agent's preferences can be approximately represented with the hypothesis class used for learning. Our study highlights the nuances associated with effective moral preference elicitation in practice and advocates for the cautious use of active learning as a methodology to learn moral preferences.

Vijay Keswani, Cyrus Cousins, Breanna Nguyen et al.

Alignment methods in moral domains seek to elicit moral preferences of human stakeholders and incorporate them into AI. This presupposes moral preferences as static targets, but such preferences often evolve over time. Proper alignment of AI to dynamic human preferences should ideally account for "legitimate" changes to moral reasoning, while ignoring changes related to attention deficits, cognitive biases, or other arbitrary factors. However, common AI alignment approaches largely neglect temporal changes in preferences, posing serious challenges to proper alignment, especially in high-stakes applications of AI, e.g., in healthcare domains, where misalignment can jeopardize the trustworthiness of the system and yield serious individual and societal harms. This work investigates the extent to which people's moral preferences change over time, and the impact of such changes on AI alignment. Our study is grounded in the kidney allocation domain, where we elicit responses to pairwise comparisons of hypothetical kidney transplant patients from over 400 participants across 3-5 sessions. We find that, on average, participants change their response to the same scenario presented at different times around 6-20% of the time (exhibiting "response instability"). Additionally, we observe significant shifts in several participants' retrofitted decision-making models over time (capturing "model instability"). The predictive performance of simple AI models decreases as a function of both response and model instability. Moreover, predictive performance diminishes over time, highlighting the importance of accounting for temporal changes in preferences during training. These findings raise fundamental normative and technical challenges relevant to AI alignment, highlighting the need to better understand the object of alignment (what to align to) when user preferences change significantly over time.

Megan Li, Wendy Bickersteth, Ningjing Tang et al.

Due to its general-purpose nature, Generative AI is applied in an ever-growing set of domains and tasks, leading to an expanding set of risks of harm impacting people, communities, society, and the environment. These risks may arise due to failures during the design and development of the technology, as well as during its release, deployment, or downstream usages and appropriations of its outputs. In this paper, building on prior taxonomies of AI risks, harms, and failures, we construct a taxonomy specifically for Generative AI failures and map them to the harms they precipitate. Through a systematic analysis of 499 publicly reported incidents, we describe what harms are reported, how they arose, and who they impact. We report the prevalence of each type of harm, underlying failure mode, and harmed stakeholder, as well as their common co-occurrences. We find that most reported incidents are caused by use-related issues but bring harm to parties beyond the end user(s) of the Generative AI system at fault, and that the landscape of Generative AI harms is distinct from that of traditional AI. Our work offers actionable insights to policymakers, developers, and Generative AI users. In particular, we call for the prioritization of non-technical risk and harm mitigation strategies, including public disclosures and education and careful regulatory stances.

Mateo Dulce Rubio, Siqi Zeng, Qi Wang et al.

Landmines remain a threat to war-affected communities for years after conflicts have ended, partly due to the laborious nature of demining tasks. Humanitarian demining operations begin by collecting relevant information from the sites to be cleared, which is then analyzed by human experts to determine the potential risk of remaining landmines. In this paper, we propose RELand system to support these tasks, which consists of three major components. We (1) provide general feature engineering and label assigning guidelines to enhance datasets for landmine risk modeling, which are widely applicable to global demining routines, (2) formulate landmine presence as a classification problem and design a novel interpretable model based on sparse feature masking and invariant risk minimization, and run extensive evaluation under proper protocols that resemble real-world demining operations to show a significant improvement over the state-of-the-art, and (3) build an interactive web interface to suggest priority areas for demining organizations. We are currently collaborating with a humanitarian demining NGO in Colombia that is using our system as part of their field operations in two areas recently prioritized for demining.

Nari Johnson, Hoda Heidari

Artificial Intelligence Impact Assessments ("AIIAs"), a family of tools that provide structured processes to imagine the possible impacts of a proposed AI system, have become an increasingly popular proposal to govern AI systems. Recent efforts from government or private-sector organizations have proposed many diverse instantiations of AIIAs, which take a variety of forms ranging from open-ended questionnaires to graded score-cards. However, to date that has been limited evaluation of existing AIIA instruments. We conduct a classroom study (N = 38) at a large research-intensive university (R1) in an elective course focused on the societal and ethical implications of AI. We assign students to different organizational roles (for example, an ML scientist or product manager) and ask participant teams to complete one of three existing AI impact assessments for one of two imagined generative AI systems. In our thematic analysis of participants' responses to pre- and post-activity questionnaires, we find preliminary evidence that impact assessments can influence participants' perceptions of the potential risks of generative AI systems, and the level of responsibility held by AI experts in addressing potential harm. We also discover a consistent set of limitations shared by several existing AIIA instruments, which we group into concerns about their format and content, as well as the feasibility and effectiveness of the activity in foreseeing and mitigating potential harms. Drawing on the findings of this study, we provide recommendations for future work on developing and validating AIIAs.

Michael Feffer, Anusha Sinha, Wesley Hanwen Deng et al.

In response to rising concerns surrounding the safety, security, and trustworthiness of Generative AI (GenAI) models, practitioners and regulators alike have pointed to AI red-teaming as a key component of their strategies for identifying and mitigating these risks. However, despite AI red-teaming's central role in policy discussions and corporate messaging, significant questions remain about what precisely it means, what role it can play in regulation, and how it relates to conventional red-teaming practices as originally conceived in the field of cybersecurity. In this work, we identify recent cases of red-teaming activities in the AI industry and conduct an extensive survey of relevant research literature to characterize the scope, structure, and criteria for AI red-teaming practices. Our analysis reveals that prior methods and practices of AI red-teaming diverge along several axes, including the purpose of the activity (which is often vague), the artifact under evaluation, the setting in which the activity is conducted (e.g., actors, resources, and methods), and the resulting decisions it informs (e.g., reporting, disclosure, and mitigation). In light of our findings, we argue that while red-teaming may be a valuable big-tent idea for characterizing GenAI harm mitigations, and that industry may effectively apply red-teaming and other strategies behind closed doors to safeguard AI, gestures towards red-teaming (based on public definitions) as a panacea for every possible risk verge on security theater. To move toward a more robust toolbox of evaluations for generative AI, we synthesize our recommendations into a question bank meant to guide and scaffold future AI red-teaming practices.

Benjamin Laufer, Jon Kleinberg, Hoda Heidari

Recent policy proposals aim to improve the safety of general-purpose AI, but there is little understanding of the efficacy of different regulatory approaches to AI safety. We present a strategic model that explores the interactions between safety regulation, the general-purpose AI creators, and domain specialists--those who adapt the technology for specific applications. Our analysis examines how different regulatory measures, targeting different parts of the AI development chain, affect the outcome of this game. In particular, we assume AI technology is characterized by two key attributes: safety and performance. The regulator first sets a minimum safety standard that applies to one or both players, with strict penalties for non-compliance. The general-purpose creator then invests in the technology, establishing its initial safety and performance levels. Next, domain specialists refine the AI for their specific use cases, updating the safety and performance levels and taking the product to market. The resulting revenue is then distributed between the specialist and generalist through a revenue-sharing parameter. Our analysis reveals two key insights: First, weak safety regulation imposed predominantly on domain specialists can backfire. While it might seem logical to regulate AI use cases, our analysis shows that weak regulations targeting domain specialists alone can unintentionally reduce safety. This effect persists across a wide range of settings. Second, in sharp contrast to the previous finding, we observe that stronger, well-placed regulation can in fact mutually benefit all players subjected to it. When regulators impose appropriate safety standards on both general-purpose AI creators and domain specialists, the regulation functions as a commitment device, leading to safety and performance gains, surpassing what is achieved under no regulation or regulating one player alone.

Sophie Greenwood, Karen Levy, Solon Barocas et al.

As AI technologies improve, people are increasingly willing to delegate tasks to AI agents. In many cases, the human decision-maker chooses whether to delegate to an AI agent based on properties of the specific instance of the decision-making problem they are facing. Since humans typically lack full awareness of all the factors relevant to this choice for a given decision-making instance, they perform a kind of categorization by treating indistinguishable instances -- those that have the same observable features -- as the same. In this paper, we define the problem of designing the optimal algorithmic delegate in the presence of categories. This is an important dimension in the design of algorithms to work with humans, since we show that the optimal delegate can be an arbitrarily better teammate than the optimal standalone algorithmic agent. The solution to this optimal delegation problem is not obvious: we discover that this problem is fundamentally combinatorial, and illustrate the complex relationship between the optimal design and the properties of the decision-making task even in simple settings. Indeed, we show that finding the optimal delegate is computationally hard in general. However, we are able to find efficient algorithms for producing the optimal delegate in several broad cases of the problem, including when the optimal action may be decomposed into functions of features observed by the human and the algorithm. Finally, we run computational experiments to simulate a designer updating an algorithmic delegate over time to be optimized for when it is actually adopted by users, and show that while this process does not recover the optimal delegate in general, the resulting delegate often performs quite well.

Vijay Keswani, Vincent Conitzer, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong et al.

A growing body of work in Ethical AI attempts to capture human moral judgments through simple computational models. The key question we address in this work is whether such simple AI models capture {the critical} nuances of moral decision-making by focusing on the use case of kidney allocation. We conducted twenty interviews where participants explained their rationale for their judgments about who should receive a kidney. We observe participants: (a) value patients' morally-relevant attributes to different degrees; (b) use diverse decision-making processes, citing heuristics to reduce decision complexity; (c) can change their opinions; (d) sometimes lack confidence in their decisions (e.g., due to incomplete information); and (e) express enthusiasm and concern regarding AI assisting humans in kidney allocation decisions. Based on these findings, we discuss challenges of computationally modeling moral judgments {as a stand-in for human input}, highlight drawbacks of current approaches, and suggest future directions to address these issues.

Nari Johnson, Elise Silva, Harrison Leon et al.

Most AI tools adopted by governments are not developed internally, but instead are acquired from third-party vendors in a process called public procurement. In this paper, we conduct the first empirical study of how United States cities' procurement practices shape critical decisions surrounding public sector AI. We conduct semi-structured interviews with 19 city employees who oversee AI procurement across 7 U.S. cities. We found that cities' legacy procurement practices, which are shaped by decades-old laws and norms, establish infrastructure that determines which AI is purchased, and which actors hold decision-making power over procured AI. We characterize the emerging actions cities have taken to adapt their purchasing practices to address algorithmic harms. From employees' reflections on real-world AI procurements, we identify three key challenges that motivate but are not fully addressed by existing AI procurement reform initiatives. Based on these findings, we discuss implications and opportunities for the FAccT community to support cities in foreseeing and preventing AI harms throughout the public procurement processes.

Anusha Sinha, Keltin Grimes, James Lucassen et al.

A red team simulates adversary attacks to help defenders find effective strategies to defend their systems in a real-world operational setting. As more enterprise systems adopt AI, red-teaming will need to evolve to address the unique vulnerabilities and risks posed by AI systems. We take the position that AI systems can be more effectively red-teamed if AI red-teaming is recognized as a domain-specific evolution of cyber red-teaming. Specifically, we argue that existing Cyber Red Teams who adopt this framing will be able to better evaluate systems with AI components by recognizing that AI poses new risks, has new failure modes to exploit, and often contains unpatchable bugs that re-prioritize disclosure and mitigation strategies. Similarly, adopting a cybersecurity framing will allow existing AI Red Teams to leverage a well-tested structure to emulate realistic adversaries, promote mutual accountability with formal rules of engagement, and provide a pattern to mature the tooling necessary for repeatable, scalable engagements. In these ways, the merging of AI and Cyber Red Teams will create a robust security ecosystem and best position the community to adapt to the rapidly changing threat landscape.

Michael Feffer, Hoda Heidari, Zachary C. Lipton

With Artificial Intelligence systems increasingly applied in consequential domains, researchers have begun to ask how these systems ought to act in ethically charged situations where even humans lack consensus. In the Moral Machine project, researchers crowdsourced answers to "Trolley Problems" concerning autonomous vehicles. Subsequently, Noothigattu et al. (2018) proposed inferring linear functions that approximate each individual's preferences and aggregating these linear models by averaging parameters across the population. In this paper, we examine this averaging mechanism, focusing on fairness concerns in the presence of strategic effects. We investigate a simple setting where the population consists of two groups, with the minority constituting an α < 0.5 share of the population. To simplify the analysis, we consider the extreme case in which within-group preferences are homogeneous. Focusing on the fraction of contested cases where the minority group prevails, we make the following observations: (a) even when all parties report their preferences truthfully, the fraction of disputes where the minority prevails is less than proportionate in α; (b) the degree of sub-proportionality grows more severe as the level of disagreement between the groups increases; (c) when parties report preferences strategically, pure strategy equilibria do not always exist; and (d) whenever a pure strategy equilibrium exists, the majority group prevails 100% of the time. These findings raise concerns about stability and fairness of preference vector averaging as a mechanism for aggregating diverging voices. Finally, we discuss alternatives, including randomized dictatorship and median-based mechanisms.

Keegan Harris, Daniel Ngo, Logan Stapleton et al.

In settings where Machine Learning (ML) algorithms automate or inform consequential decisions about people, individual decision subjects are often incentivized to strategically modify their observable attributes to receive more favorable predictions. As a result, the distribution the assessment rule is trained on may differ from the one it operates on in deployment. While such distribution shifts, in general, can hinder accurate predictions, our work identifies a unique opportunity associated with shifts due to strategic responses: We show that we can use strategic responses effectively to recover causal relationships between the observable features and outcomes we wish to predict, even under the presence of unobserved confounding variables. Specifically, our work establishes a novel connection between strategic responses to ML models and instrumental variable (IV) regression by observing that the sequence of deployed models can be viewed as an instrument that affects agents' observable features but does not directly influence their outcomes. We show that our causal recovery method can be utilized to improve decision-making across several important criteria: individual fairness, agent outcomes, and predictive risk. In particular, we show that if decision subjects differ in their ability to modify non-causal attributes, any decision rule deviating from the causal coefficients can lead to (potentially unbounded) individual-level unfairness.

Keegan Harris, Hoda Heidari, Zhiwei Steven Wu

Automated decision-making tools increasingly assess individuals to determine if they qualify for high-stakes opportunities. A recent line of research investigates how strategic agents may respond to such scoring tools to receive favorable assessments. While prior work has focused on the short-term strategic interactions between a decision-making institution (modeled as a principal) and individual decision-subjects (modeled as agents), we investigate interactions spanning multiple time-steps. In particular, we consider settings in which the agent's effort investment today can accumulate over time in the form of an internal state - impacting both his future rewards and that of the principal. We characterize the Stackelberg equilibrium of the resulting game and provide novel algorithms for computing it. Our analysis reveals several intriguing insights about the role of multiple interactions in shaping the game's outcome: First, we establish that in our stateful setting, the class of all linear assessment policies remains as powerful as the larger class of all monotonic assessment policies. While recovering the principal's optimal policy requires solving a non-convex optimization problem, we provide polynomial-time algorithms for recovering both the principal and agent's optimal policies under common assumptions about the process by which effort investments convert to observable features. Most importantly, we show that with multiple rounds of interaction at her disposal, the principal is more effective at incentivizing the agent to accumulate effort in her desired direction. Our work addresses several critical gaps in the growing literature on the societal impacts of automated decision-making - by focusing on longer time horizons and accounting for the compounding nature of decisions individuals receive over time.

David Lindner, Hoda Heidari, Andreas Krause

Machine Learning (ML) increasingly informs the allocation of opportunities to individuals and communities in areas such as lending, education, employment, and beyond. Such decisions often impact their subjects' future characteristics and capabilities in an a priori unknown fashion. The decision-maker, therefore, faces exploration-exploitation dilemmas akin to those in multi-armed bandits. Following prior work, we model communities as arms. To capture the long-term effects of ML-based allocation decisions, we study a setting in which the reward from each arm evolves every time the decision-maker pulls that arm. We focus on reward functions that are initially increasing in the number of pulls but may become (and remain) decreasing after a certain point. We argue that an acceptable sequential allocation of opportunities must take an arm's potential for growth into account. We capture these considerations through the notion of policy regret, a much stronger notion than the often-studied external regret, and present an algorithm with provably sub-linear policy regret for sufficiently long time horizons. We empirically compare our algorithm with several baselines and find that it consistently outperforms them, in particular for long time horizons.

Hoda Heidari, Vedant Nanda, Krishna P. Gummadi

Most existing notions of algorithmic fairness are one-shot: they ensure some form of allocative equality at the time of decision making, but do not account for the adverse impact of the algorithmic decisions today on the long-term welfare and prosperity of certain segments of the population. We take a broader perspective on algorithmic fairness. We propose an effort-based measure of fairness and present a data-driven framework for characterizing the long-term impact of algorithmic policies on reshaping the underlying population. Motivated by the psychological literature on \emph{social learning} and the economic literature on equality of opportunity, we propose a micro-scale model of how individuals may respond to decision-making algorithms. We employ existing measures of segregation from sociology and economics to quantify the resulting macro-scale population-level change. Importantly, we observe that different models may shift the group-conditional distribution of qualifications in different directions. Our findings raise a number of important questions regarding the formalization of fairness for decision-making models.

Till Speicher, Hoda Heidari, Nina Grgic-Hlaca et al.

Discrimination via algorithmic decision making has received considerable attention. Prior work largely focuses on defining conditions for fairness, but does not define satisfactory measures of algorithmic unfairness. In this paper, we focus on the following question: Given two unfair algorithms, how should we determine which of the two is more unfair? Our core idea is to use existing inequality indices from economics to measure how unequally the outcomes of an algorithm benefit different individuals or groups in a population. Our work offers a justified and general framework to compare and contrast the (un)fairness of algorithmic predictors. This unifying approach enables us to quantify unfairness both at the individual and the group level. Further, our work reveals overlooked tradeoffs between different fairness notions: using our proposed measures, the overall individual-level unfairness of an algorithm can be decomposed into a between-group and a within-group component. Earlier methods are typically designed to tackle only between-group unfairness, which may be justified for legal or other reasons. However, we demonstrate that minimizing exclusively the between-group component may, in fact, increase the within-group, and hence the overall unfairness. We characterize and illustrate the tradeoffs between our measures of (un)fairness and the prediction accuracy.

Hoda Heidari, Claudio Ferrari, Krishna P. Gummadi et al.

We draw attention to an important, yet largely overlooked aspect of evaluating fairness for automated decision making systems---namely risk and welfare considerations. Our proposed family of measures corresponds to the long-established formulations of cardinal social welfare in economics, and is justified by the Rawlsian conception of fairness behind a veil of ignorance. The convex formulation of our welfare-based measures of fairness allows us to integrate them as a constraint into any convex loss minimization pipeline. Our empirical analysis reveals interesting trade-offs between our proposal and (a) prediction accuracy, (b) group discrimination, and (c) Dwork et al.'s notion of individual fairness. Furthermore and perhaps most importantly, our work provides both heuristic justification and empirical evidence suggesting that a lower-bound on our measures often leads to bounded inequality in algorithmic outcomes; hence presenting the first computationally feasible mechanism for bounding individual-level inequality.

Richard Berk, Hoda Heidari, Shahin Jabbari et al.

We introduce a flexible family of fairness regularizers for (linear and logistic) regression problems. These regularizers all enjoy convexity, permitting fast optimization, and they span the rang from notions of group fairness to strong individual fairness. By varying the weight on the fairness regularizer, we can compute the efficient frontier of the accuracy-fairness trade-off on any given dataset, and we measure the severity of this trade-off via a numerical quantity we call the Price of Fairness (PoF). The centerpiece of our results is an extensive comparative study of the PoF across six different datasets in which fairness is a primary consideration.

Richard A. Berk, Hoda Heidari, Shahin Jabbari et al.

Objectives: Discussions of fairness in criminal justice risk assessments typically lack conceptual precision. Rhetoric too often substitutes for careful analysis. In this paper, we seek to clarify the tradeoffs between different kinds of fairness and between fairness and accuracy. Methods: We draw on the existing literatures in criminology, computer science and statistics to provide an integrated examination of fairness and accuracy in criminal justice risk assessments. We also provide an empirical illustration using data from arraignments. Results: We show that there are at least six kinds of fairness, some of which are incompatible with one another and with accuracy. Conclusions: Except in trivial cases, it is impossible to maximize accuracy and fairness at the same time, and impossible simultaneously to satisfy all kinds of fairness. In practice, a major complication is different base rates across different legally protected groups. There is a need to consider challenging tradeoffs.