Max Langenkamp

Richard Moulange, Max Langenkamp, Tessa Alexanian et al.

Recent advancements in generative machine learning have enabled rapid progress in biological design tools (BDTs) such as protein structure and sequence prediction models. The unprecedented predictive accuracy and novel design capabilities of BDTs present new and significant dual-use risks. For example, their predictive accuracy allows biological agents, whether vaccines or pathogens, to be developed more quickly, while the design capabilities could be used to discover drugs or evade DNA screening techniques. Similar to other dual-use AI systems, BDTs present a wicked problem: how can regulators uphold public safety without stifling innovation? We highlight how current regulatory proposals that are primarily tailored toward large language models may be less effective for BDTs, which require fewer computational resources to train and are often developed in an open-source manner. We propose a range of measures to mitigate the risk that BDTs are misused, across the areas of responsible development, risk assessment, transparency, access management, cybersecurity, and investing in resilience. Implementing such measures will require close coordination between developers and governments.

Max Langenkamp, Allan Costa, Chris Cheung

Widespread developments in automation have reduced the need for human input. However, despite the increased power of machine learning, in many contexts these programs make decisions that are problematic. Biases within data and opaque models have amplified human prejudices, giving rise to such tools as Amazon's (now defunct) experimental hiring algorithm, which was found to consistently downgrade resumes when the word "women's" was added before an activity. This article critically surveys the existing legal and technological landscape surrounding algorithmic hiring. We argue that the negative impact of hiring algorithms can be mitigated by greater transparency from the employers to the public, which would enable civil advocate groups to hold employers accountable, as well as allow the U.S. Department of Justice to litigate. Our main contribution is a framework for automated hiring transparency, algorithmic transparency reports, which employers using automated hiring software would be required to publish by law. We also explain how existing regulations in employment and trade secret law can be extended by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and Congress to accommodate these reports.