Andreea Minca

Peihan Huo, Oscar Peralta, Junyu Guo et al.

The Mean-Field approximation is a tractable approach for studying large population dynamics. However, its assumption on homogeneity and universal connections among all agents limits its applicability in many real-world scenarios. Multi-Population Mean-Field Game (MP-MFG) models have been introduced in the literature to address these limitations. When the underlying Stochastic Block Model is known, we show that a Policy Mirror Ascent algorithm finds the MP-MFG Nash Equilibrium. In more realistic scenarios where the block model is unknown, we propose a re-sampling scheme from a graphon integrated with the finite N-player MP-MFG model. We develop a novel learning framework based on a Graphon Game with Re-Sampling (GGR-S) model, which captures the complex network structures of agents' connections. We analyze GGR-S dynamics and establish the convergence to dynamics of MP-MFG. Leveraging this result, we propose an efficient sample-based N-player Reinforcement Learning algorithm for GGR-S without population manipulation, and provide a rigorous convergence analysis with finite sample guarantee.

Lucy Huo, Ariah Klages-Mundt, Andreea Minca et al.

We model incentive security in non-custodial stablecoins and derive conditions for participation in a stablecoin system across risk absorbers (vaults/CDPs) and holders of governance tokens. We apply option pricing theory to derive closed form solutions to the stakeholders' problems, and to value their positions within the capital structure of the stablecoin. We derive the optimal interest rate that is incentive compatible, as well as conditions for the existence of equilibria without governance attacks, and discuss implications for designing secure protocols.

Qiaomin Xie, Zhuoran Yang, Zhaoran Wang et al.

We propose a reinforcement learning algorithm for stationary mean-field games, where the goal is to learn a pair of mean-field state and stationary policy that constitutes the Nash equilibrium. When viewing the mean-field state and the policy as two players, we propose a fictitious play algorithm which alternatively updates the mean-field state and the policy via gradient-descent and proximal policy optimization, respectively. Our algorithm is in stark contrast with previous literature which solves each single-agent reinforcement learning problem induced by the iterates mean-field states to the optimum. Furthermore, we prove that our fictitious play algorithm converges to the Nash equilibrium at a sublinear rate. To the best of our knowledge, this seems the first provably convergent single-loop reinforcement learning algorithm for mean-field games based on iterative updates of both mean-field state and policy.

Ariah Klages-Mundt, Dominik Harz, Lewis Gudgeon et al.

Stablecoins are one of the most widely capitalized type of cryptocurrency. However, their risks vary significantly according to their design and are often poorly understood. We seek to provide a sound foundation for stablecoin theory, with a risk-based functional characterization of the economic structure of stablecoins. First, we match existing economic models to the disparate set of custodial systems. Next, we characterize the unique risks that emerge in non-custodial stablecoins and develop a model framework that unifies existing models from economics and computer science. We further discuss how this modeling framework is applicable to a wide array of cryptoeconomic systems, including cross-chain protocols, collateralized lending, and decentralized exchanges. These unique risks yield unanswered research questions that will form the crux of research in decentralized finance going forward.

Ariah Klages-Mundt, Andreea Minca

The `Black Thursday' crisis in cryptocurrency markets demonstrated deleveraging risks in over-collateralized non-custodial stablecoins. We develop a stochastic model that helps explain deleveraging crises in these over-collateralized systems. In our model, the stablecoin supply is decided by speculators who optimize the profitability of a leveraged position while incorporating the forward-looking cost of collateral liquidations, which involves the endogenous price of the stablecoin. We formally characterize regimes that are interpreted as stable and unstable for the stablecoin. We prove bounds on quadratic variation and the probability of large deviations in the stable domain and we demonstrate distinctly greater price variance in the unstable domain. We identify a deflationary deleveraging spiral by means of a submartingale. These deleveraging spirals, which resemble short squeezes, lead to faster collateral drawdown (and potential shortfalls) and are accompanied by higher price variance, as experienced on Black Thursday. We conclude by discussing non-custodial ways in which the issues raised in this paper can be mitigated.

Xin Qian, Yudong Chen, Andreea Minca

For the degree corrected stochastic block model in the presence of arbitrary or even adversarial outliers, we develop a convex-optimization-based clustering algorithm that includes a penalization term depending on the positive deviation of a node from the expected number of edges to other inliers. We prove that under mild conditions, this method achieves exact recovery of the underlying clusters. Our synthetic experiments show that our algorithm performs well on heterogeneous networks, and in particular those with Pareto degree distributions, for which outliers have a broad range of possible degrees that may enhance their adversarial power. We also demonstrate that our method allows for recovery with significantly lower error rates compared to existing algorithms.

Ariah Klages-Mundt, Andreea Minca

We develop a model of stable assets, including non-custodial stablecoins backed by cryptocurrencies. Such stablecoins are popular methods for bootstrapping price stability within public blockchain settings. We derive fundamental results about dynamics and liquidity in stablecoin markets, demonstrate that these markets face deleveraging feedback effects that cause illiquidity during crises and exacerbate collateral drawdown, and characterize stable dynamics of the system under particular conditions. The possibility of such `deleveraging spirals' was first predicted in the initial release of our paper in 2019 and later directly observed during the `Black Thursday' crisis in Dai in 2020. From these insights, we suggest design improvements that aim to improve long-term stability. We also introduce new attacks that exploit arbitrage-like opportunities around stablecoin liquidations. Using our model, we demonstrate that these can be profitable. These attacks may induce volatility in the `stable' asset and cause perverse incentives for miners, posing risks to blockchain consensus. A variant of such attacks also later occurred during Black Thursday, taking the form of mempool manipulation to clear Dai liquidation auctions at near zero prices, costing $8m.